37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1333277 |
Time | |
Date | 201602 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Dawn |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B747-800 Advanced |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Main Gear Tire |
Person 1 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | Captain Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical |
Narrative:
Aircraft taxied normal to the runway. The takeoff roll was normal and the rudder inputs I made to maintain centerline did not feel abnormal to me.during the takeoff roll we did get EICAS messages; however; I did not see them. It was later agreed that the relief pilot as well as the captain (pm) momentarily viewed a 'tire pressure' EICAS before it cleared. The estimated speed when the 'tire pressure' message appeared was about 150 knots. We continued to accelerate down the runway and performed the normal takeoff profile and duties. After the gear was up and we passed through 400 feet; EICAS 'brake limiter' and 'antiskid' were displayed.we continued the departure and after passing 10;000 feet we ran the non-normal electronic checklist (ecl) for 'brake limiter' as well as 'antiskid'. After the checklists were completed we began to further investigate the issue. We pulled up the gear page on the lower EICAS and could see that there were multiple 'limiter' indications; at least one on each main gear. The left body gear had three 'antiskid' indications as well as two 'limiter' indications. The left body gear also had no tire pressure or brake temperature indications for all four tires. There were also associated status messages 'gear monitor'; 'tire pressure system'; 'brake temperature system'; 'brake limiter' and 'antiskid'.the crew agreed that continuing to our filed destination would most likely not be in the best interest of the operation. We began to coordinate with the departure controllers advising them of our situation; the captain used the satcom to contact dispatch and maintenance. As the situation was being discussed on satcom with the company; ATC informed us that ground operations located debris on the runway.eventually the joint decision was made to return to [departure airport]. We turned back and coordinated with ATC to dump fuel. We initially began to dump fuel to maximum landing weight (mlw); but we received more details about the debris from ATC including metal; possible panels; and lots of tire rubber. We all agreed landing as light as possible would be better so we dumped further fuel below mlw to minimize the stress to the gear upon touchdown. Fuel on board (fob) at the commencement of dumping was approximately 100.0 kgs; we selected 25.0 kgs as the fuel to remain.captain completed all the company coordination and ATC coordination. The approach was briefed; we switched pilot flying (PF) and pilot monitoring (pm) duties and the captain conducted a normal landing on the runway; the longest runway and the same one we used for departure.in the event that we needed to evacuate we would not have been able to look up in operations manual the location of the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker; as per the normal shutdown checklist. Putting the location of the circuit breakers on the laminated or ecl checklist would be very helpful in the event we had to make an unplanned evacuation. I.e.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A B747-8 air carrier crew reported that a tire failed during takeoff presenting BRAKE LIMITER and ANTISKID EICAS messages. The takeoff was continued; but the flight returned to land after the departure airport found aircraft debris on the runway.
Narrative: Aircraft taxied normal to the runway. The takeoff roll was normal and the rudder inputs I made to maintain centerline did not feel abnormal to me.During the takeoff roll we did get EICAS messages; however; I did not see them. It was later agreed that the Relief Pilot as well as the Captain (PM) momentarily viewed a 'TIRE PRESSURE' EICAS before it cleared. The estimated speed when the 'TIRE PRESSURE' message appeared was about 150 knots. We continued to accelerate down the runway and performed the normal takeoff profile and duties. After the gear was up and we passed through 400 feet; EICAS 'BRAKE LIMITER' and 'ANTISKID' were displayed.We continued the departure and after passing 10;000 feet we ran the non-normal Electronic Checklist (ECL) for 'BRAKE LIMITER' as well as 'ANTISKID'. After the Checklists were completed we began to further investigate the issue. We pulled up the gear page on the lower EICAS and could see that there were multiple 'LIMITER' indications; at least one on each main gear. The left body gear had three 'ANTISKID' indications as well as two 'LIMITER' indications. The left body gear also had no tire pressure or brake temperature indications for all four tires. There were also associated STATUS messages 'GEAR MONITOR'; 'TIRE PRESSURE SYSTEM'; 'BRAKE TEMPERATURE SYSTEM'; 'BRAKE LIMITER' and 'ANTISKID'.The crew agreed that continuing to our filed destination would most likely not be in the best interest of the operation. We began to coordinate with the Departure Controllers advising them of our situation; the Captain used the SATCOM to contact dispatch and maintenance. As the situation was being discussed on SATCOM with the company; ATC informed us that ground operations located debris on the runway.Eventually the joint decision was made to return to [departure airport]. We turned back and coordinated with ATC to dump fuel. We initially began to dump fuel to Maximum Landing Weight (MLW); but we received more details about the debris from ATC including metal; possible panels; and lots of tire rubber. We all agreed landing as light as possible would be better so we dumped further fuel below MLW to minimize the stress to the gear upon touchdown. Fuel on Board (FOB) at the commencement of dumping was approximately 100.0 KGS; we selected 25.0 KGS as the fuel to remain.Captain completed all the company coordination and ATC coordination. The approach was briefed; we switched Pilot Flying (PF) and Pilot Monitoring (PM) duties and the Captain conducted a normal landing on the runway; the longest runway and the same one we used for departure.In the event that we needed to evacuate we would not have been able to look up in Operations Manual the location of the cockpit voice recorder circuit breaker; as per the normal shutdown checklist. Putting the location of the circuit breakers on the laminated or ECL checklist would be very helpful in the event we had to make an unplanned evacuation. i.e.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.