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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1351588 |
Time | |
Date | 201604 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | HNL.Airport |
State Reference | HI |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Small Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 135 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft X inbound over the freeway and aircraft was a rejecting to hnl in an emergency [condition] (smoke in cockpit). Tower supervisor was notified about aircraft X returning as an emergency when aircraft was over punchbowl (about 10-15 miles out from hnl airport). Tower crash phone was out of service. We've had at least 2 control sheets in cedar stating procedures if tower crash phone is out if there's an emergency the tower calls the ramp and relays emergency aircraft information and ramp control is to take appropriate action and notify the required agencies.aircraft X inbound from punchbowl emergency smoke in cockpit and tower supervisor calls the state ramp to pass on emergency information. Minutes later state ramp calls the tower back and asks the tower sup if the tower was going to activate the primary crash phone. The tower supervisor informs the state ramp that the tower crash phone is down and is per our procedures we are to call the state ramp during emergencies with information. The state ramp had absolutely no idea that the tower crash phone was out let alone they had no idea the procedures for the tower crash phone being out. By the time the emergency residing vehicles responded aircraft X was short final. Thankfully smoke in cockpit didn't get worse. Somewhere along the line the ball was dropped. Procedures should not be expected to be in only cedar; they should be briefed and eventually out in the SOP. My facility is horrible in keeping controllers informed of the latest procedures/publications. The tower supervisor did the best he could to take care of the situation however; the situation could be gone easily the other way and he would have been put in a really bad situation.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: HCF Controller reported of an emergency inbound and the tower crash phone being out of service. Tower Supervisor called the Ramp Tower as per the SOP and made appropriate notifications. People at the Ramp Tower did not know what they were supposed to do. While aircraft was over the numbers the emergency equipment arrived.
Narrative: Aircraft X inbound over the freeway and aircraft was a rejecting to HNL in an emergency [condition] (smoke in cockpit). Tower supervisor was notified about Aircraft X returning as an emergency when aircraft was over Punchbowl (about 10-15 miles out from HNL airport). Tower crash phone was out of service. We've had at least 2 control sheets in CEDAR stating procedures if tower crash phone is out if there's an emergency the tower calls the ramp and relays emergency aircraft information and Ramp Control is to take appropriate action and notify the required agencies.Aircraft X inbound from Punchbowl emergency smoke in cockpit and tower supervisor calls the State ramp to pass on emergency information. Minutes later State ramp calls the tower back and asks the tower sup if the tower was going to activate the primary crash phone. The tower supervisor informs the State ramp that the tower crash phone is down and is per our procedures we are to call the State ramp during emergencies with information. The State ramp had absolutely no idea that the tower crash phone was out let alone they had no idea the procedures for the tower crash phone being out. By the time the emergency residing vehicles responded Aircraft X was short final. Thankfully smoke in cockpit didn't get worse. Somewhere along the line the ball was dropped. Procedures should not be expected to be in only Cedar; they should be briefed and eventually out in the SOP. My facility is horrible in keeping controllers informed of the latest procedures/publications. The tower supervisor did the best he could to take care of the situation however; the situation could be gone easily the other way and he would have been put in a really bad situation.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.