Narrative:

While parked at the gate and about 10-15 minutes prior to push; a maintenance technician who had been working a previously reported wing light defect; told us that a burning smell and smoke in the forward cargo bin had been reported to maintenance by a baggage handler and that an equipment cooling fan had been found to be the cause; and that there was not currently a fire on board; but the fan had malfunctioned and caught fire. At that time; all three pilots went down on the ramp and up into the forward cargo compartment to survey the damage personally. Maintenance showed us the cooling fan and we saw the charred wires on the fan control assembly as well as quite a bit of charred insulation; as well as the fact that the cargo side wall insulating blanket had a hole burned completely through it and into the cargo compartment. We returned to the flight deck and informed the passengers of a mechanical delay; and continued working with maintenance to determine the best course of action; however at that point after having seen the extent of the damage; in my mind it seemed clearly evident the aircraft should be taken out of service for repairs. We had just had an electrical fire on board; which luckily had extinguished itself; but which could have very well been a much worse situation had it continued- especially if it would have occurred after takeoff; or had the cargo hold had been loaded. We then deplaned the passengers. The on-scene maintenance technicians agreed the aircraft should not continue without a thorough troubleshooting of the malfunction and fire; which would take a considerable amount of time. I should note; at no time did we have any indication on the flight deck of smoke; or even an EICAS message for the malfunctioning equipment cooling fan; which I thought we should have gotten. Maintenance control seemed adamant that the flight could continue by simply MEL'ing the inop cooling fan that had just caused the fire; as they did not have replacement parts. The technicians working on the aircraft expressed to me and the other pilots that they were not at all comfortable doing that given the extent of the damage; and not knowing how much other wiring damage there might be; and that it would take a considerable amount of time to thoroughly evaluate.I discussed the situation thoroughly with the other pilots and we all agreed that we did not feel at all comfortable taking the airplane on an ETOPS flight at night across the ocean. Shortly thereafter; I placed a call to the flight operations manager; and expressed our concerns with accepting the aircraft. He said the best course of action was to call dispatch and coordinate an aircraft swap with them and the ops director. I called dispatch; and they set up a conference call with operations; and we discussed the situation; and I decided the safest course of action was to not accept the aircraft for the flight; and told them that was my decision- to not accept the aircraft. Maintenance continued to work on the aircraft and told me they did not have parts to fix the fan and they were concerned with the integrity of the wiring harnesses and associated controls.by now; we were about 2-3 hours past scheduled departure; and ops was still looking into finding another aircraft; but was unable to work a solution. Apparently a shift change occurred at the flight operations manager desk; and I received a call from another captain there wanting to know why I was refusing the aircraft. I expressed my concerns; as well as those of my other two crew members; and I told him I felt the safest course of action was to take the aircraft out of service until it could be thoroughly vetted to return. I told him I was refusing the aircraft as my primary responsibility was for the safety of my passengers and crew. Quite honestly; I was feeling pressured to take an aircraft I was not comfortable taking- and neither were my other two crew members.I thought it had been determined we would not be taking that aircraft; when I then received a call from the crew coordinator trying to find out what was going on; and she wanted to transfer me over to maintenance control; which she did. We had a call with maintenance control on speakerphone; with my other two pilots; and he was explaining why he thought it was okay to take the airplane; even though the technicians working on the aircraft were not comfortable sending it and all three pilots were not at all comfortable taking it. Again we all felt we were being pressured to accept an airplane we did not feel safe operating at night in an ETOPS environment. The flight was subsequently cancelled as there was no aircraft swap available.I am keenly aware of the economic necessity of maintaining our schedule reliability; and I couldn't agree more; however; as a captain; I must; and will; always put the safety of my passengers and crew first. I do not take lightly having to refuse an aircraft; and did so only because I firmly believed that was the safest course of action given the circumstances I and my crew were faced with in this situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 equipment cooling fan and associated wiring caught fire and subsequently burned through the forward cargo sidewall and insulation into the cargo compartment. The flight crew and local maintenance technicians refused to release the aircraft for a night ETOPS flight over several managers' objections.

