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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1355788 |
Time | |
Date | 201605 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | MHT.Airport |
State Reference | NH |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Takeoff |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | Central Warning/Master Caution |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 205 Flight Crew Type 8900 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Not Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 176 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe |
Narrative:
Taking off of runway 35 at mht; at approximately 110 KIAS (V1 was 134); the takeoff configuration warning horn sound began. My abort briefing has always included the statement that the only things that meet our abort criteria above 80 knots will have some kind audible warning or indication; with the exception being; aircraft unsafe or unable to fly. With this in mind; and hearing an audible warning; I instinctively began to retard the thrust levers to abort the takeoff; and looked at the flap indicator; which correctly read flaps 1. I immediately decided that I did not want to perform a high speed abort for a takeoff warning horn. I immediately increased the thrust levers back to the max thrust N1 bugs; and completed the takeoff uneventfully. The takeoff warning horn only sounded for two; or maybe three beeps; and then stopped. I had only slightly retarded the thrust levers when I decided not to abort (I estimate approximately 10% N1). I know; from years of human factors education; that indecision can often be your own worst enemy; however; I did not have any concerns about the airworthiness of the aircraft; and felt that the decision to continue; even though the takeoff performance data was now invalid; was of considerably less risk than a high speed abort for an erroneous takeoff configuration warning horn. All checklists were properly completed; to the best of my knowledge. We were not rushed. The warning horn did not sound during the thrust lever check.I messaged maintenance through ACARS to meet us at [destination]; however; nobody showed up. Enroute I had confirmed in the fom that an 'info only' entry in the logbook was the correct course of action with no maintenance notification required. Upon arrival at the gate; I completed the 'info only' entry in the logbook; and briefed the next flight crew about the incident.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 flight crew reported they elected to continue the takeoff after receiving a momentary takeoff warning horn at approximately 110 kts.
Narrative: Taking off of Runway 35 at MHT; at approximately 110 KIAS (V1 was 134); the Takeoff Configuration Warning horn sound began. My abort briefing has always included the statement that the only things that meet our abort criteria above 80 knots will have some kind audible warning or indication; with the exception being; aircraft unsafe or unable to fly. With this in mind; and hearing an audible warning; I instinctively began to retard the thrust levers to abort the takeoff; and looked at the flap indicator; which correctly read flaps 1. I immediately decided that I did not want to perform a high speed abort for a Takeoff Warning horn. I immediately increased the thrust levers back to the Max Thrust N1 bugs; and completed the takeoff uneventfully. The Takeoff Warning horn only sounded for two; or maybe three beeps; and then stopped. I had only slightly retarded the thrust levers when I decided not to abort (I estimate approximately 10% N1). I know; from years of human factors education; that indecision can often be your own worst enemy; however; I did not have any concerns about the airworthiness of the aircraft; and felt that the decision to continue; even though the takeoff performance data was now invalid; was of considerably less risk than a high speed abort for an erroneous takeoff configuration Warning horn. All checklists were properly completed; to the best of my knowledge. We were not rushed. The warning horn did not sound during the thrust lever check.I messaged Maintenance through ACARS to meet us at [destination]; however; nobody showed up. Enroute I had confirmed in the FOM that an 'Info Only' entry in the logbook was the correct course of action with no Maintenance notification required. Upon arrival at the gate; I completed the 'Info Only' entry in the logbook; and briefed the next Flight Crew about the incident.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.