Narrative:

Before flight was able to push back; they lost all yellow hydraulic fluid and maintenance (mx) was called out. After speaking with our contract [mechanic] on the field they found out he was a new a&P and had less than 1 year experience. At that point mx control began to discuss amongst themselves that they hoped a relatively new [mechanic] could find the leak. Mx was able to locate the leak at a seal (I believe) and aircraft on ground (aog) located another part. Then everyone realized that because of the inexperience of the [mechanic] on the field the policy would not allow him to inspect the part. Policy states something like; [mechanic] with less than 1 year experience are not allowed to receive and inspect parts. The more experienced [mechanic] who could have inspected it would not be into the airport for several hours. Crew scheduling jumped in with that the crew would time out; and the pressure went on from soc and mx supervisor. They started asking if there was an exception to this rule. Could we use an emergency mx provider to receive the part? Why was no one considering why we have the rule! Was the young [mechanic] on the field exceptional; maybe? Was that the governing decision making process? No; company pressure to not lose a crew or take a longer delay was. Delays should not trump safety! To be clear no one was trying to be unsafe on purpose but the pressure not to take delays/time out crews is now the governing principle valued by management. Considering the amount of mx management and controllers run out of the department because management wasn't getting the performance they wanted; I can understand how this situation could be set up. Here is a couple other examples I have seen in the last couple weeks. In the fom there [are] 4 mx items that we are not allowed to plan and international flight with inoperative; unless receiving direct authorization from the director of ops. One of which is the TCAS; in the last month an aircraft with a TCAS inoperative was on a line that went internationally multiple times. When I asked if there was a swap for the aircraft; I was told they wouldn't want to take a delay when they can just get permission to fly the aircraft. Why do we have the rule? If it is not an issue to even be considered; then why include it as a safety/operational restriction. A new dispatcher had an aircraft with weather radar failure in flight. Some of the first things said to him were that according to the fars we can continue to destination; will we be able to complete this flight and deal with it at the destination. Despite an area of scattered storms. The flight was able to be sent around the weather safely; but it is a lot of pressure on a new dispatcher to feel as he is dealing with his first mid air issue at the airline. Not intentional pressure to force completion; but again why is there a rule? Captains routinely complain about ops not having headsets while pushing back aircraft into a busy airport. There is an authorized way to do hand communications to safely push back aircraft; I get that. But why is the preferred and standard procedure to use a headset? I get that there are exceptions to all these rules for a reason; there are times when situations don't fit into the governing principle. An airline runs a dangerous operation when it plans to using exceptions instead of the rule. [Airline] has to respect safety and the intended way operations are to be conducted constantly making the exceptions work because doing that is the only way to keep the airline running sets us up to have a failure that is a tragedy. Stop lionizing people for making something work. Something that is an exception or slightly in the gray area that because it was used saved a crew; an hour; or whatever. While questioning anyone who doesn't take that route because they are trying to run the operation by the rules it was designed to operate under. If you do this you are tacitly encouraging people to just make the operation work because that is all you value. I have been told when I ask questions multiple times that management knows that there are systematic problems; ops not answering their messages or no mx scheduled on the field till hours after the first scheduled departure; but if you just will find a way to keep it moving the management team will sort it all out. They are trying. That is on its way to create a corporate attitude that is a disaster for safety. The fix for this is to create a standard operating procedure that you mean; and then follow it. Yes there should be occasional deviations from this but they should be considered significant and viewed in as a possible deviation from the safest course of action. There has to be communication about how we need to operate according to our standard operating procedures (particularly in the soc); and then support of people who act on that despite the possible delays.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A Dispatcher reported that a flight was unable to push back due to a hydraulic leak and there would not be a qualified maintenance person to inspect a replacement part for several hours.

Narrative: Before flight was able to push back; they lost all yellow HYD fluid and Maintenance (MX) was called out. After speaking with our contract [mechanic] on the field they found out he was a new A&P and had less than 1 year experience. At that point MX control began to discuss amongst themselves that they hoped a relatively new [mechanic] could find the leak. MX was able to locate the leak at a seal (I believe) and Aircraft On Ground (AOG) located another part. Then everyone realized that because of the inexperience of the [mechanic] on the field the policy would not allow him to inspect the part. Policy states something like; [mechanic] with less than 1 year experience are not allowed to Receive and inspect parts. The more experienced [mechanic] who could have inspected it would not be into the airport for several hours. Crew scheduling jumped in with that the crew would time out; and the pressure went on from SOC and MX supervisor. They started asking if there was an exception to this rule. Could we use an emergency MX provider to receive the part? WHY WAS NO ONE CONSIDERING WHY WE HAVE THE RULE! Was the young [mechanic] on the field exceptional; maybe? Was that the governing decision making process? No; company pressure to not lose a crew or take a longer delay was. Delays should not trump safety! To be clear no one was trying to be unsafe on purpose but the pressure not to take delays/time out crews is now the governing principle valued by management. Considering the amount of MX management and controllers run out of the department because management wasn't getting the performance they wanted; I can understand how this situation could be set up. Here is a couple other examples I have seen in the last couple weeks. In the FOM there [are] 4 MX items that we are not allowed to plan and international flight with inoperative; unless receiving direct authorization from the director of ops. One of which is the TCAS; in the last month an aircraft with a TCAS inoperative was on a line that went internationally multiple times. When I asked if there was a swap for the aircraft; I was told they wouldn't want to take a delay when they can just get permission to fly the aircraft. WHY DO WE HAVE THE RULE? If it is not an issue to even be considered; then why include it as a safety/operational restriction. A new dispatcher had an aircraft with weather radar failure in flight. Some of the first things said to him were that according to the FARs we can continue to destination; will we be able to complete this flight and deal with it at the destination. Despite an area of scattered storms. The flight was able to be sent around the weather safely; but it is a lot of pressure on a new dispatcher to feel as he is dealing with his first mid air issue at the airline. Not intentional pressure to force completion; but again WHY IS THERE A RULE? Captains routinely complain about ops not having headsets while pushing back aircraft into a busy airport. There is an authorized way to do hand communications to safely push back aircraft; I get that. But why is the preferred and standard procedure to use a headset? I get that there are exceptions to all these rules for a reason; there are times when situations don't fit into the governing principle. An airline runs a dangerous operation when it plans to using exceptions instead of the rule. [Airline] has to respect safety and the intended way operations are to be conducted constantly making the exceptions work because doing that is the only way to keep the airline running sets us up to have a failure that is a tragedy. Stop lionizing people for making something work. Something that is an exception or slightly in the gray area that because it was used saved a crew; an hour; or whatever. While questioning anyone who doesn't take that route because they are trying to run the operation by the rules it was designed to operate under. IF YOU DO THIS YOU ARE TACITLY ENCOURAGING PEOPLE TO JUST MAKE THE OPERATION WORK BECAUSE THAT IS ALL YOU VALUE. I have been told when I ask questions multiple times that management knows that there are systematic problems; ops not answering their messages or no MX scheduled on the field till hours after the first scheduled departure; but if you just will find a way to keep it moving the management team will sort it all out. They are trying. THAT IS ON ITS WAY TO CREATE A CORPORATE ATTITUDE THAT IS A DISASTER FOR SAFETY. The fix for this is to create a standard operating procedure that you mean; and then follow it. Yes there should be occasional deviations from this but they should be considered significant and viewed in as a possible deviation from the safest course of action. There has to be communication about how we need to operate according to our standard operating procedures (particularly in the SOC); and then support of people who act on that despite the possible delays.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.