Narrative:

We departed with very close to our ramp fuel number (i.e. Far above our takeoff fuel number). An alternate was not required; and none was on our flight plan. We were planned to land with approximately 3300lbs of fuel; a typical number for flights that do not require an alternate. Winds were out of the east; and [destination] was in a northbound operation. The final was a long one; probably 20-25 miles; with many airplanes in line to land. We experienced continuous moderate turbulence as we entered clouds and precipitation to the south of the field. As we were cleared for the approach and switched to tower; we noticed airplanes were being broken off the approach. As we listened further; we found out the winds had picked up and now exceeded the tailwind limitation of the airplane; and they were giving airplanes instructions to track the localizer; then giving them headings to put them in line for landing to an as-yet undetermined runway. At this point we were at roughly 3100lbs of fuel; and I begin thinking about a diversion. Given the deteriorating weather to our south; lack of alternate fuel; and relative distance of possible alternate airports I decided the safest option would be to continue in the pattern. I'm sure dispatch was quite busy; because they were little help in putting together a plan. They didn't give us the weather I asked for. We made a minimum fuel declaration as our fuel dropped to reserve; as several other flights were doing. We continued northbound in line to land in IMC; icing conditions and continuous moderate turbulence. At this point we were also addressing a right rev unsafe caution message per the QRH. As ATC required us to maintain 170 knots; we had no choice but to fly with the flaps extended. I was able to safely raise them to 8 degrees to minimize drag on the airplane. The first officer and I; with the helpful assistance of our jumpseater; continually evaluated our fuel situation versus our position and formulated alternatives. As our fuel dropped below reserve to less than 30 minutes remaining; I [advised ATC] for low fuel; and told ATC in the event of a go-around or missed approach that I would proceed directly to [a point] just south of the airport; and land straight-in there. We had yet another 25 mile final where we touched down. Just as we were touching down on the mains; we received a low fuel caution message. We landed with 1200lbs of fuel; barely enough for a go-around.it became obvious that we would be in a fuel-critical situation when we were broken off the approach and shuffled back into line. It took ATC several minutes to formulate a plan themselves; they could not give everyone a runway to expect immediately; or a time estimate; which caused us planning difficulty as well.a combination of factors caused this low fuel event; but I believe the overriding cause is the company's current fuel policy. Our flight plan was perfectly legal; with a very typical fuel over destination number for our landing; approximately 3300 pounds. If we depart very close to our ramp fuel number; fly our flight planned speeds with no deviations and a 'normal' approach and landing; we land remarkably close to that number. This number; however; gives us very little leeway for off-nominal situations. Other causes of this low fuel emergency were the wind shift itself; along with the airport's last-minute switch to a northbound operation and subsequent re-alignment of traffic toward the opposite direction runway. Holding us at 170 knots required us to be in a high drag situation with flaps extended. My declaration of minimum fuel; which should ostensibly protect us from any undue delay; was most likely ineffective due to the high number of [company] airplanes declaring minimum fuel; and did not serve to expedite our return.once we were told to expect to break off the approach; we began assessing our fuel situation. We had noticed deteriorating weather to the south of our position; and we were alreadyin moderate rain and turbulence. I asked for [alternate] weather and to see how the radar looked; but only got a metar. I wasn't sure I could make it straight to [the alternate] without deviating around weather; and it looked like we would be able to land back in [destination] without too much of a delay at that point. I then examined the possibility of going [somewhere else]; where I knew the weather was acceptable; but our fuel calculations showed us arriving at those airports burning into emergency fuel. I decided to stay in the pattern because I know the local area quite well; and know of several suitable general aviation airports in the area with long-enough runways in case of a dire emergency. We could have descended just a little bit and been in VMC; so I wasn't worried about an instrument approach to an unfamiliar airport. We did everything we could to minimize drag on the airplane; speeding up and raising flaps completely wasn't a viable option; because we would have had to be broken out of the line. With other airplanes in the same situation; that would not have helped anyone.I believe beyond a shadow of doubt that our current fuel policy should be critically re-examined. There is an axiom in aviation that 'what is legal is not always safe;' and it would serve us well to heed that caution. Our