Narrative:

On approach to ZZZ runway xxr through approximately 2000 MSL the captain noticed a nose gear air/ground status message. I continued the approach until approximately 800 AGL; at which point we received a warning EICAS configuration message along with associated flaps; spoilers and stabilizer indications (in conjunction with a local configuration light). I immediately initiated a go-around simultaneous of the captain's command and proceeded to obtain approach control vectors to remain within close proximity of the airport. The captain and I performed the appropriate QRH checklist (configuration) and agreed that the now intermittent warning was the result of an erroneous air/ground sensor. We further decided to lower the gear and configure flaps before initiating a call to dispatch/maintenance. I remained pilot flying and coordinated with ATC while the captain conferred with dispatch/maintenance. The captain also asked forward a jump seating mechanic to request any help he could offer. Once maintenance concurred that we were most likely experiencing an air/ground sensor anomaly; the captain asked to consult with the subject matter expert (sme). He was told that the sme could not be located but that they would continue to search for them. Given the now extra fuel burn consideration; we could not wait for the sme to be located and the captain and I agreed to execute an approach to landing. The dispatcher stated they would [advise ATC] but I reiterated our status to ATC; resulting in immediate priority handling for another ILS runway xxr. The captain assumed aircraft control only after accomplishing all appropriate normal checklists. As expected; the warning indications ceased at touchdown. The remainder of the flight from landing to shutdown was uneventful.as safety was not compromised the captain elected to clear the runway and continue into the ramp area. Emergency vehicles pursued the aircraft until shutdown; although no assistance was necessary. A post flight cursory inspection by a mechanic revealed the likely cause of the warning indications to be a severed rivet on a plate associated with the nose gear air/ground sensor. At no time during the events described above was safety of flight compromised; as the captain successfully utilized resources at our disposal both within and out of the flight deck. However; the inaccessibility of a subject matter expert during this emergency is unacceptable. As explained in recurrent training every year; the sme's sole purpose is precisely to assist in situations of an urgent nature. If dispatch and maintenance are available at the immediate call; then the same should hold true for the sme.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 flight crew reported experiencing a malfunctioning nose gear air/ground sensor which resulted in several configuration warning messages. After completing all troubleshooting checklists and consulting with maintenance personnel; a successful landing was accomplished.

Narrative: On approach to ZZZ Runway XXR through approximately 2000 MSL the captain noticed a nose gear air/ground status message. I continued the approach until approximately 800 AGL; at which point we received a WARNING EICAS CONFIGURATION message along with associated FLAPS; SPOILERS and STABILIZER indications (in conjunction with a local CONFIGURATION light). I immediately initiated a go-around simultaneous of the captain's command and proceeded to obtain approach control vectors to remain within close proximity of the airport. The captain and I performed the appropriate QRH checklist (CONFIGURATION) and agreed that the now intermittent warning was the result of an erroneous air/ground sensor. We further decided to lower the gear and configure flaps before initiating a call to dispatch/maintenance. I remained pilot flying and coordinated with ATC while the captain conferred with dispatch/maintenance. The captain also asked forward a jump seating mechanic to request any help he could offer. Once maintenance concurred that we were most likely experiencing an air/ground sensor anomaly; the captain asked to consult with the Subject Matter Expert (SME). He was told that the SME could not be located but that they would continue to search for them. Given the now extra fuel burn consideration; we could not wait for the SME to be located and the captain and I agreed to execute an approach to landing. The dispatcher stated they would [advise ATC] but I reiterated our status to ATC; resulting in immediate priority handling for another ILS Runway XXR. The captain assumed aircraft control only after accomplishing all appropriate normal checklists. As expected; the WARNING indications ceased at touchdown. The remainder of the flight from landing to shutdown was uneventful.As safety was not compromised the captain elected to clear the runway and continue into the ramp area. Emergency vehicles pursued the aircraft until shutdown; although no assistance was necessary. A post flight cursory inspection by a mechanic revealed the likely cause of the WARNING indications to be a severed rivet on a plate associated with the nose gear air/ground sensor. At no time during the events described above was safety of flight compromised; as the captain successfully utilized resources at our disposal both within and out of the flight deck. However; the inaccessibility of a Subject Matter Expert during this emergency is unacceptable. As explained in recurrent training every year; the SME's sole purpose is precisely to assist in situations of an urgent nature. If dispatch and maintenance are available at the immediate call; then the same should hold true for the SME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.