Narrative:

We departed gate and proceeded to start engine number 1 when advised by the rampers we were clear to start to conduct first flight checks. The captain decided to taxi on one engine since there was a very long line for takeoff on runway 4. We began our taxi and eventually switched over to the tower frequency. At this time; I was told to delay engine start number 2 and attempted the start. The engine start advisory appeared and the switch light illuminated; but there was no rise in N2. I aborted the start and followed company procedures. The captain decided to attempt another start; but this time using crossbleed air from the number 1 side. The problem continued and once again there was no N2 indication. I called tower and got clearance across the runway and switched to ground frequency to attempt to troubleshoot the problem. The captain and I agreed it was most likely a start valve malfunction on the number 2 engine; and he called maintenance while I contacted operations to get a gate to return to. Once we taxied back to our gate; we deplaned the passengers and maintenance arrived. They told us they were going to attempt to manually open the start valve on the number 2 engine and we worked out a signaling system in order to ensure the safety of maintenance personnel on the engine. The first start attempt with maintenance personnel was aborted because of rapidly rising interstage turbine temperature (itt) and a potential hot start on the number 2 engine. The maintenance personnel returned to the cockpit and decided to attempt a second start. The second start attempt was aborted as well; but this time by the systems in the aircraft. After approximately 5 minutes; we attempted a third start; but this time we used normal procedures and the number 2 engine started. The maintenance personnel signed off the maintenance log and we were cleared to depart. We boarded the passengers and requested pushback from the gate. When the rampers advised us to start engines; the captain opted to start number 2 for a single engine taxi to runway 4. We attempted the start; but once again were forced to abort the start because a rapid rise in itt up to approximately 750 degrees. The captain called maintenance and sought their advice on what actions to take next. They told him to attempt another start while he was in communication with them. The number 2 engine started within limits on the second start and we proceeded to taxi to takeoff from runway 4. On takeoff; the itt was abnormally high but still in the green. Throughout the flight; itt on the number 2 engine was approximately 100-150 degrees hotter than on the number 1 engine; but still within the limits and in the green arc.after landing in our filed destination; we were rushed by a gate agent attempting to get the already delayed flight off the ground. The captain and I went through normal procedures to get the flight to safely depart. We did not receive a pre departure clearance so we contacted clearance delivery and were given our clearance and also a wheels up time of xa:35 local. We were unable to meet this time and requested a different time with ground after pushback. A new wheels up time of xa:50 local time was assigned and we pushed back from the gate and started the number 2 engine. Once again; the itt rose rapidly and reached an abnormally high temperature; but did not exceed limitations. The captain told me that it was the advice of maintenance to let the system abort the start and not manually abort it prior to the start. After successfully starting number 2; I started number 1 and we began our taxi to runway xx. It is my recollection that we did not perform a takeoff briefing; however; all items on the takeoff briefing were discussed just minutes before at the gate. We lined up to take runway xx; the captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. He advanced the thrust levers while I kept a constant scan on itt. The highest value I recall seeing was 914 degrees. We continued the takeoff and were handed off to departure. At approximately xa:50 local time and at 2;000 feet MSL; the master warning illuminated and the triple chime sounded indicated a fire. We identified the number 2 engine as the engine on fire and proceeded to follow the engine fire/severe damage immediate action checklist. This led us to the QRH and we followed the procedures outlined in the QRH exactly and adhered to the training we had received from the company. We decided that engine damage was suspected and did not attempt a relight of the number 2 engine. I performed the single engine procedures checklist and we got the aircraft configured for landing. When the emergency presented itself the captain took over the radio so I was free to run the checklist without interruption. He [advised ATC] and was assigned vectors to return to runway xx . He advised the flight attendants of the nature of the emergency and told them not to conduct an emergency evacuation of the cabin. We programmed the ILS xx into the FMS and tuned the proper frequencies. We also completed an arrival check and landing check. When we landed on runway xx; emergency vehicles gave us the all clear and stated there was no fire they could see. We taxied back to the gate and the emergency vehicles followed us. No other incident occurred after this point.the only threats that occurred during the flight was the engine fire and that was extinguished as soon as the number 2 engine was shut down and the single engine landing. Both were complied with utilizing proper checklist procedures. I believe this was because of the short time to wheels up assigned by ATC and a desire to get the already drastically delayed flight off the ground. No undesired aircraft state occurred as a result of this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-700 flight crew reported experiencing a #2 engine starter malfunction on the first flight of the day and returned to the gate. All subsequent #2 engine starts produced high Interstage Turbine Temperature. On the second takeoff the day; the #2 engine fire warning alerted at 2;000 feet climbing so the QRH was completed and the flight returned to the departure airport for an uneventful single engine landing.

