Narrative:

During my walk around inspection; I identified a small drip from the refueling hose and approached the fueler to show him; he was facing the inside of his truck and not paying attention to the refueling operation. Since it dripped about 1 drop every 2 seconds; he stated he would write up the discrepancy after refueling the aircraft. I did not see the drip as significant enough to ask him to stop fueling. This event was inconsequential to the fuel spill but identifies a shortfall in the fueler's procedure which should require them to watch the operation; or if that is a requirement then the fueler was not following procedures. About 10 minutes later; while sitting at my duty station before departure; the master warning light illuminated with the associated chime and an ECAM message indicated the right wing fuel tank overflow. I looked out the window briefly to verify the severity of the condition and saw a small amount of fuel venting from the right wing. The captain was at his station but was talking on the phone to dispatch about our weather routing. I tapped the captain on the shoulder and said 'we're venting fuel' and then followed the ECAM instruction; which was to select the fuel cross-feed open. I looked out the window again and the fuel continued to vent so I quickly opened the window and yelled to the fueler to stop fueling. He was facing the opposite direction from the leak and due to ground equipment noise could not hear me. The fuel then started to gush from the wing vent and the fueler still did not identify the problem. I yelled several times to the ground crew who relayed the message to the fueler who then stopped fueling. The entire event lasted less than 2 minutes. I then immediately called operations and maintenance on the company frequency and advised them we had spilled approximately 20-30 gallons of fuel below the right wing. The captain was still on the phone but after I advised him of what had happened he hung up with dispatch; we agreed that I should go out to meet maintenance and the ground crew to see the severity of the spill. The ground crew had already started spreading absorbent material from the spill cart and had confined the spill to an area with about a 40 foot radius. I met maintenance and the fire department team on the ramp and was advised by the ramp manager and the fireman in charge to remove the passengers from the aircraft. I walked back up the jet bridge and told the captain who then began the de-boarding process.the aircraft was fueled to the required amount; but the fuel page on the multi-function display showed the right wing had 13;940 pounds of fuel with the digits in amber (OM lists fuel capacity as 13;750 for the A-321 model aircraft); the left wing tank had approximately 13;750; the center tank had approximately 14;000; and there was no fuel in either act. The fuel continued to drip slowly from the wing tank which was still full. Maintenance was not certain how to transfer the fuel so I provided them my ipad with OM to follow the manual fuel transfer procedure which is conducted at the refuel panel on the ground and requires breaking the safety wires. During the procedure the maintenance team stated the wire for the guarded switch was loose or not intact; and potentially the refueler had manually fueled the aircraft. The fueler stated he used the automatic mode and it was an aircraft system malfunction. Maintenance determined the system had functioned normally and repaired the safety wire but no logbook entry was made. Fueler should directly observe the operation (including the vents) at all times. This event should be tracked along with others to identify any patterns with the airbus automatic fueling system.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 flight crew experienced an ECAM message for FUEL R WING TK OVERFLOW during fueling. The fueler is instructed to stop fueling but not before fuel is vented out the right wing vent causing a fuel spill. The right wing had been filled beyond capacity; indicating that auto shut off had not occurred.

Narrative: During my walk around inspection; I identified a small drip from the refueling hose and approached the fueler to show him; he was facing the inside of his truck and not paying attention to the refueling operation. Since it dripped about 1 drop every 2 seconds; he stated he would write up the discrepancy after refueling the aircraft. I did not see the drip as significant enough to ask him to stop fueling. This event was inconsequential to the fuel spill but identifies a shortfall in the fueler's procedure which should require them to watch the operation; or if that is a requirement then the fueler was not following procedures. About 10 minutes later; while sitting at my duty station before departure; the master warning light illuminated with the associated chime and an ECAM message indicated the right wing fuel tank overflow. I looked out the window briefly to verify the severity of the condition and saw a small amount of fuel venting from the right wing. The captain was at his station but was talking on the phone to dispatch about our weather routing. I tapped the captain on the shoulder and said 'we're venting fuel' and then followed the ECAM instruction; which was to select the fuel cross-feed open. I looked out the window again and the fuel continued to vent so I quickly opened the window and yelled to the fueler to stop fueling. He was facing the opposite direction from the leak and due to ground equipment noise could not hear me. The fuel then started to gush from the wing vent and the fueler still did not identify the problem. I yelled several times to the ground crew who relayed the message to the fueler who then stopped fueling. The entire event lasted less than 2 minutes. I then immediately called operations and maintenance on the company frequency and advised them we had spilled approximately 20-30 gallons of fuel below the right wing. The captain was still on the phone but after I advised him of what had happened he hung up with dispatch; we agreed that I should go out to meet maintenance and the ground crew to see the severity of the spill. The ground crew had already started spreading absorbent material from the spill cart and had confined the spill to an area with about a 40 foot radius. I met maintenance and the fire department team on the ramp and was advised by the ramp manager and the fireman in charge to remove the passengers from the aircraft. I walked back up the jet bridge and told the captain who then began the de-boarding process.The aircraft was fueled to the required amount; but the fuel page on the multi-function display showed the right wing had 13;940 pounds of fuel with the digits in amber (OM lists fuel capacity as 13;750 for the A-321 model aircraft); the left wing tank had approximately 13;750; the center tank had approximately 14;000; and there was no fuel in either ACT. The fuel continued to drip slowly from the wing tank which was still full. Maintenance was not certain how to transfer the fuel so I provided them my iPad with OM to follow the manual fuel transfer procedure which is conducted at the refuel panel on the ground and requires breaking the safety wires. During the procedure the maintenance team stated the wire for the guarded switch was loose or not intact; and potentially the refueler had manually fueled the aircraft. The fueler stated he used the automatic mode and it was an aircraft system malfunction. Maintenance determined the system had functioned normally and repaired the safety wire but no logbook entry was made. Fueler should directly observe the operation (including the vents) at all times. This event should be tracked along with others to identify any patterns with the airbus automatic fueling system.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.