Narrative:

The two aircraft involved were in two different sectors with the crj aircraft tracking due eastbound to get around weather. The aircraft took off with routing over [washington airspace]. No aircraft had flown over fak in over two hours due to severe weather. Tmu should have never let that aircraft depart on that route. I; as the d-side; routed the aircraft over fkn… [to its destination]. This was the only way to get to [the destination]. The other aircraft was in sector 38 tracking northbound on J165 just south of nkkie intersection. This aircraft had not begun to deviate for the weather but would need to soon. The two aircraft got within 4.8 miles of each other at FL270. Prior; during; and after this event; several aircraft (10+) entered sector 38 from sector 36 without handoffs being made. The controllers working both sectors were too busy with separating and rerouting aircraft around the severe weather to ensure handoffs were made in a timely manner.in this particular instance; there were a few sectors that did not have weather. Those sectors were well over map value for hours on end. Even though requests were made to shut off departures; these came far too late; and were not effective enough in limiting the sectors volume. In my particular sector; we requested to shut off the barmy and kilns departures out of clt. 30 minutes later; I was still getting departures. Additionally; these departures were routed through severe thunderstorms. Nothing that would have helped me do my job of ensuring a safe; orderly; and efficient flow of traffic had been accomplished. As a result; this event occurred. It should be expected whenever there are two or more adjacent sectors working overloaded for over an hour. There was a line of weather that extended from the western end of kentucky east past richmond; va. This was not an isolated thunderstorm; it was a line of weather that had been predicted for days before. Yet still; the FAA's traffic management unit; from the command center on down; failed to prepare and act as it should have in the face of a severe weather event. Traffic management; either through gross negligence or unbridled apathy opted to allow aircraft to depart on routes that would require them to deviate hundreds of miles off course. Even after it was clear that entire sectors would not be able to work aircraft; and tmu was made aware of the situation; they opted to do nothing to manage the traffic in any meaningful way. They instead opted to allow the traffic to run 'until the wheels fell off' and then slow the traffic down as necessary. That is not a plan. That is highly trained professionals making a conscious choice to not make a plan. It leads me to believe that we have a collection of people both at the atscc and at our local tmu who are either choosing to not do their jobs effectively or are simply incompetent. Tmu's lack of effectiveness is not new. Every spring we hear about how 'this year will be different.' yet still; nothing changes. My expectations for tmu are low and diminishing; but the group continues to disappoint me on a daily basis. Safety is regularly compromised and yet no one is held accountable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Three ZDC Controllers described a loss of separation event that occurred during chaotic deviations around a line of thunderstorms. Lack of planning and control from the TMU were cited as factor in the event.

Narrative: The two aircraft involved were in two different sectors with the CRJ aircraft tracking due eastbound to get around weather. The aircraft took off with routing over [Washington Airspace]. No aircraft had flown over FAK in over two hours due to severe weather. TMU should have never let that aircraft depart on that route. I; as the D-Side; routed the aircraft over FKN… [to its destination]. This was the only way to get to [the destination]. The other aircraft was in sector 38 tracking northbound on J165 just south of NKKIE intersection. This aircraft had not begun to deviate for the weather but would need to soon. The two aircraft got within 4.8 miles of each other at FL270. Prior; during; and after this event; several aircraft (10+) entered sector 38 from sector 36 without handoffs being made. The controllers working both sectors were too busy with separating and rerouting aircraft around the severe weather to ensure handoffs were made in a timely manner.In this particular instance; there were a few sectors that did not have weather. Those sectors were well over map value for hours on end. Even though requests were made to shut off departures; these came far too late; and were not effective enough in limiting the sectors volume. In my particular sector; we requested to shut off the BARMY and KILNS departures out of CLT. 30 minutes later; I was still getting departures. Additionally; these departures were routed through severe thunderstorms. Nothing that would have helped me do my job of ensuring a safe; orderly; and efficient flow of traffic had been accomplished. As a result; this event occurred. It should be expected whenever there are two or more adjacent sectors working overloaded for over an hour. There was a line of weather that extended from the western end of Kentucky east past Richmond; VA. This was not an isolated thunderstorm; it was a line of weather that had been predicted for days before. Yet still; the FAA's Traffic Management Unit; from the Command Center on down; failed to prepare and act as it should have in the face of a severe weather event. Traffic Management; either through gross negligence or unbridled apathy opted to allow aircraft to depart on routes that would require them to deviate hundreds of miles off course. Even after it was clear that entire sectors would not be able to work aircraft; and TMU was made aware of the situation; they opted to do nothing to manage the traffic in any meaningful way. They instead opted to allow the traffic to run 'until the wheels fell off' and then slow the traffic down as necessary. That is not a plan. That is highly trained professionals making a conscious choice to not make a plan. It leads me to believe that we have a collection of people both at the ATSCC and at our local TMU who are either choosing to not do their jobs effectively or are simply incompetent. TMU's lack of effectiveness is not new. Every spring we hear about how 'This year will be different.' Yet still; nothing changes. My expectations for TMU are low and diminishing; but the group continues to disappoint me on a daily basis. Safety is regularly compromised and yet no one is held accountable.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.