Narrative:

Working a very busy local control position and dealing with a cumbersome and unsafe letter of agreement with the [company] ramp control is a hazard to flight safety. In this situation I was very busy adjusting the aircraft on final to achieve and maintain proper intersecting runway separation also known as preventing collisions between aircraft operating within the system. The primary purpose for the ATC. The traffic density was above average; and wind conditions made complexity elevated. As an additional contributing factor of workload a [small aircraft] departed runway 35 VFR which could not be seen out the window or on radar. During all of this aircraft X was twice given taxi instructions in accordance with local directives. The aircraft was intentionally not given a frequency change (I have found that this is a good way to work around aircraft that choose to ignore ATC instructions and listen to ramp 'controllers' instead of air traffic controllers). Aircraft X did choose to ignore ATC instructions and held on the taxiway for an extended period of time despite being given clear taxi instructions once again. Aircraft X after blocking an exit point of the runway for an extended period of time did enter the ramp after communicating with the ramp 'controller'. This caused me to shift focus from separating aircraft on converging courses to deal with an aircraft that before the LOA was changed for efficiency would have never been an issue. This facility has placed efficiency ahead of safety. This LOA is unsafe. Listen to the controller work force who are either dissatisfied with it or choose to ignore it and have gone back to working the way we used to do things.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PHL Local Controller reported a new Letter of Agreement procedure creates an unsafe situation for aircraft taxiing to the ramp.

Narrative: Working a very busy local control position and dealing with a cumbersome and unsafe letter of agreement with the [company] ramp control is a hazard to flight safety. In this situation I was very busy adjusting the aircraft on final to achieve and maintain proper intersecting runway separation also known as preventing collisions between aircraft operating within the system. The primary purpose for the ATC. The traffic density was above average; and wind conditions made complexity elevated. As an additional contributing factor of workload a [small aircraft] departed Runway 35 VFR which could not be seen out the window or on RADAR. During all of this Aircraft X was twice given taxi instructions in accordance with local directives. The aircraft was intentionally not given a frequency change (I have found that this is a good way to work around aircraft that choose to ignore ATC instructions and listen to ramp 'controllers' instead of air traffic controllers). Aircraft X did choose to ignore ATC instructions and held on the taxiway for an extended period of time despite being given clear taxi instructions once again. Aircraft X after blocking an exit point of the runway for an extended period of time did enter the ramp after communicating with the ramp 'controller'. This caused me to shift focus from separating aircraft on converging courses to deal with an aircraft that before the LOA was changed for efficiency would have never been an issue. This facility has placed efficiency ahead of safety. This LOA is unsafe. Listen to the controller work force who are either dissatisfied with it or choose to ignore it and have gone back to working the way we used to do things.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.