Narrative:

There were thunderstorms building south of charlotte; and I noted with the first officer that we would look closely at the fuel and weather for the return trip. The airline procedure is to put extra fuel for enroute weather issues in the 'hold' line on the flight release. The airline also keeps very careful track of historic fuel usage. This process is referred to as the historical fuel requirement (hfr). It is designed to account for everyday issues; such as ATC required early descents and long final approaches at hub airports. Certain weather or runway parameters at the destination should trigger an increase in the hfr. This hfr is normally less than the minimum extra fuel (mef) that we carry anyway; but hfr could well exceed mef during a weather event. In a recent training class; we were told that the dispatcher consults a database during the planning process; and the hfr will change based on the average weather and air traffic conditions through the day. The example in the handout shows a route from augusta to charlotte. There is no way to tell the actual hfr numbers just by looking at the flight release; and I usually wouldn't need to know anyway. But if I did need to know; I would have to ask the dispatcher.in reviewing the weather and fuel plan; I noted the following:1. No hold fuel; or any other indication that the dispatcher had planned the flight taking enroute weather into account; and;2. An unusable alternate; given that the weather would be between me and said alternate; assuming that I started from a missed approach at the destination. At a minimum; using this alternate would have required additional fuel to go around the weather.I called the dispatcher; and asked why there was no fuel on the hold line for enroute delays. Further; what was the actual hfr required for the flight? Was our hfr at the 90th percentile (the everyday value); or the 99th (required in this case due to forecast thunderstorms at the destination)? My thinking was that if the hfr for this route at this time of day was very low; then the 1000 pound mef could well suffice; provided I still had that fuel on the airplane at takeoff. (More on that later. It is a glaring flaw in this whole hfr system). On the other hand; if the hfr was; say; 800 pounds; then I would not have enough for my historic use on the route plus the anticipated enroute track around the weather.imagine my disappointment when the dispatcher had no idea what I was talking about. He said that he had seen a memo on the subject; or maybe something during training; but hadn't understood it at all. He certainly didn't routinely consult any database. 'How much extra fuel did I want?' he asked. I started to dig in my heels; asking 'you first;' how much he thought I might need in terms of an enroute delay; not to mention actually getting to the alternate he had selected; and I really needed an answer about the 99th percentile fuel. However; I quickly decided that the dispatcher was utterly unequipped to take charge of the situation. Causing a significant delay to make a point was not going to make me very popular with my passengers or my boss; and the weather was building in the meantime. Getting the flight under way quickly and with adequate fuel was the best thing I could do. I asked for a new flight release showing an extra 1000 lbs on the hold line. I also briefed my first officer that we would not burn into our 1000 pound mef by any significant amount prior to takeoff. Further; we would not attempt to go to the alternate on the release in the event of a diversion. There were several places that were both closer and had good weather enroute. We completed the flight without incident; and deviated for weather by perhaps 20-30 miles. That small weather deviation was luck; not skill. The weather was mostly off our left on the arrival; and did not directly affect the airport. Flights on other arrivals did have to hold; or got rerouted onto our arrival path.there appears to bea gap in dispatcher training and their day-to-day application of the historic fuel program. Also; each dispatcher has a monthly meeting with their supervisor; where their fuel stats are reviewed. (This was also mentioned in a training session by a consultant hired by mainline). Dispatchers are graded by the number of times they put extra fuel on a flight; among other things. A lower number is better. I think that this need to justify oneself later does not lead to a willingness to put extra fuel on now. It's easier to wait for captains to insist; and then put it off on them.Suggestions1. The required fuel value from the departure to destination and alternate must be realistic considering enroute weather conditions between those points; and account for any historic overburn.2. When hfr 99th is used; there should be a remark on the release. As the PIC; I would then be able to easily crosscheck whether this rule was followed.3. Obviously; the hfr process shown to pilots during training isn't how it really works. This should be fixed in dispatch; or we should provide pilots with factual information in training.we have an impressive database that appears to be unused in practice; and dispatchers who don't understand the most basic questions about how they planned the flight. Add a grading system that rewards overthinking; and you compound the problem. Also; this entire hfr process; for this flight and every flight; is flawed. We measure gate-to-gate; which means that the hfr includes ground delays; and even includes a taxi-in delay after arrival. This fuel is put in 'tanker;' which means it is not required to be on board at takeoff. 121.639 requires adequate fuel to be on board the airplane at takeoff (not at pushback; but at takeoff); including fuel to the alternate. 121.647 further refines this process. We could put hfr above the line and require that amount for takeoff; and put the rest of the mef on the tanker line. Maybe there is another way to do it. But knowing via our database that a given flight will overburn by x amount on average and not requiring that extra on the airplane at takeoff is; in my belief; negligent. We shouldn't do it; and FAA shouldn't allow it. Our statement that the hfr process does not determine where during the flight the over burn occurred; or why; amounts to willful ignorance. It does not excuse us from the regulation. Understanding the system; I will never commence a takeoff in one of our airplanes at the minimum legal fuel without knowing that the hfr value for that flight is zero.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 Captain reported he was unhappy with the Dispatcher's lack of knowledge with the company method for determining an appropriate fuel load.

