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Attributes | |
ACN | 1348581 |
Time | |
Date | 201604 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Marginal |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Robinson R44 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Engine |
Person 1 | |
Function | Instructor Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Commercial Flight Crew Rotorcraft Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Flight Instructor |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 25 Flight Crew Total 253 Flight Crew Type 232 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
I was taking a rotorcraft CFI for his initial flight in a robinson R-44II. This instructor had completed all of his time (+/- 180 hours) in the schweitzer 300. He was interested in getting familiar with robinson helicopters to expand his employment opportunities. We completed the required sfar 73 awareness training beforehand. Next we walked through the preflight checklist step by step taking time to become familiar with aircraft systems. Utilizing a checklist again; the engine start was uneventful; however while explaining the purpose of the hydraulic system check the engine stopped unexpectedly. We discovered quickly that when removing friction from flight controls the student mistook the main fuel shutoff for the collective friction adjustment. Leaving the collective friction on and the fuel off. The hydraulic system check is one of the last checks you perform prior to liftoff. If we had been in more of a hurry to depart we could possibly have been airborne in a hover or takeoff profile when the engine stopped. In my opinion this was a possible near miss for an incident and an excellent learning opportunity. Personally; I check the friction tension prior to liftoff to ensure no hindrance of flight controls. I am sure that prior to liftoff I would have checked the collective friction and noticed the fuel shutoff in the closed position. Also we possibly would have not been able to complete the hydraulic system check with the collective friction still applied. In the future I will be taking extra steps to ensure each student fully understands the importance of knowing the difference between the collective friction and the fuel shutoff. There are multiple checks in place to help avoid this from causing a fuel starved engine in flight and I am unaware of any similar instances but I feel that this may possibly be something that others need to know about in order to avoid a more disastrous outcome.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: R44 flight instructor reported that a helicopter pilot in training inadvertently mistook the fuel shutoff for the collective friction adjustment after engine start.
Narrative: I was taking a Rotorcraft CFI for his initial flight in a Robinson R-44II. This instructor had completed all of his time (+/- 180 Hours) in the Schweitzer 300. He was interested in getting familiar with Robinson helicopters to expand his employment opportunities. We completed the required SFAR 73 awareness training beforehand. Next we walked through the preflight checklist step by step taking time to become familiar with aircraft systems. Utilizing a checklist again; the engine start was uneventful; however while explaining the purpose of the hydraulic system check the engine stopped unexpectedly. We discovered quickly that when removing friction from flight controls the student mistook the main fuel shutoff for the collective friction adjustment. Leaving the collective friction on and the fuel off. The hydraulic system check is one of the last checks you perform prior to liftoff. If we had been in more of a hurry to depart we could possibly have been airborne in a hover or takeoff profile when the engine stopped. In my opinion this was a possible near miss for an incident and an excellent learning opportunity. Personally; I check the friction tension prior to liftoff to ensure no hindrance of flight controls. I am sure that prior to liftoff I would have checked the collective friction and noticed the fuel shutoff in the closed position. Also we possibly would have not been able to complete the hydraulic system check with the collective friction still applied. In the future I will be taking extra steps to ensure each student fully understands the importance of knowing the difference between the collective friction and the fuel shutoff. There are multiple checks in place to help avoid this from causing a fuel starved engine in flight and I am unaware of any similar instances but I feel that this may possibly be something that others need to know about in order to avoid a more disastrous outcome.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.