critical fuel situation may have been caused by an unusual combination of factors this time; but I don't believe it is unique to our specific scenario. It is an unrealistic expectation to assume a return to landing from a go-around or missed approach will be immediate; ATC will work you into the pattern where they can; but other aircraft need to land; too. Sometimes there are other complicating factors: something malfunctions late into the approach that requires a missed approach and attention from the QRH; or several airplanes have to go around due to unexpected windshear. I believe that our target fuel over destination numbers for the hubs should be revisited and revised upwards significantly. It's not always a simple case of diverting for extra fuel if we find we won't have a good margin--in our specific case that was not realistic. Additionally; I find that the assumptions used to calculate takeoff fuel are unrealistic in most scenarios without alternates; and takeoff should usually not be attempted at that number. In our specific case; we even took off close to ramp fuel. I even went above and beyond the company's usual fuel saving policies on this flight. As we pushed back from the gate and received a 30-minute wheels up delay; I elected to sit with only the APU running. We started one engine to taxi to the runway and arrive at the runway just in time to take off; and started the other one very close to our takeoff time. If I had started an engine when we pushed back from the gate; it might have changed our scenario completely; and not for the better.furthermore; there is a feeling amongst the pilot group that at least one dispatcher and/or coordinator have pushed back against pilots requesting extra fuel in special circumstances; which can discourage many pilots from requesting extra fuel when they think they might need it. I feel it is incumbent upon the company to create an atmosphere where such requests are not viewed as wasteful; but rather indicative of good judgement. Dispatchers and pilots alike should be encouraged to take the steps necessary to ensure flight safety without fear of retribution or any other deleterious action from the company.it is my honest and very real fear that if the company does not take action to revisit the fuel policy and create a positive atmosphere for pilots and dispatchers to ensure good margins for safe flights; especially when we have so many new employees coming online without much experience; then we stand the risk of losing an airplane.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 flight crew reported experiencing a low fuel state when their destination changed runway configuration due to shifting winds. The Captain was critical of company fuel policy.

Narrative: We departed with very close to our ramp fuel number (i.e. far above our takeoff fuel number). An alternate was not required; and none was on our flight plan. We were planned to land with approximately 3300lbs of fuel; a typical number for flights that do not require an alternate. Winds were out of the east; and [destination] was in a northbound operation. The final was a long one; probably 20-25 miles; with many airplanes in line to land. We experienced continuous moderate turbulence as we entered clouds and precipitation to the south of the field. As we were cleared for the approach and switched to tower; we noticed airplanes were being broken off the approach. As we listened further; we found out the winds had picked up and now exceeded the tailwind limitation of the airplane; and they were giving airplanes instructions to track the localizer; then giving them headings to put them in line for landing to an as-yet undetermined runway. At this point we were at roughly 3100lbs of fuel; and I begin thinking about a diversion. Given the deteriorating weather to our south; lack of alternate fuel; and relative distance of possible alternate airports I decided the safest option would be to continue in the pattern. I'm sure dispatch was quite busy; because they were little help in putting together a plan. They didn't give us the weather I asked for. We made a minimum fuel declaration as our fuel dropped to reserve; as several other flights were doing. We continued northbound in line to land in IMC; icing conditions and continuous moderate turbulence. At this point we were also addressing a R REV UNSAFE caution message per the QRH. As ATC required us to maintain 170 knots; we had no choice but to fly with the flaps extended. I was able to safely raise them to 8 degrees to minimize drag on the airplane. The First Officer and I; with the helpful assistance of our jumpseater; continually evaluated our fuel situation versus our position and formulated alternatives. As our fuel dropped below reserve to less than 30 minutes remaining; I [advised ATC] for low fuel; and told ATC in the event of a go-around or missed approach that I would proceed directly to [a point] just south of the airport; and land straight-in there. We had yet another 25 mile final where we touched down. Just as we were touching down on the mains; we received a LOW FUEL caution message. We landed with 1200lbs of fuel; barely enough for a go-around.It became obvious that we would be in a fuel-critical situation when we were broken off the approach and shuffled