Narrative:

2 like type commuter aircraft being vectored for visibility approach were on opp base legs to runway 31R at the same altitude. The aircraft on left base reported on tower frequency with airport insight. The pilot did not report the opp direction traffic in sight. It was not apparent which aircraft was intended to be #1, as they were equidistant from the runway. As radar sep steadily decreased, I began to take the necessary steps to achieve some approved sep, including traffic pointout and subsequently a vector. It was later determined that the aircraft intended to be #2 had been instructed to maintain visibility sep with #1, information that would have allowed me as a tower controller to perform much more effectively. I point out here that at no time during the progression of this incident was the information passed along to me, only after the conflict had been resolved. Both aircraft landed west/O incident, however it was necessary for the #2 aircraft to execute a missed approach because of a lack of adequate approach interval, approximately 1 mi, and the succeeding aircraft was not changed to the tower frequency until 1/2 mi on final. Jfk tower and jfk approach are signatories to a LOA outlining transfer of control points for all approachs and establishing tower and approach airspace. To summarize, I believe that the following 3 items were major contributing factors to a potentially fatal loss of sep: 1) the approach control violated tower airspace west/O coordination, 2) the approach control was not forthcoming with approach sequence information that was in my opinion not obvious, and 3) the approach control did not ensure that 2 aircraft on merging courses were able to maintain visibility sep prior to transfer of control. Adherence to the LOA and a cessation of the adversarial attitude between tower and approach may help to avert a recurrence.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACFT SEQUENCING NOT FORWARDED TO TWR.

Narrative: 2 LIKE TYPE COMMUTER ACFT BEING VECTORED FOR VIS APCH WERE ON OPP BASE LEGS TO RWY 31R AT THE SAME ALT. THE ACFT ON LEFT BASE RPTED ON TWR FREQ WITH ARPT INSIGHT. THE PLT DID NOT RPT THE OPP DIRECTION TFC IN SIGHT. IT WAS NOT APPARENT WHICH ACFT WAS INTENDED TO BE #1, AS THEY WERE EQUIDISTANT FROM THE RWY. AS RADAR SEP STEADILY DECREASED, I BEGAN TO TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO ACHIEVE SOME APPROVED SEP, INCLUDING TFC POINTOUT AND SUBSEQUENTLY A VECTOR. IT WAS LATER DETERMINED THAT THE ACFT INTENDED TO BE #2 HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAINTAIN VIS SEP WITH #1, INFO THAT WOULD HAVE ALLOWED ME AS A TWR CTLR TO PERFORM MUCH MORE EFFECTIVELY. I POINT OUT HERE THAT AT NO TIME DURING THE PROGRESSION OF THIS INCIDENT WAS THE INFO PASSED ALONG TO ME, ONLY AFTER THE CONFLICT HAD BEEN RESOLVED. BOTH ACFT LANDED W/O INCIDENT, HOWEVER IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE #2 ACFT TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BECAUSE OF A LACK OF ADEQUATE APCH INTERVAL, APPROX 1 MI, AND THE SUCCEEDING ACFT WAS NOT CHANGED TO THE TWR FREQ UNTIL 1/2 MI ON FINAL. JFK TWR AND JFK APCH ARE SIGNATORIES TO A LOA OUTLINING TRANSFER OF CONTROL POINTS FOR ALL APCHS AND ESTABLISHING TWR AND APCH AIRSPACE. TO SUMMARIZE, I BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING 3 ITEMS WERE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO A POTENTIALLY FATAL LOSS OF SEP: 1) THE APCH CTL VIOLATED TWR AIRSPACE W/O COORD, 2) THE APCH CTL WAS NOT FORTHCOMING WITH APCH SEQUENCE INFO THAT WAS IN MY OPINION NOT OBVIOUS, AND 3) THE APCH CTL DID NOT ENSURE THAT 2 ACFT ON MERGING COURSES WERE ABLE TO MAINTAIN VIS SEP PRIOR TO TRANSFER OF CTL. ADHERENCE TO THE LOA AND A CESSATION OF THE ADVERSARIAL ATTITUDE BTWN TWR AND APCH MAY HELP TO AVERT A RECURRENCE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.