Narrative: We departed gate and proceeded to start engine number 1 when advised by the rampers we were clear to start to conduct first flight checks. The Captain decided to taxi on one engine since there was a very long line for takeoff on RWY 4. We began our taxi and eventually switched over to the tower frequency. At this time; I was told to delay engine start number 2 and attempted the start. The engine start advisory appeared and the switch light illuminated; but there was no rise in N2. I aborted the start and followed company procedures. The captain decided to attempt another start; but this time using crossbleed air from the number 1 side. The problem continued and once again there was no N2 indication. I called tower and got clearance across the runway and switched to ground frequency to attempt to troubleshoot the problem. The Captain and I agreed it was most likely a start valve malfunction on the number 2 engine; and he called maintenance while I contacted operations to get a gate to return to. Once we taxied back to our gate; we deplaned the passengers and maintenance arrived. They told us they were going to attempt to manually open the start valve on the number 2 engine and we worked out a signaling system in order to ensure the safety of maintenance personnel on the engine. The first start attempt with maintenance personnel was aborted because of rapidly rising Interstage Turbine Temperature (ITT) and a potential hot start on the number 2 engine. The maintenance personnel returned to the cockpit and decided to attempt a second start. The second start attempt was aborted as well; but this time by the systems in the aircraft. After approximately 5 minutes; we attempted a third start; but this time we used normal procedures and the number 2 engine started. The maintenance personnel signed off the maintenance log and we were cleared to depart. We boarded the passengers and requested pushback from the gate. When the rampers advised us to start engines; the Captain opted to start number 2 for a single engine taxi to RWY 4. We attempted the start; but once again were forced to abort the start because a rapid rise in ITT up to approximately 750 degrees. The Captain called maintenance and sought their advice on what actions to take next. They told him to attempt another start while he was in communication with them. The number 2 engine started within limits on the second start and we proceeded to taxi to takeoff from RWY 4. On takeoff; the ITT was abnormally high but still in the green. Throughout the flight; ITT on the number 2 engine was approximately 100-150 degrees hotter than on the number 1 engine; but still within the limits and in the green arc.After landing in our filed destination; we were rushed by a gate agent attempting to get the already delayed flight off the ground. The Captain and I went through normal procedures to get the flight to safely depart. We did not receive a PDC so we contacted clearance delivery and were given our clearance and also a wheels up time of XA:35 local. We were unable to meet this time and requested a different time with ground after pushback. A new wheels up time of XA:50 local time was assigned and we pushed back from the gate and started the number 2 engine. Once again; the ITT rose rapidly and reached an abnormally high temperature; but did not exceed limitations. The Captain told me that it was the advice of maintenance to let the system abort the start and not manually abort it prior to the start. After successfully starting number 2; I started number 1 and we began our taxi to RWY XX. It is my recollection that we did not perform a takeoff briefing; however; all items on the takeoff briefing were discussed just minutes before at the gate. We lined up to take RWY XX; the Captain was the pilot flying and I was the pilot monitoring. He advanced the thrust levers while I kept a constant scan on ITT. The highest value I recall seeing was 914 degrees. We continued the takeoff and were handed off to departure. At approximately XA:50 local time and at 2;000 feet MSL; the Master Warning illuminated and the triple chime sounded indicated a fire. We identified the number 2 engine as the engine on fire and proceeded to follow the Engine Fire/Severe Damage Immediate Action Checklist. This led us to the QRH and we followed the procedures outlined in the QRH exactly and adhered to the training we had received from the company. We decided that engine damage was suspected and did not attempt a relight of the number 2 engine. I performed the Single Engine Procedures checklist and we got the aircraft configured for landing. When the emergency presented itself the Captain took over the radio so I was free to run the checklist without interruption. He [advised ATC] and was assigned vectors to return to RWY XX . He advised the Flight Attendants of the nature of the emergency and told them not to conduct an emergency evacuation of the cabin. We programmed the ILS XX into the FMS and tuned the proper frequencies. We also completed an arrival check and landing check. When we landed on RWY XX; emergency vehicles gave us the all clear and stated there was no fire they could see. We taxied back to the gate and the emergency vehicles followed us. No other incident occurred after this point.The only threats that occurred during the flight was the engine fire and that was extinguished as soon as the number 2 engine was shut down and the single engine landing. Both were complied with utilizing proper checklist procedures. I believe this was because of the short time to wheels up assigned by ATC and a desire to get the already drastically delayed flight off the ground. No undesired aircraft state occurred as a result of this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.