Narrative:

We were cleared for the ILS runway 8 approach into marquette co airport. WX at the time was reported to us as 200' partially obscured, 1/2 mi visibility, light snow, blowing snow, wind 090/12, braking action poor. At approximately 200' above decision height we got the approach lights in view, shortly thereafter the runway lights and runway came into view. Captain continued on down to land on profile. On touchdown all visual references were lost by blowing snow. When we emerged we were veering across the right-hand side of the runway. We proceeded to veer off the runway. The aircraft came to rest in the area between the runway and the taxiway. As soon as the aircraft came to rest we shut down the engines, a call was made for crash fire rescue equipment on FSS frequency, and we proceeded with the emergency checklist. The F/a came forward and reported that no one was injured. I proceeded aft to check possible routes out of the aircraft and the cabin situation. Upon arrival of crash fire rescue equipment the passenger were evacuated through the forward cabin door due to the snow the aircraft was resting in. After all the passenger were evacuated the crew exited the aircraft accompanied by crash fire rescue equipment personnel. In my opinion the mishap was the result of recurring natural WX phenomenon which is also influenced by the area's terrain. This WX includes large amounts of snowfall with quick accumulations as well as variable winds. The local terrain includes a large rock hill just to the north of runway 08-26 in marquette. This hill creates mechanical turbulence around it which makes the wind variable across the airport property, and creating situations such as the 'white out' we encountered. We had no prior warning that this could occur or that it was occurring that evening. As well, the runway surface was less than ideal. It was reported as plowed, however runway markings were barely visible and blended with the snow. No surface preparations such as sand or salt had been placed on the runway which might have helped traction upon touchdown. Air crews should also have some guidelines to go by in this type of situation. Very few if any publications address this issue and subsequently neither do many training programs. This is a tough situation in that no visual references are available and the aircraft is usually very close or on the ground. These things I feel might have been contributing factors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER LNDG AT MQT DEPARTS RWY IN CROSSWIND GUSTS AND BLOWING SNOW WHITEOUT.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR THE ILS RWY 8 APCH INTO MARQUETTE CO ARPT. WX AT THE TIME WAS REPORTED TO US AS 200' PARTIALLY OBSCURED, 1/2 MI VISIBILITY, LIGHT SNOW, BLOWING SNOW, WIND 090/12, BRAKING ACTION POOR. AT APPROX 200' ABOVE DECISION HEIGHT WE GOT THE APCH LIGHTS IN VIEW, SHORTLY THEREAFTER THE RWY LIGHTS AND RWY CAME INTO VIEW. CAPT CONTINUED ON DOWN TO LAND ON PROFILE. ON TOUCHDOWN ALL VISUAL REFERENCES WERE LOST BY BLOWING SNOW. WHEN WE EMERGED WE WERE VEERING ACROSS THE RIGHT-HAND SIDE OF THE RWY. WE PROCEEDED TO VEER OFF THE RWY. THE ACFT CAME TO REST IN THE AREA BETWEEN THE RWY AND THE TXWY. AS SOON AS THE ACFT CAME TO REST WE SHUT DOWN THE ENGINES, A CALL WAS MADE FOR CFR ON FSS FREQ, AND WE PROCEEDED WITH THE EMER CHECKLIST. THE F/A CAME FORWARD AND REPORTED THAT NO ONE WAS INJURED. I PROCEEDED AFT TO CHECK POSSIBLE ROUTES OUT OF THE ACFT AND THE CABIN SITUATION. UPON ARR OF CFR THE PAX WERE EVACUATED THROUGH THE FORWARD CABIN DOOR DUE TO THE SNOW THE ACFT WAS RESTING IN. AFTER ALL THE PAX WERE EVACUATED THE CREW EXITED THE ACFT ACCOMPANIED BY CFR PERSONNEL. IN MY OPINION THE MISHAP WAS THE RESULT OF RECURRING NATURAL WX PHENOMENON WHICH IS ALSO INFLUENCED BY THE AREA'S TERRAIN. THIS WX INCLUDES LARGE AMOUNTS OF SNOWFALL WITH QUICK ACCUMULATIONS AS WELL AS VARIABLE WINDS. THE LCL TERRAIN INCLUDES A LARGE ROCK HILL JUST TO THE N OF RWY 08-26 IN MARQUETTE. THIS HILL CREATES MECHANICAL TURBULENCE AROUND IT WHICH MAKES THE WIND VARIABLE ACROSS THE ARPT PROPERTY, AND CREATING SITUATIONS SUCH AS THE 'WHITE OUT' WE ENCOUNTERED. WE HAD NO PRIOR WARNING THAT THIS COULD OCCUR OR THAT IT WAS OCCURRING THAT EVENING. AS WELL, THE RWY SURFACE WAS LESS THAN IDEAL. IT WAS REPORTED AS PLOWED, HOWEVER RWY MARKINGS WERE BARELY VISIBLE AND BLENDED WITH THE SNOW. NO SURFACE PREPARATIONS SUCH AS SAND OR SALT HAD BEEN PLACED ON THE RWY WHICH MIGHT HAVE HELPED TRACTION UPON TOUCHDOWN. AIR CREWS SHOULD ALSO HAVE SOME GUIDELINES TO GO BY IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION. VERY FEW IF ANY PUBLICATIONS ADDRESS THIS ISSUE AND SUBSEQUENTLY NEITHER DO MANY TRAINING PROGRAMS. THIS IS A TOUGH SITUATION IN THAT NO VISUAL REFERENCES ARE AVAILABLE AND THE ACFT IS USUALLY VERY CLOSE OR ON THE GND. THESE THINGS I FEEL MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.