Narrative:

Aircraft X departed from within my airspace. Aircraft was climbing east. As the aircraft approached a boundary I handed aircraft off to adjacent sector. Climbing southbound in [ZZZ] airspace was aircraft Y. Both aircraft were climbing at similar rates and were at approximately the same altitudes. They displayed the data block for aircraft Y on my scope but did not call for a point out or to reference my traffic climbing into their airspace.[ZZZ] area does not use interim altitudes; so I had no idea if they were keeping their traffic climbing; or stopping aircraft Y's climb so aircraft X could climb above. Being that they were taking no action; and the confliction was going to occur in their airspace; I took evasive maneuvers and stopped aircraft X at FL190. Soon after; the [ZZZ] controller called and spoke to me and asked why I hadn't stopped my aircraft sooner since they had 'put theirs on my scope.' I advised them that they had taken no action; and they should have been expediting the climb of aircraft Y; as they had given me no instruction or advised me to stop or continue the climb with aircraft X. I told them I would turn my aircraft 20 degrees left to pass behind aircraft Y; who; although they never told me; and did not indicate in the data block; had been stopped at 18;000 feet; which was unusable at the time. I issued 20 degrees left to aircraft X; who began the turn. Immediately after issuing the control instruction; the [ZZZ] area called and told me to put aircraft X on a heading of 180 degrees. Aircraft X who had almost completed the 20 degree left turn then had to turn right to heading 180. This ensured that the aircraft were a dead tie. Aircraft X turned right and ended up with no lateral separation between aircraft Y; with aircraft Y at an unusable altitude of 18;000 feet and aircraft X at 19;000 feet. This is at least the second time in as many weeks the same controller in the south area has made an incredibly unsafe and frankly; illogical control instruction causing two aircraft to become uncomfortably close. The control area should be required to use interim altitudes in the data block. Also; the controller in the area needs remedial training. Also; that controller should be retrained on giving point outs and whose responsibility it is to resolve conflicts in their airspace; especially since no coordination had been accomplished. In my opinion; the controller is unsafe and management needs to take action to correct their behavior.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Controller receiving a handoff from a sector did not take appropriate action to issue control instructions for that aircraft in order to avoid other enroute traffic.

Narrative: Aircraft X departed from within my airspace. Aircraft was climbing east. As the aircraft approached a boundary I handed aircraft off to adjacent sector. Climbing southbound in [ZZZ] airspace was Aircraft Y. Both aircraft were climbing at similar rates and were at approximately the same altitudes. They displayed the data block for Aircraft Y on my scope but did NOT call for a point out or to reference my traffic climbing into their airspace.[ZZZ] area does not use interim altitudes; so I had NO idea if they were keeping their traffic climbing; or stopping Aircraft Y's climb so Aircraft X could climb above. Being that they were taking NO action; and the confliction was going to occur in their airspace; I took evasive maneuvers and stopped Aircraft X at FL190. Soon after; the [ZZZ] controller called and spoke to me and asked why I hadn't stopped my aircraft sooner since they had 'put theirs on my scope.' I advised them that they had taken no action; and they should have been expediting the climb of Aircraft Y; as they had given me NO instruction or advised me to stop or continue the climb with Aircraft X. I told them I would turn my aircraft 20 degrees left to pass behind Aircraft Y; who; although they NEVER told me; and did not indicate in the data block; had been stopped at 18;000 feet; which was UNUSABLE at the time. I issued 20 degrees left to Aircraft X; who began the turn. Immediately after issuing the control instruction; the [ZZZ] area called and told me to put Aircraft X on a heading of 180 degrees. Aircraft X who had almost completed the 20 degree left turn then had to turn right to heading 180. This ensured that the aircraft were a dead tie. Aircraft X turned right and ended up with no lateral separation between Aircraft Y; with Aircraft Y at an unusable altitude of 18;000 feet and Aircraft X at 19;000 feet. This is at least the second time in as many weeks the same controller in the south area has made an incredibly UNSAFE and frankly; illogical control instruction causing two aircraft to become uncomfortably close. The Control Area should be required to use interim altitudes in the data block. Also; the controller in the area NEEDS remedial training. Also; that controller should be retrained on giving point outs and whose responsibility it is to resolve conflicts in their airspace; especially since no coordination had been accomplished. In my opinion; the controller is UNSAFE and management needs to take action to correct their behavior.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.