Narrative:

I was working radar/satellite and controller in charge (controller in charge) in a combined tower configuration. A co-worker was working local control; ground control; and flight data combined in the tower. [Airport operations] made an initial call for clearance on to taxiway alpha and runway 22 for surface inspections. Ground control cleared [airport operations] on to the requested taxiway and runway 22. Aircraft X called ready for taxi and received instructions from ground control. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff on runway 22. [Airport operations] called ground control and advised that he had never been told to exit the runway for the departing aircraft. After learning what had happened; ground control asked that [airport operations] call the tower at his first convenience. On the phone; [airport operations] advised that he was clear of the runway only because he was monitoring the frequency while working and quickly exited upon hearing local control issue a takeoff instruction.it is important to note that in this incident; the individual working local; ground; and flight data did not follow a local procedure and failed to use the required [reminder aid] when someone has been given clearance on to an active runway. As controller in charge I did not hear him issue a vehicle clearance on to the runway because I was performing controller in charge functions and working a position. Due to me not hearing the initial clearance on to the runway; no [reminder aid] being used and not a single other transmission being made to the truck between the time he was given clearance on to the runway and aircraft X being cleared; no 'flag' was raised on my part as to (a) why the [reminder aid] was not being utilized as required and (B) why a takeoff instruction had been given with a vehicle on the departure end of runway 22.all personnel must use required [reminder aid] devices at all times. I feel that a controller in charge combined with a position is ineffective. This is a perfect example. It is not practical to assume that a person working a position and performing required controller in charge duties can 100 percent monitor other operations for safety. Prior to this and obviously now; I strongly believe that a standalone controller in charge should be required. This is the only way that the operation and frequencies will be monitored to prevent events like this from happening.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Controller In Charge also working control positions in the Tower reported not noticing the Local Controller clear an aircraft for takeoff with a vehicle on the active runway.

Narrative: I was working Radar/Satellite and Controller in Charge (CIC) in a combined tower configuration. A co-worker was working Local Control; Ground Control; and Flight Data combined in the tower. [Airport Operations] made an initial call for clearance on to Taxiway Alpha and Runway 22 for surface inspections. Ground Control cleared [Airport Operations] on to the requested taxiway and Runway 22. Aircraft X called ready for taxi and received instructions from Ground Control. Aircraft X was cleared for takeoff on Runway 22. [Airport Operations] called Ground Control and advised that he had never been told to exit the runway for the departing aircraft. After learning what had happened; Ground Control asked that [Airport Operations] call the tower at his first convenience. On the phone; [Airport Operations] advised that he was clear of the runway only because he was monitoring the frequency while working and quickly exited upon hearing Local Control issue a takeoff instruction.It is important to note that in this incident; the individual working Local; Ground; and Flight Data did not follow a local procedure and failed to use the required [reminder aid] when someone has been given clearance on to an active runway. As Controller in Charge I did not hear him issue a vehicle clearance on to the runway because I was performing CIC functions and working a position. Due to me not hearing the initial clearance on to the runway; no [reminder aid] being used and not a single other transmission being made to the truck between the time he was given clearance on to the runway and Aircraft X being cleared; no 'flag' was raised on my part as to (A) why the [reminder aid] was not being utilized as required and (B) why a takeoff instruction had been given with a vehicle on the departure end of Runway 22.All personnel must use required [reminder aid] devices at all times. I feel that a CIC combined with a position is ineffective. This is a perfect example. It is not practical to assume that a person working a position and performing required CIC duties can 100 percent monitor other operations for safety. Prior to this and obviously now; I strongly believe that a standalone CIC should be required. This is the only way that the operation and frequencies will be monitored to prevent events like this from happening.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.