Narrative:

On takeoff the copilot's window opened at approximately 65 knots. Due to the noise and confusion; I took control and rejected the takeoff and turned off the auto brakes. With approximately 6;000 feet of runway left; the aircraft decelerated with minimal braking. I exited prior to the end of the runway and made a PA informing the passengers and instructing them to remain in their seats. Because of the short brake application and slow speed involved; I did not feel any inspection was necessary. I taxied back; referred to the brake cooling chart; checked minimum takeoff fuel and departed.the landing was normal except for a small vibration at about 70 knots on rollout. On the short taxi I noticed the hydraulic a quantity zero EICAS message and suspected a blown tire had ruptured the line. While calling maintenance; a crew chief called to report 4 blown tires on the left main strut. Maintenance was requested and the log book completed.because this was not a heavy weight/ high speed event; I did not consider this an emergency. This flight had several unusual problems to solve before leaving the gate. Although not rushed; the before starting engines checklist was completed quickly and apparently I missed the visual cross check of the copilots window even though the handle was in the correct position. When the window opened early on the takeoff roll; I handled it quickly to avoid continuing the takeoff with the confusion of transferring controls in the increasing wind noise. Since I rejected the takeoff below 80 knots with so much runway to slow the aircraft; I concentrated on informing the passengers and crew and continuing the flight with the fuel on board. I did not assign the proper priority to the rejected takeoff and considered it another problem solved. Therefore I did not reference the QRH. Had I done that even though it occurred at a slow speed; we may have determined that it required an inspection.I consider myself highly trained and experienced. This is the 3rd rejected takeoff in well over 10;000 hours on this aircraft and all of them occurred at low speed. Had I thought of this as an emergency and referenced the QRH; the notes would have been reviewed for post reject inspection criteria. Recommend this should be re-emphasized at training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300ER Crew reported rejecting a takeoff at 65 knots with a slow taxi back for another takeoff. After landing at their destination they reported a vibration and loss of the A hydraulic system. Maintenance crew reported 4 blown tires on the left main strut.

Narrative: On takeoff the copilot's window opened at approximately 65 knots. Due to the noise and confusion; I took control and rejected the takeoff and turned off the auto brakes. With approximately 6;000 feet of runway left; the aircraft decelerated with minimal braking. I exited prior to the end of the runway and made a PA informing the passengers and instructing them to remain in their seats. Because of the short brake application and slow speed involved; I did not feel any inspection was necessary. I taxied back; referred to the brake cooling chart; checked minimum takeoff fuel and departed.The landing was normal except for a small vibration at about 70 knots on rollout. On the short taxi I noticed the hydraulic A quantity zero EICAS message and suspected a blown tire had ruptured the line. While calling maintenance; a crew chief called to report 4 blown tires on the left main strut. Maintenance was requested and the log book completed.Because this was not a heavy weight/ high speed event; I did not consider this an emergency. This flight had several unusual problems to solve before leaving the gate. Although not rushed; the before starting engines checklist was completed quickly and apparently I missed the visual cross check of the copilots window even though the handle was in the correct position. When the window opened early on the takeoff roll; I handled it quickly to avoid continuing the takeoff with the confusion of transferring controls in the increasing wind noise. Since I rejected the takeoff below 80 knots with so much runway to slow the aircraft; I concentrated on informing the passengers and crew and continuing the flight with the fuel on board. I did not assign the proper priority to the rejected takeoff and considered it another problem solved. Therefore I did not reference the QRH. Had I done that even though it occurred at a slow speed; we may have determined that it required an inspection.I consider myself highly trained and experienced. This is the 3rd rejected takeoff in well over 10;000 hours on this aircraft and all of them occurred at low speed. Had I thought of this as an emergency and referenced the QRH; the notes would have been reviewed for post reject inspection criteria. Recommend this should be re-emphasized at training.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.