Narrative: While parked at the gate and about 10-15 minutes prior to push; a maintenance technician who had been working a previously reported wing light defect; told us that a burning smell and smoke in the forward cargo bin had been reported to maintenance by a baggage handler and that an equipment cooling fan had been found to be the cause; and that there was not currently a fire on board; but the fan had malfunctioned and caught fire. At that time; all three pilots went down on the ramp and up into the forward cargo compartment to survey the damage personally. Maintenance showed us the cooling fan and we saw the charred wires on the fan control assembly as well as quite a bit of charred insulation; as well as the fact that the cargo side wall insulating blanket had a hole burned completely through it and into the cargo compartment. We returned to the flight deck and informed the passengers of a mechanical delay; and continued working with maintenance to determine the best course of action; however at that point after having seen the extent of the damage; in my mind it seemed clearly evident the aircraft should be taken out of service for repairs. We had just had an electrical fire on board; which luckily had extinguished itself; but which could have very well been a much worse situation had it continued- especially if it would have occurred after takeoff; or had the cargo hold had been loaded. We then deplaned the passengers. The on-scene maintenance technicians agreed the aircraft should not continue without a thorough troubleshooting of the malfunction and fire; which would take a considerable amount of time. I should note; at no time did we have any indication on the flight deck of smoke; or even an EICAS message for the malfunctioning equipment cooling fan; which I thought we should have gotten. Maintenance Control seemed adamant that the flight could continue by simply MEL'ing the inop cooling fan that had just caused the fire; as they did not have replacement parts. The technicians working on the aircraft expressed to me and the other pilots that they were not at all comfortable doing that given the extent of the damage; and not knowing how much other wiring damage there might be; and that it would take a considerable amount of time to thoroughly evaluate.I discussed the situation thoroughly with the other pilots and we all agreed that we did not feel at all comfortable taking the airplane on an ETOPS flight at night across the ocean. Shortly thereafter; I placed a call to the Flight Operations Manager; and expressed our concerns with accepting the aircraft. He said the best course of action was to call dispatch and coordinate an aircraft swap with them and the Ops Director. I called Dispatch; and they set up a conference call with operations; and we discussed the situation; and I decided the safest course of action was to not accept the aircraft for the flight; and told them that was my decision- to not accept the aircraft. Maintenance continued to work on the aircraft and told me they did not have parts to fix the fan and they were concerned with the integrity of the wiring harnesses and associated controls.By now; we were about 2-3 hours past scheduled departure; and Ops was still looking into finding another aircraft; but was unable to work a solution. Apparently a shift change occurred at the Flight Operations Manager desk; and I received a call from another Captain there wanting to know why I was refusing the aircraft. I expressed my concerns; as well as those of my other two crew members; and I told him I felt the safest course of action was to take the aircraft out of service until it could be thoroughly vetted to return. I told him I was refusing the aircraft as my primary responsibility was for the safety of my passengers and crew. Quite honestly; I was feeling pressured to take an aircraft I was not comfortable taking- and neither were my other two crew members.I thought it had been determined we would not be taking that aircraft; when I then received a call from the Crew Coordinator trying to find out what was going on; and she wanted to transfer me over to Maintenance Control; which she did. We had a call with Maintenance control on speakerphone; with my other two pilots; and he was explaining why he thought it was okay to take the airplane; even though the Technicians working on the aircraft were not comfortable sending it and all three pilots were not at all comfortable taking it. Again we all felt we were being pressured to accept an airplane we did not feel safe operating at night in an ETOPS environment. The flight was subsequently cancelled as there was no aircraft swap available.I am keenly aware of the economic necessity of maintaining our schedule reliability; and I couldn't agree more; however; as a Captain; I must; and will; always put the safety of my passengers and crew first. I do not take lightly having to refuse an aircraft; and did so only because I firmly believed that was the safest course of action given the circumstances I and my crew were faced with in this situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.