back into line. It took ATC several minutes to formulate a plan themselves; they could not give everyone a runway to expect immediately; or a time estimate; which caused us planning difficulty as well.A combination of factors caused this low fuel event; but I believe the overriding cause is the company's current fuel policy. Our flight plan was perfectly legal; with a very typical Fuel over Destination number for our landing; approximately 3300 pounds. If we depart very close to our Ramp Fuel number; fly our flight planned speeds with no deviations and a 'normal' approach and landing; we land remarkably close to that number. This number; however; gives us very little leeway for off-nominal situations. Other causes of this low fuel emergency were the wind shift itself; along with the airport's last-minute switch to a northbound operation and subsequent re-alignment of traffic toward the opposite direction runway. Holding us at 170 knots required us to be in a high drag situation with flaps extended. My declaration of minimum fuel; which should ostensibly protect us from any undue delay; was most likely ineffective due to the high number of [Company] airplanes declaring minimum fuel; and did not serve to expedite our return.Once we were told to expect to break off the approach; we began assessing our fuel situation. We had noticed deteriorating weather to the south of our position; and we were alreadyin moderate rain and turbulence. I asked for [alternate] weather and to see how the radar looked; but only got a METAR. I wasn't sure I could make it straight to [the alternate] without deviating around weather; and it looked like we would be able to land back in [destination] without too much of a delay at that point. I then examined the possibility of going [somewhere else]; where I knew the weather was acceptable; but our fuel calculations showed us arriving at those airports burning into emergency fuel. I decided to stay in the pattern because I know the local area quite well; and know of several suitable general aviation airports in the area with long-enough runways in case of a dire emergency. We could have descended just a little bit and been in VMC; so I wasn't worried about an instrument approach to an unfamiliar airport. We did everything we could to minimize drag on the airplane; speeding up and raising flaps completely wasn't a viable option; because we would have had to be broken out of the line. With other airplanes in the same situation; that would not have helped anyone.I believe beyond a shadow of doubt that our current fuel policy should be critically re-examined. There is an axiom in aviation that 'what is legal is not always safe;' and it would serve us well to heed that caution. Our critical fuel situation may have been caused by an unusual combination of factors this time; but I don't believe it is unique to our specific scenario. It is an unrealistic expectation to assume a return to landing from a go-around or missed approach will be immediate; ATC will work you into the pattern where they can; but other aircraft need to land; too. Sometimes there are other complicating factors: Something malfunctions late into the approach that requires a missed approach and attention from the QRH; or several airplanes have to go around due to unexpected windshear. I believe that our target Fuel over Destination numbers for the hubs should be revisited and revised upwards significantly. It's not always a simple case of diverting for extra fuel if we find we won't have a good margin--in our specific case that was not realistic. Additionally; I find that the assumptions used to calculate Takeoff Fuel are unrealistic in most scenarios without alternates; and takeoff should usually not be attempted at that number. In our specific case; we even took off close to ramp fuel. I even went above and beyond the company's usual fuel saving policies on this flight. As we pushed back from the gate and received a 30-minute wheels up delay; I elected to sit with only the APU running. We started one engine to taxi to the runway and arrive at the runway just in time to take off; and started the other one very close to our takeoff time. If I had started an engine when we pushed back from the gate; it might have changed our scenario completely; and not for the better.Furthermore; there is a feeling amongst the pilot group that at least one dispatcher and/or coordinator have pushed back against pilots requesting extra fuel in special circumstances; which can discourage many pilots from requesting extra fuel when they think they might need it. I feel it is incumbent upon the Company to create an atmosphere where such requests are not viewed as wasteful; but rather indicative of good judgement. Dispatchers and pilots alike should be encouraged to take the steps necessary to ensure flight safety without fear of retribution or any other deleterious action from the Company.It is my honest and very real fear that if the Company does not take action to revisit the fuel policy and create a positive atmosphere for pilots and dispatchers to ensure good margins for safe flights; especially when we have so many new employees coming online without much experience; then we stand the risk of losing an airplane.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.