Narrative:

I went back to the area after a break; but was stopped in the hall by a cpc (certified professional controller) that told me how bad the volume was and he jokingly suggested that I not go back. I arrived to a saturated air/ckb complex with more aircraft in the air sector than the radar controller could safely handle. A cpc with just over a year of certified experience was on the radar; a newly checked out D side only was the air D; and a young cpc was 'tracking'. Tmu didn't seem to help the situation as the saturation continued from all directions. Air had iad inbounds on vectors in irl's airspace over pittsburgh as well as several aircraft spinning on the boundary with ZDC; still fighting to get spacing. Turbulence/chop forced more aircraft into air sector. A young cpc was feeding air from ckb as well. I offered a break to the D side. He felt too busy to pass. I offered a break to the right side. He felt too busy to pass. I offered a break to the tracker. He jumped at the opportunity to get out of the way. We didn't use split mode and track in the traditional sense though. I plugged in to the prempt jack opposite of the original 'tracker' to get my bearings and the tracker left without saying a word. As soon as I got a look at the display; I immediately realized that letting the newly checked out D side to remain on position was a mistake. An experienced cpc came into the area and I asked him if he could get the D side out to help us. His response was 'I won't have any more of an idea of what is going on than he does.' I went back to the scope and tried to help in any way I could. The inexperienced D side needed prompting to find several aircraft that were well in our airspace that were not on frequency. The right side was so far down the drain that he needed help with simple vectors. At that point; the edst (en route decision support tool) routes began to 'blue out'. Flight plans and handoffs began to fail from ZDC to us. I told the D side to keep coordinating as much as possible with ZDC and to find the multiple aircraft still missing from our frequency. The right side descended an aircraft from FL270 to try to prevent a loss of separation from a vectored aircraft also at FL270. The descending aircraft was leaving FL270 and handed off to ZDC when loss of separation occurred. He stopped to acknowledge aloud that he 'had a deal'. The aircraft were diverging at that point and I prompted him to switch the descending aircraft to ZDC since there was nothing more he could do anyway. The right side regained the picture and control of the sector. As the traffic died down; I was instructed to relieve the radar controller.several factors contributed to this [situation]. The area was in a transition period as the supervisor was at the weather briefing and a controller in charge was in charge. The controller in charge assigned the new D side to the air D side. The supervisor came back; relieved the controller in charge and assigned him to track. I think that the cpc that passed me in hall; or the cpc that relieved him; should have been assigned to work the air D side because of the complexity and volume. If that wasn't possible; the relieved controller in charge should've been assigned to be the air D side instead of tracking. Neither the controller in charge; nor the supervisor; paged anyone back that could have possibly helped the situation. There was too little experience in the area at the time; especially in that half of the area. We do not use the 'tracker' position properly. I think that the cpcs that walked away for breaks and the one that basically refused to step up to help contributed to the problem almost as much as the lack of direction from the people in charge. Tmu continues to hang our area out to dry on a routine basis. It's almost like tmu has no idea what goes on with our flow. I'm not sure if it's apathy or lack of experience on their part as well. I'm not sure what happened with the equipment during this scenario. ZID is not required to space the 'corner cutters' they receive from ZOB area 4 with the other aircraft that they give us. That makes it difficult for us to sequence in the last 80 miles.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB Controller reported an Airborne Conflict event contributed to the lack of experience among some of the controllers involved.

Narrative: I went back to the area after a break; but was stopped in the hall by a CPC (Certified Professional Controller) that told me how bad the volume was and he jokingly suggested that I not go back. I arrived to a saturated AIR/CKB complex with more aircraft in the AIR sector than the radar controller could safely handle. A CPC with just over a year of certified experience was on the radar; a newly checked out D side only was the AIR D; and a young CPC was 'tracking'. TMU didn't seem to help the situation as the saturation continued from all directions. AIR had IAD inbounds on vectors in IRL's airspace over Pittsburgh as well as several aircraft spinning on the boundary with ZDC; still fighting to get spacing. Turbulence/Chop forced more aircraft into AIR sector. A young CPC was feeding AIR from CKB as well. I offered a break to the D side. He felt too busy to pass. I offered a break to the R side. He felt too busy to pass. I offered a break to the Tracker. He jumped at the opportunity to get out of the way. We didn't use split mode and track in the traditional sense though. I plugged in to the PREMPT jack opposite of the original 'tracker' to get my bearings and the Tracker left without saying a word. As soon as I got a look at the display; I immediately realized that letting the newly checked out D side to remain on position was a mistake. An experienced CPC came into the area and I asked him if he could get the D side out to help us. His response was 'I won't have any more of an idea of what is going on than he does.' I went back to the scope and tried to help in any way I could. The inexperienced D side needed prompting to find several aircraft that were well in our airspace that were not on frequency. The R side was so far down the drain that he needed help with simple vectors. At that point; the EDST (En route Decision Support Tool) routes began to 'blue out'. Flight plans and handoffs began to fail from ZDC to us. I told the D side to keep coordinating as much as possible with ZDC and to find the multiple aircraft still missing from our frequency. The R side descended an aircraft from FL270 to try to prevent a loss of separation from a vectored aircraft also at FL270. The descending aircraft was leaving FL270 and handed off to ZDC when loss of separation occurred. He stopped to acknowledge aloud that he 'had a deal'. The aircraft were diverging at that point and I prompted him to switch the descending aircraft to ZDC since there was nothing more he could do anyway. The R side regained the picture and control of the sector. As the traffic died down; I was instructed to relieve the radar controller.Several factors contributed to this [situation]. The area was in a transition period as the supervisor was at the weather briefing and a CIC was in charge. The CIC assigned the new D side to the AIR D side. The supervisor came back; relieved the CIC and assigned him to track. I think that the CPC that passed me in hall; or the CPC that relieved him; should have been assigned to work the AIR D side because of the complexity and volume. If that wasn't possible; the relieved CIC should've been assigned to be the AIR D side instead of tracking. Neither the CIC; nor the supervisor; paged anyone back that could have possibly helped the situation. There was too little experience in the area at the time; especially in that half of the area. We do not use the 'tracker' position properly. I think that the CPCs that walked away for breaks and the one that basically refused to step up to help contributed to the problem almost as much as the lack of direction from the people in charge. TMU continues to hang our area out to dry on a routine basis. It's almost like TMU has no idea what goes on with our flow. I'm not sure if it's apathy or lack of experience on their part as well. I'm not sure what happened with the equipment during this scenario. ZID is not required to space the 'corner cutters' they receive from ZOB area 4 with the other aircraft that they give us. That makes it difficult for us to sequence in the last 80 miles.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.