Narrative:

Dosta approach told us initially to plan on visibility approach. WX was later given as 500' scattered. We commented to ourselves that the layer didn't look scattered, more like broken. The lower layer was almost checkerboard with clouds and small holes. No hole appeared big enough for a VFR descent/visibility/contact approach. While being vectored the captain announced he had the end of the runway in sight. Since we were on a left down wind, it was on his side of the aircraft and I could not see anything, I gave control to the captain who began an immediate descent. While I was running landing checks, we descended into the cloud layer and lost visibility references. We came out the bottom at about 400' AGL and had overshot the runway 35 centerline and were too close/fast to correct back to runway centerline. The captain asked me to get an expedited landing clearance for runway 30 and tower cleared us to land again. We were fast and only had approach flaps. We landed and with heavy reverse and braking got stopped. The runway we landed on was not listed in our airport runway analysis charts. We had conducted a circling approach with less than 1000' and 3 mi required by our operations specifications or a contact approach (not clear of clouds) which we are not authority/authorized. At first I assumed that the captain had adequate visibility references on his side of the aircraft and that it was simply in my blind spot. As the situation progressed, I was shocked by the captain's lack of judgement in even attempting the visibility approach with obviously no better references on his side than I had on mine. I thought he would miss the approach instead of continue to another runway so low and fast. This was the first time I had flown with this captain. I should have asserted myself to try to avoid the initial visibility attempt or I should have pushed for a missed approach. I believe that my initial probationary status was a factor in my thinking.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LTT ACCEPTS A VIS AND GOES IMC. CIRCLES AND LANDS ON RWY NOT AUTH IN COMPANY OP SPECS.

Narrative: DOSTA APCH TOLD US INITIALLY TO PLAN ON VIS APCH. WX WAS LATER GIVEN AS 500' SCATTERED. WE COMMENTED TO OURSELVES THAT THE LAYER DIDN'T LOOK SCATTERED, MORE LIKE BROKEN. THE LOWER LAYER WAS ALMOST CHECKERBOARD WITH CLOUDS AND SMALL HOLES. NO HOLE APPEARED BIG ENOUGH FOR A VFR DSCNT/VIS/CONTACT APCH. WHILE BEING VECTORED THE CAPT ANNOUNCED HE HAD THE END OF THE RWY IN SIGHT. SINCE WE WERE ON A L DOWN WIND, IT WAS ON HIS SIDE OF THE ACFT AND I COULD NOT SEE ANYTHING, I GAVE CTL TO THE CAPT WHO BEGAN AN IMMEDIATE DSCNT. WHILE I WAS RUNNING LNDG CHKS, WE DSNDED INTO THE CLOUD LAYER AND LOST VIS REFERENCES. WE CAME OUT THE BOTTOM AT ABOUT 400' AGL AND HAD OVERSHOT THE RWY 35 CENTERLINE AND WERE TOO CLOSE/FAST TO CORRECT BACK TO RWY CENTERLINE. THE CAPT ASKED ME TO GET AN EXPEDITED LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 30 AND TWR CLRED US TO LAND AGAIN. WE WERE FAST AND ONLY HAD APCH FLAPS. WE LANDED AND WITH HEAVY REVERSE AND BRAKING GOT STOPPED. THE RWY WE LANDED ON WAS NOT LISTED IN OUR ARPT RWY ANALYSIS CHARTS. WE HAD CONDUCTED A CIRCLING APCH WITH LESS THAN 1000' AND 3 MI REQUIRED BY OUR OPS SPECS OR A CONTACT APCH (NOT CLR OF CLOUDS) WHICH WE ARE NOT AUTH. AT FIRST I ASSUMED THAT THE CAPT HAD ADEQUATE VIS REFERENCES ON HIS SIDE OF THE ACFT AND THAT IT WAS SIMPLY IN MY BLIND SPOT. AS THE SITUATION PROGRESSED, I WAS SHOCKED BY THE CAPT'S LACK OF JUDGEMENT IN EVEN ATTEMPTING THE VIS APCH WITH OBVIOUSLY NO BETTER REFERENCES ON HIS SIDE THAN I HAD ON MINE. I THOUGHT HE WOULD MISS THE APCH INSTEAD OF CONTINUE TO ANOTHER RWY SO LOW AND FAST. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME I HAD FLOWN WITH THIS CAPT. I SHOULD HAVE ASSERTED MYSELF TO TRY TO AVOID THE INITIAL VIS ATTEMPT OR I SHOULD HAVE PUSHED FOR A MISSED APCH. I BELIEVE THAT MY INITIAL PROBATIONARY STATUS WAS A FACTOR IN MY THINKING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.