37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1353385 |
Time | |
Date | 201605 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZNY.ARTCC |
State Reference | NY |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Widebody Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 129 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Oceanic |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Route In Use | Oceanic |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 6 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural Clearance Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
I took over the D87/89. The sector was busy with weather deviations and volume. Sector 81 had performed coordination with the previous controller with aircraft X westbound; the aircraft was coordinated at FL350. Also aircraft Y was coordinated at FL390 with a left weather deviation 30 miles left of course. Both aircraft were to progress over the same waypoint antig. Both aircraft were cpdlc and abs-B equipped. I got an aircraft route progression (arp) message on aircraft X and I processed the message and the message stated he was reporting at FL390 however was supposed to be at FL350 I noticed the aircraft was still in the radar sector so I deleted the message noticing that the aircraft was coordinated at FL350 and I just thought that the aircraft had not been given a descent clearance yet. I then proceeded to take care of a red conflict between two aircraft at FL430 which I was investigating; looking at their routes of flights and flight plans trying to figure out why advanced technologies and oceanic procedures (atop) was predicting a conflict. Aircraft Y made a controller pilot data link communication (cpdlc) request for a further deviation 40 left of course which I probed and sent. Again back to the red conflict to fix the flight plans and received another arp message on aircraft X. I sent a message for aircraft X to confirm altitude and moved on the take care of weather deviations and perform more inbound and outbound coordination. I then received notification that aircraft X was indeed at FL390 so I processed the altitude and noticed he was in conflict with aircraft Y. I then climbed aircraft X to FL400 to solve the conflict. I called sector 81 asking what altitude aircraft X was coordinated at and the controller answered FL350. The sector 81 controller failed to notice the coordinated altitude on the strip prior to terminating radar service. Had this been noticed along with a more detailed relief briefing; this situation would not have been dumped on me. First I feel that if an aircraft is adb-B equipped and we are tracking them on atop than any time that aircraft progresses a waypoint other than the correct altitude the atop system should notify the controller by lighting up red both that aircraft that are in conflict instead of a trial probe. We get trial probes constantly on aircraft and 9 times out of 10 they are not useful. This would divert the controller's attention to the conflict and situations would be avoided. Second; sector 81 controllers should immediately put the aircraft to the coordinated altitude instead of waiting until the last possible second or have the controllers descend/climb further from the boundary fix to stop the arp messages. Lastly sector 81 should be removed from area F and moved to area east.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZNY Controller reported of a conflict with two aircraft at the same altitude. Confusion ensued because aircraft progression reports showed one of the aircraft at a different altitude. Reporter climbed one aircraft to avoid conflict.
Narrative: I took over the D87/89. The sector was busy with weather deviations and volume. Sector 81 had performed coordination with the previous controller with Aircraft X westbound; the aircraft was coordinated at FL350. Also Aircraft Y was coordinated at FL390 with a left weather deviation 30 miles left of course. Both aircraft were to progress over the same waypoint ANTIG. Both aircraft were CPDLC and ABS-B equipped. I got an Aircraft Route Progression (ARP) message on Aircraft X and I processed the message and the message stated he was reporting at FL390 however was supposed to be at FL350 I noticed the aircraft was still in the radar sector so I deleted the message noticing that the aircraft was coordinated at FL350 and I just thought that the aircraft had not been given a descent clearance yet. I then proceeded to take care of a red conflict between two aircraft at FL430 which I was investigating; looking at their routes of flights and flight plans trying to figure out why Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP) was predicting a conflict. Aircraft Y made a Controller Pilot Data Link Communication (CPDLC) request for a further deviation 40 left of course which I probed and sent. Again back to the red conflict to fix the flight plans and received another ARP message on Aircraft X. I sent a message for Aircraft X to confirm altitude and moved on the take care of weather deviations and perform more inbound and outbound coordination. I then received notification that aircraft X was indeed at FL390 so I processed the altitude and noticed he was in conflict with Aircraft Y. I then climbed Aircraft X to FL400 to solve the conflict. I called sector 81 asking what altitude Aircraft X was coordinated at and the controller answered FL350. The sector 81 controller failed to notice the coordinated altitude on the strip prior to terminating radar service. Had this been noticed along with a more detailed relief briefing; this situation would not have been dumped on me. First I feel that if an aircraft is ADB-B equipped and we are tracking them on ATOP than any time that aircraft progresses a waypoint other than the correct altitude the ATOP system should notify the controller by lighting up red both that aircraft that are in conflict instead of a trial probe. We get trial probes constantly on aircraft and 9 times out of 10 they are not useful. This would divert the controller's attention to the conflict and situations would be avoided. Second; sector 81 controllers should immediately put the aircraft to the coordinated altitude instead of waiting until the last possible second or have the controllers descend/climb further from the boundary fix to stop the ARP messages. Lastly sector 81 should be removed from Area F and moved to Area E.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.