Narrative:

Operationally our flight was normal until takeoff. Captain was the pilot flying. After rotation it seemed he noticed something with the controls. Sometime during the initial climb I asked 'is something wrong?' he said he wasn't sure. As we accelerated to 250 knots he slowly banked to the left and right and explained it was heavy to the left. We engaged and disengaged the autopilot several times during the climb and in cruise to try and get a feel for if something was indeed wrong. During this the autopilot trim lwd caution message illuminated twice. We considered that fairly normal. The captain demonstrated how turning the yoke to the right; the plane banked and seemed normal. Conversely in order to get the plane to bank left at the same rate the yoke had to be turned almost twice as much. I pulled up the flight controls synoptics page to see what was going on. The ailerons seemed to both be functioning normally. However when the airplane was pitched slightly up or down; you could see the pointer for the left side of the elevator was slightly off from the right. They were not aligned. It was our determination that the two sides of the elevator were split. This caused a constant rolling force to the right and required a considerable amount of extra aileron force to turn left. We also noticed that as airspeed increased the problem was less severe. Which made sense aerodynamically because the ailerons were operating more efficiently at higher airspeed. We were discussing our arrival and coming up with a plan. The captain; knowing a sim instructor was on our flight; asked me if I thought he should come to the cockpit; in order so we could get a third opinion. I agreed we should use all our resources. The captain had his seat assignment so I asked the flight attendant if she minded to have him call us on the intercom. When he called; the captain explained to him the situation and asked that he come to the jump seat in order to help us determine a plan. He agreed to assist and came up as we descended through 18;000 ft. After conversing; he reviewed the maintenance [logbook] for previous write ups and we discussed what might be wrong as well as what options we had. The challenge we faced was the potential increase of control issues as we slowed. We collaborated and decided to slow the aircraft as soon as possible below 10;000ft; change to the longest runway. We intended to stay in VFR conditions and; if at any point; we experience any anomalies or the airplane required any more control input than was previously experienced we would then accelerate; execute a go around; declare an emergency; remain in the area; reduce fuel onboard and then land. We asked that the instructor remain in the jumpseat in order to have an additional set of eyes on the flight control synoptic page that would be pulled up as much as possible. The three of us agreed to continue to communicate below 10;000 feet in order to remain continually informed of the airplane status. We were cleared by ATC to 7000 feet. At some point; after we descended through 10;000 feet; the captain disengaged the autopilot. As the captain was 'feeling out the controls' we were communicating about how the airplane was handling. At the same time I was communicating with ATC and answering thier questions as to why we needed the other runway. I explained the control issue and was asked whether we were declaring a emergency. Our response was 'not at this time'. The captain unintentionally continued descending through 7;000 feet and I brought this to his attention whereby he corrected at around 6;500 feet and climbed back up to a level altitude of 7;000. ATC asked during our conversation if we were 'level at 7;000; I show you at 6;600' I apologized and told him we were correcting and now back to 7;000. He said it was 'no problem' and immediately gave us further clearance to change for [the long runway] runway. ATC asked number of souls and fuel on board. I stumbled a little with the number trying to think if I added a jumpseater and the number of laps was unclear on the passenger load sheet. I provided ATC the wrong number initially but corrected the count immediately after. I also gave fuel; in hours; and ATC asked us to give it in pounds. I complied. The visual approach was normal with the exception of us communicating more and having the flight control synoptic page up. The captain said it took about the same amount of extra input on the ailerons to compensate for the elevator as on takeoff. The landing was normal and there was emergency equipment on both sides of the runway when we landed. We rolled out to the end of the runway and were asked if we needed further assistance. We did not and taxied into the gate. I was concerned that I may have missed something during my flight control check flow so I performed another during taxi in. All flight control synoptics showed full deflection matching the bars when the flight controls were manipulated to be fully deflected. Even in neutral position flight controls seemed normal; matching neutral detent. The only way to really tell something was wrong was to very slightly move the elevator forward or aft and match their respective side with the neutral detent on the synoptic page. A split in the elevators was visible.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 flight crew reported a left rolling tendency in flight as described by the flying Captain. The flight control synoptic page seemed to show that the two elevators were not in alignment. Flight continued to destination for a normal landing.

