Narrative:

I was acting as the first officer on this flight; a mx repo from las. Upon completing the weight and balance and appropriate checklists the captain began coordinating the pushback with the tug driver below. The tug driver informed us that we could not push until an escort had arrived. We waited for approximately 20 minutes for the escort to arrive. When the escort arrived she told the tug driver that we did not need an escort and drove away. I then called ramp control on 124.4 and requested push back. We were cleared to push. During the push we were pushed onto taxi way delta without clearance; holding up traffic taxing to 19L for departure; as well as causing the escort to return to speak with our tug driver. We had the tug driver pull us back into the spot while I contacted ground control to clear up the issue. Once the traffic was clear ground cleared us for push on taxiway delta. The flight continued without further incident.during my preflight I had quickly reviewed the 10-7 pages for las; however I did miss the note on 10-7A explaining that pushing out of mx spots 1-3 requires coordination with ground control. Seeing as this was my first time operating out of the mx ramp; I should have taken the time to read all of the notes on the 10-7 pages. Reading this note would have prevented the whole event from happening. Additionally; when communicating with ramp control the controller made no mention of the close proximity of taxiway delta behind us. While we did not communicate directly with the escort; only relayed messages through our tug driver; the captain and I were not aware of the escort mentioning anything about the taxiway to the tug driver. In reflecting on the chain of events leading up to the incursion; there were three missed opportunities to avoid the situation; the crews notes; ramp control and the escort. However; the overall responsibility still lies with the crew. In the future I will be more mindful of all of the 10-7 pages; especially when conducting irregular operations or operating out of unfamiliar locations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier First Officer reported not reading the 10-7A crew briefing page for LAS requiring that crews departing maintenance spots 1-3 contact Ground Control for coordination. The aircraft had to be pulled back into the spot after pushing back onto Taxiway Delta without clearance.

Narrative: I was acting as the FO on this flight; a MX repo from LAS. Upon completing the weight and balance and appropriate checklists the captain began coordinating the pushback with the tug driver below. The tug driver informed us that we could not push until an escort had arrived. We waited for approximately 20 minutes for the escort to arrive. When the escort arrived she told the tug driver that we did not need an escort and drove away. I then called ramp control on 124.4 and requested push back. We were cleared to push. During the push we were pushed onto taxi way delta without clearance; holding up traffic taxing to 19L for departure; as well as causing the escort to return to speak with our tug driver. We had the tug driver pull us back into the spot while I contacted ground control to clear up the issue. Once the traffic was clear ground cleared us for push on Taxiway Delta. The flight continued without further incident.During my preflight I had quickly reviewed the 10-7 pages for LAS; however I did miss the note on 10-7A explaining that pushing out of MX spots 1-3 requires coordination with ground control. Seeing as this was my first time operating out of the MX ramp; I should have taken the time to read all of the notes on the 10-7 pages. Reading this note would have prevented the whole event from happening. Additionally; when communicating with Ramp control the controller made no mention of the close proximity of taxiway Delta behind us. While we did not communicate directly with the escort; only relayed messages through our tug driver; the captain and I were not aware of the escort mentioning anything about the taxiway to the tug driver. In reflecting on the chain of events leading up to the incursion; there were three missed opportunities to avoid the situation; the crews notes; ramp control and the escort. However; the overall responsibility still lies with the crew. In the future I will be more mindful of ALL of the 10-7 pages; especially when conducting irregular operations or operating out of unfamiliar locations.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.