Narrative:

I'm feeling a little snake bit. This is my second safety event of the day. The final monitor (FM) cancelled aircraft X's approach clearance because they were overtaking traffic ahead. I do not recall the callsign of the lead aircraft. Although OJT was in progress on local west (lw) I do not believe that is a factor in this incident. Lw had just departed aircraft Y on runway 36R; turning to heading 340; climbing to 10;000; when shortly thereafter; FM cancelled aircraft X's approach and issued fly runway heading; maintain 3;000. In lw's judgment there would not be sufficient space between the aircraft Y and aircraft X so lw issued a left turn to 340; maintain 3;000 to aircraft X while aircraft X was still several miles south of the field. I initiated a handoff to the departure 3 controller (DR3) via the stars and verbally coordinated with the FM [final monitor] that we were breaking aircraft X out early. Next; I initiated verbal coordination with DR3; notifying him that aircraft X was heading 340 at 3;000. It did not occur to me that I should have pointed out aircraft X to meacham north (mn) until later when the controller in charge notified me that 'aircraft X is being tracked' which I clarified meant that D10 was investigating a possible loss.I must have assumed that the FM controller would take care of any point outs; which in hindsight was not good air traffic control. However; D10 airspace boundaries are not depicted on tower radar displays; nor are we trained on all the airspace that abuts ours. Instead; we are given standard missed approach headings and frequencies to assign. Several actions could have prevented this event.1. When FM cancelled aircraft X's approach clearance; they could have broken them out since they have better familiarity with that airspace than we do.2. Airspace boundaries around tower airspace should be depicted and trained so we can better know into whose airspace we may be turning.3. Standard missed approach procedures should be replaced with 'assign heading and altitude to avert conflict with other arrivals/departures and hand off to the appropriate controller.4. When tower advised FM that they are going to turn somebody early; the FM should advise who to hand off the aircraft to or offer to take care of the point out. This one seems less preferable than teaching us the airspace more thoroughly.5. All this could have been completely avoided by better application of speed control by the arrival controller who set this all up by feeding the overtake to the FM and lw controllers to fix. FM should only be concerned with ensuring the non-transgression zone between parallel approaches is protected; rather than cleaning up after a final controller who didn't ensure their aircraft would remain separated to the runway.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DFW Tower Controller reported an airspace violation. Aircraft was taken off approach due to a lack of separation and turned. Controllers did not make appropriate point out.

Narrative: I'm feeling a little snake bit. This is my second safety event of the day. The Final Monitor (FM) cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance because they were overtaking traffic ahead. I do not recall the callsign of the lead aircraft. Although OJT was in progress on Local West (LW) I do not believe that is a factor in this incident. LW had just departed Aircraft Y on RWY 36R; turning to heading 340; climbing to 10;000; when shortly thereafter; FM cancelled Aircraft X's approach and issued fly runway heading; maintain 3;000. In LW's judgment there would not be sufficient space between the Aircraft Y and Aircraft X so LW issued a left turn to 340; maintain 3;000 to Aircraft X while Aircraft X was still several miles south of the field. I initiated a handoff to the Departure 3 controller (DR3) via the STARS and verbally coordinated with the FM [Final Monitor] that we were breaking Aircraft X out early. Next; I initiated verbal coordination with DR3; notifying him that Aircraft X was heading 340 at 3;000. It did not occur to me that I should have pointed out Aircraft X to Meacham North (MN) until later when the CIC notified me that 'Aircraft X is being tracked' which I clarified meant that D10 was investigating a possible loss.I must have assumed that the FM controller would take care of any point outs; which in hindsight was not good air traffic control. However; D10 airspace boundaries are not depicted on tower radar displays; nor are we trained on all the airspace that abuts ours. Instead; we are given standard missed approach headings and frequencies to assign. Several actions could have prevented this event.1. When FM cancelled Aircraft X's approach clearance; they could have broken them out since they have better familiarity with that airspace than we do.2. Airspace boundaries around tower airspace should be depicted and trained so we can better know into whose airspace we may be turning.3. Standard missed approach procedures should be replaced with 'assign heading and altitude to avert conflict with other arrivals/departures and hand off to the appropriate controller.4. When tower advised FM that they are going to turn somebody early; the FM should advise who to hand off the aircraft to or offer to take care of the point out. This one seems less preferable than teaching us the airspace more thoroughly.5. All this could have been completely avoided by better application of speed control by the arrival controller who set this all up by feeding the overtake to the FM and LW controllers to fix. FM should only be concerned with ensuring the non-transgression zone between parallel approaches is protected; rather than cleaning up after a final controller who didn't ensure their aircraft would remain separated to the runway.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.