Narrative: Operationally our flight was normal until takeoff. Captain was the pilot flying. After rotation it seemed he noticed something with the controls. Sometime during the initial climb I asked 'is something wrong?' He said he wasn't sure. As we accelerated to 250 knots he slowly banked to the left and right and explained it was heavy to the left. We engaged and disengaged the autopilot several times during the climb and in cruise to try and get a feel for if something was indeed wrong. During this the autopilot trim LWD caution message illuminated twice. We considered that fairly normal. The Captain demonstrated how turning the yoke to the right; the plane banked and seemed normal. Conversely in order to get the plane to bank left at the same rate the yoke had to be turned almost twice as much. I pulled up the flight controls Synoptics page to see what was going on. The ailerons seemed to both be functioning normally. However when the airplane was pitched slightly up or down; you could see the pointer for the left side of the elevator was slightly off from the right. They were not aligned. It was our determination that the two sides of the elevator were split. This caused a constant rolling force to the right and required a considerable amount of extra aileron force to turn left. We also noticed that as airspeed increased the problem was less severe. Which made sense aerodynamically because the ailerons were operating more efficiently at higher airspeed. We were discussing our arrival and coming up with a plan. The Captain; knowing a sim instructor was on our flight; asked me if I thought he should come to the cockpit; in order so we could get a third opinion. I agreed we should use all our resources. The Captain had his seat assignment so I asked the flight attendant if she minded to have him call us on the intercom. When he called; the Captain explained to him the situation and asked that he come to the jump seat in order to help us determine a plan. He agreed to assist and came up as we descended through 18;000 ft. After conversing; he reviewed the maintenance [logbook] for previous write ups and we discussed what might be wrong as well as what options we had. The challenge we faced was the potential increase of control issues as we slowed. We collaborated and decided to slow the aircraft as soon as possible below 10;000ft; Change to the longest runway. We intended to stay in VFR conditions and; if at any point; we experience any anomalies or the airplane required any more control input than was previously experienced we would then accelerate; execute a go around; declare an emergency; remain in the area; reduce fuel onboard and then land. We asked that the instructor remain in the jumpseat in order to have an additional set of eyes on the flight control synoptic page that would be pulled up as much as possible. The three of us agreed to continue to communicate below 10;000 feet in order to remain continually informed of the airplane status. We were cleared by ATC to 7000 feet. At some point; after we descended through 10;000 feet; the Captain disengaged the autopilot. As the Captain was 'feeling out the controls' we were communicating about how the airplane was handling. At the same time I was communicating with ATC and answering thier questions as to why we needed the other runway. I explained the control issue and was asked whether we were declaring a emergency. Our response was 'not at this time'. The Captain unintentionally continued descending through 7;000 feet and I brought this to his attention whereby he corrected at around 6;500 feet and climbed back up to a level altitude of 7;000. ATC asked during our conversation if we were 'level at 7;000; I show you at 6;600' I apologized and told him we were correcting and now back to 7;000. He said it was 'no problem' and immediately gave us further clearance to change for [the long runway] runway. ATC asked number of souls and fuel on board. I stumbled a little with the number trying to think if I added a jumpseater and the number of laps was unclear on the passenger load sheet. I provided ATC the wrong number initially but corrected the count immediately after. I also gave fuel; in hours; and ATC asked us to give it in pounds. I complied. The visual approach was normal with the exception of us communicating more and having the flight control synoptic page up. The captain said it took about the same amount of extra input on the ailerons to compensate for the elevator as on takeoff. The landing was normal and there was emergency equipment on both sides of the runway when we landed. We rolled out to the end of the runway and were asked if we needed further assistance. We did not and taxied into the gate. I was concerned that I may have missed something during my flight control check flow so I performed another during taxi in. All flight control synoptics showed full deflection matching the bars when the flight controls were manipulated to be fully deflected. Even in neutral position flight controls seemed normal; matching neutral detent. The only way to really tell something was wrong was to very slightly move the elevator forward or aft and match their respective side with the neutral detent on the synoptic page. A split in the elevators was visible.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.