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Less than standard separation between air carrier X and Y. Air carrier a and B. System error. Situation: controller certification procedure.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 135887 |
| Time | |
| Date | 199002 |
| Day | Thu |
| Local Time Of Day | 1801 To 2400 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | atc facility : cmh |
| State Reference | OH |
| Altitude | msl bound lower : 4000 msl bound upper : 4000 |
| Environment | |
| Flight Conditions | IMC |
| Light | Night |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Controlling Facilities | tracon : cmh |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng |
| Flight Phase | cruise other descent : approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Aircraft 2 | |
| Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
| Make Model Name | Medium Large Transport |
| Navigation In Use | Other Other |
| Flight Phase | cruise other descent : approach |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | other personnel other |
| Qualification | controller : radar |
| Experience | controller non radar : 8 controller radar : 8 |
| ASRS Report | 135887 |
| Person 2 | |
| Affiliation | government : faa |
| Function | oversight : supervisor |
| Qualification | controller : radar |
| Supplementary | |
| Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
| Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
I was working in cmh TRACON at the time of the events. A developmental who is certified on final position was working final. The developmental's supervisor was watching from another scope. There was an inbound rush and the developmental was directly responsible for no less than 4 sets (8 aircraft) losing separation within a 15 min period. The closest 2 sets were air carrier X (medium large transport) and Y (medium large transport) also air carrier a and air carrier B. Both sets were at the same altitude, with about 1 mi separation. Later in the evening the same developmental on the same position, with the same supervisor watching, lost separation with 2 other air carrier's. The supervisor observed the whole series of events and took no action. This supervisor certified this developmental on all positions (they are personal friends) against several recommendations and obviously did not want to take responsibility for the separation errors. I feel this type of situation could be remedied with the use of fpl controllers from opposite crews doing evaluations and certification of developmentals.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: LESS THAN STANDARD SEPARATION BETWEEN ACR X AND Y. ACR A AND B. SYSTEM ERROR. SITUATION: CTLR CERTIFICATION PROC.
Narrative: I WAS WORKING IN CMH TRACON AT THE TIME OF THE EVENTS. A DEVELOPMENTAL WHO IS CERTIFIED ON FINAL POSITION WAS WORKING FINAL. THE DEVELOPMENTAL'S SUPVR WAS WATCHING FROM ANOTHER SCOPE. THERE WAS AN INBND RUSH AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR NO LESS THAN 4 SETS (8 ACFT) LOSING SEPARATION WITHIN A 15 MIN PERIOD. THE CLOSEST 2 SETS WERE ACR X (MLG) AND Y (MLG) ALSO ACR A AND ACR B. BOTH SETS WERE AT THE SAME ALT, WITH ABOUT 1 MI SEPARATION. LATER IN THE EVENING THE SAME DEVELOPMENTAL ON THE SAME POSITION, WITH THE SAME SUPVR WATCHING, LOST SEPARATION WITH 2 OTHER ACR'S. THE SUPVR OBSERVED THE WHOLE SERIES OF EVENTS AND TOOK NO ACTION. THIS SUPVR CERTIFIED THIS DEVELOPMENTAL ON ALL POSITIONS (THEY ARE PERSONAL FRIENDS) AGAINST SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND OBVIOUSLY DID NOT WANT TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SEPARATION ERRORS. I FEEL THIS TYPE OF SITUATION COULD BE REMEDIED WITH THE USE OF FPL CTLRS FROM OPPOSITE CREWS DOING EVALUATIONS AND CERTIFICATION OF DEVELOPMENTALS.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.