Narrative:

During climb out we received an EICAS cyan message stating the following. Presn automatic fault [fail] followed by cyan pack 1 & pack 2 off. I had my first officer (first officer) continue to fly while observing the cabin not climbing. I search for immediate action items and subsequently guidance from the QRH. The first officer asked to level off at 5;000 ft. The QRH offered no guidance. I reverted to knowledge of aircraft systems. A fault indicating a system failure of one system/channel/computer versus a failure where both system/channel/computers fail. I found a way to revert to the secondary cabin pressure controller system by selected the cpcs (cabin pressure control system) knob from automatic to man and back to automatic. I had heard of a check airman having the same issue during training and pulled my recollection of his experience to help aid me in solving my issue. The cpcs returned to normal utilizing the second computer and the flight was continued without incident. Dispatch and maintenance were notified and logged accordingly. Because the issue was identified; isolated and rectified immediately we were able to avoid any major pressurization issues. Where there is no guidance; procedures; checklist etc.; we must use prudent judgment and skill to overcome the unexpected and unknown to deal with what is presented. A fault in automated systems without immediate automatic reversion to the backup source. I feel that without a strong knowledge base the flight might have been unnecessarily diverted or returned to the field. I feel that the QRH should have provided more guidance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB190 Flight Crew reported a PRESN AUTO FAULT EICAS message during initial climb. The Captain could not find a pertinent QRH procedure and used system knowledge to switch the CPCS to manual and back to auto restoring normal operation.

Narrative: During climb out we received an EICAS Cyan message stating the following. PRESN AUTO FAULT [FAIL] followed by cyan PACK 1 & PACK 2 OFF. I had my F/O (First Officer) continue to fly while observing the cabin not climbing. I search for immediate action items and subsequently guidance from the QRH. The F/O asked to level off at 5;000 ft. The QRH offered no guidance. I reverted to knowledge of aircraft systems. A fault indicating a system failure of one system/channel/computer versus a failure where both system/channel/computers fail. I found a way to revert to the secondary cabin pressure controller system by selected the CPCS (Cabin Pressure Control System) knob from AUTO to MAN and back to AUTO. I had heard of a check airman having the same issue during training and pulled my recollection of his experience to help aid me in solving my issue. The CPCS returned to normal utilizing the second computer and the flight was continued without incident. Dispatch and Maintenance were notified and logged accordingly. Because the issue was identified; isolated and rectified immediately we were able to avoid any major pressurization issues. Where there is no guidance; procedures; checklist etc.; we must use prudent judgment and skill to overcome the unexpected and unknown to deal with what is presented. A fault in automated systems without immediate automatic reversion to the backup source. I feel that without a strong knowledge base the flight might have been unnecessarily diverted or returned to the field. I feel that the QRH should have provided more guidance.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.