Narrative: There were thunderstorms building south of Charlotte; and I noted with the first officer that we would look closely at the fuel and weather for the return trip. The airline procedure is to put extra fuel for enroute weather issues in the 'hold' line on the flight release. The airline also keeps very careful track of historic fuel usage. This process is referred to as the historical fuel requirement (HFR). It is designed to account for everyday issues; such as ATC required early descents and long final approaches at hub airports. Certain weather or runway parameters at the destination should trigger an increase in the HFR. This HFR is normally less than the minimum extra fuel (MEF) that we carry anyway; but HFR could well exceed MEF during a weather event. In a recent training class; we were told that the dispatcher consults a database during the planning process; and the HFR will change based on the average weather and air traffic conditions through the day. The example in the handout shows a route from Augusta to Charlotte. There is no way to tell the actual HFR numbers just by looking at the flight release; and I usually wouldn't need to know anyway. But if I did need to know; I would have to ask the dispatcher.In reviewing the weather and fuel plan; I noted the following:1. No hold fuel; or any other indication that the dispatcher had planned the flight taking enroute weather into account; and;2. An unusable alternate; given that the weather would be between me and said alternate; assuming that I started from a missed approach at the destination. At a minimum; using this alternate would have required additional fuel to go around the weather.I called the dispatcher; and asked why there was no fuel on the hold line for enroute delays. Further; what was the actual HFR required for the flight? Was our HFR at the 90th percentile (the everyday value); or the 99th (required in this case due to forecast thunderstorms at the destination)? My thinking was that if the HFR for this route at this time of day was very low; then the 1000 pound MEF could well suffice; provided I still had that fuel on the airplane at takeoff. (More on that later. It is a glaring flaw in this whole HFR system). On the other hand; if the HFR was; say; 800 pounds; then I would not have enough for my historic use on the route plus the anticipated enroute track around the weather.Imagine my disappointment when the dispatcher had no idea what I was talking about. He said that he had seen a memo on the subject; or maybe something during training; but hadn't understood it at all. He certainly didn't routinely consult any database. 'How much extra fuel did I want?' he asked. I started to dig in my heels; asking 'you first;' how much he thought I might need in terms of an enroute delay; not to mention actually getting to the alternate he had selected; and I really needed an answer about the 99th percentile fuel. However; I quickly decided that the dispatcher was utterly unequipped to take charge of the situation. Causing a significant delay to make a point was not going to make me very popular with my passengers or my boss; and the weather was building in the meantime. Getting the flight under way quickly and with adequate fuel was the best thing I could do. I asked for a new flight release showing an extra 1000 lbs on the hold line. I also briefed my F/O that we would not burn into our 1000 pound MEF by any significant amount prior to takeoff. Further; we would not attempt to go to the alternate on the release in the event of a diversion. There were several places that were both closer and had good weather enroute. We completed the flight without incident; and deviated for weather by perhaps 20-30 miles. That small weather deviation was luck; not skill. The weather was mostly off our left on the arrival; and did not directly affect the airport. Flights on other arrivals did have to hold; or got rerouted onto our arrival path.There appears to bea gap in dispatcher training and their day-to-day application of the historic fuel program. Also; each dispatcher has a monthly meeting with their supervisor; where their fuel stats are reviewed. (This was also mentioned in a training session by a consultant hired by mainline). Dispatchers are graded by the number of times they put extra fuel on a flight; among other things. A lower number is better. I think that this need to justify oneself later does not lead to a willingness to put extra fuel on now. It's easier to wait for captains to insist; and then put it off on them.Suggestions1. The required fuel value from the departure to destination and alternate must be realistic considering enroute weather conditions between those points; and account for any historic overburn.2. When HFR 99th is used; there should be a remark on the release. As the PIC; I would then be able to easily crosscheck whether this rule was followed.3. Obviously; the HFR process shown to pilots during training isn't how it really works. This should be fixed in dispatch; or we should provide pilots with factual information in training.We have an impressive database that appears to be unused in practice; and dispatchers who don't understand the most basic questions about how they planned the flight. Add a grading system that rewards overthinking; and you compound the problem. Also; this entire HFR process; for this flight and every flight; is flawed. We measure gate-to-gate; which means that the HFR includes ground delays; and even includes a taxi-in delay after arrival. This fuel is put in 'tanker;' which means it is not required to be on board at takeoff. 121.639 requires adequate fuel to be on board the airplane at takeoff (not at pushback; but at TAKEOFF); including fuel to the alternate. 121.647 further refines this process. We could put HFR above the line and require that amount for takeoff; and put the rest of the MEF on the tanker line. Maybe there is another way to do it. But knowing via our database that a given flight will overburn by x amount on average and not requiring that extra on the airplane at takeoff is; in my belief; negligent. We shouldn't do it; and FAA shouldn't allow it. Our statement that the HFR process does not determine where during the flight the over burn occurred; or why; amounts to willful ignorance. It does not excuse us from the regulation. Understanding the system; I will never commence a takeoff in one of our airplanes at the minimum legal fuel without knowing that the HFR value for that flight is zero.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.