Narrative:

I filled small aircraft aircraft at livingston co airport (3HE) from the 100LL pump on the main ramp. The left tank was dry and took 26 gals, and the right tank took 18 for a total capacity of 52 gals. I used the right tank for the 10 min return trip to cackleberry (2mi9). I had planned to fly to florida with 3 passenger but a snow storm started so I cancelled departure and kept logging onto dtc duat throughout the day to wait for better WX. Rather than make a night flight, I decided to depart early the next morning. The aircraft is kept in an unheated hangar and since the temperature was forecast to drop to -5F overnight, I put a small electric preheater in the cowling, under the engine for 12 hours. I did a thorough preflight including draining the wing sumps. The wing sumps were lightly frozen but did drain and reseal. The drain for the gascolator is a handle inside the cabin by the fuel selector on the floor. The lever pulled normally but I did not get out and verify that any fuel had drained. I selected the left tank and started the engine. It started normally and idled smoothly. I warmed it for 10 mins before run-up. During run-up I did the full checklist from the operator's handbook as I always do. The oil and cylinder temperatures were in the green before I started the takeoff roll. I had done a weight and balance calculation and was very near gross weight but with the cold air and the engine up to temperature, I expected no trouble with the takeoff. The elevation at 2mi9 is 890' and runway 6 is 2120' long. The sod surface was frozen and the snow as blown off by the strong winds the night before. When I started the takeoff roll, the temperature was -1F and the windsock was showing a light wind from the north. I was expecting liftoff at midfield but the plane would not fly until about 1500'. I checked the tachometer and confirmed 2700 RPM. The climb was surprisingly poor considering the density altitude was -3000'. I held the nose low after I cleared the obstacles and let the speed increase to 95 KTS before I turned or climbed. I started a shallow climbing turn to the right and as I came through south I heard a backfire. I leveled the wings and started the emergency checklist. There was no possibility of returning to the airport. The backfiring continued and got worse. I tried both mags, confirmed the boost pump was still on, and made sure the throttle, mixture, and propeller were full forward. I switched to the right tank and tried different throttle settings and even pulled the mixture for a second to be sure I was dealing with fuel starvation. Within 10 seconds I was not able to maintain altitude. I had only attained an altitude of 300-400'. The 1ST clearing was nearly a mi ahead and was a rolling wheat field covered by 6' of hard crusted snow. I estimate there was 1200' of field from the edge of a swamp on the near side to a fence on the far side. I left the aircraft clean to stretch the glide and threw the manual landing gear down at the last second. The tracks showed the touchdown to be 3' into the field. I apparently didn't get the gear handle to latch because the gear handle went back to the floor and the gear collapsed (retracted) after only a few ft. The plane slid to a stop on its belly in about 500'. After evacuating the passenger and confirming master, mags, and fuel were off, we walked to a nearby farmhouse. I didn't think the event needed to be reported because I believed the engine died from fuel ice and the landing was smooth. This was my 1ST mistake. My next mistake was bringing in a crane the next morning and moving the aircraft. That was when 2 inspectors from the detroit FSDO arrived. They informed me that I should have reported the event to them and gave me an NTSB form to complete. After taking pictures, they allowed me to remove the aircraft. They later examined the aircraft and found ice in a fuel line in the engine compartment. Afterward, I went to the FSDO to meet with the inspectors. During the 2 hours of discussion, I admitted that I had made a serious mistake in disturbing the scene and not reporting theevent to the FAA. They told me the accident would be downgraded to an incident and that I needed to become more familiar with the regulations, especially NTSB 830. I agreed and the matter was closed. In the case of the engine failure, checking the gascolator sample may have uncovered the water contamination. I have seen rental planes where the wing sumps would not drain on a cold day and it was not considered a problem by the FBO. I believe this added to my neglect. More information on fuel contamination and fuel ice needs to be disseminated to pilots. In the case of reporting accidents and incidents I believe that there is a paranoia among pilots that causes an individual that is involved in a violation to think about their lawyer 1ST and the FAA 2ND. I was told at the FSDO that they are aware of this and would like to see a more cooperative attitude on both sides. I was treated fairly by the FAA, even though I was not completely honest with them at first. I feel there is a need for pilots to receive more information on enforcement actions.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA, TAKING OFF ON COLD DAY, EXPERIENCES FUEL EXHAUSTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER LIFTOFF AND MAKES OFF ARPT LNDG SUCCESSFULLY.

Narrative: I FILLED SMA ACFT AT LIVINGSTON CO ARPT (3HE) FROM THE 100LL PUMP ON THE MAIN RAMP. THE LEFT TANK WAS DRY AND TOOK 26 GALS, AND THE RIGHT TANK TOOK 18 FOR A TOTAL CAPACITY OF 52 GALS. I USED THE RIGHT TANK FOR THE 10 MIN RETURN TRIP TO CACKLEBERRY (2MI9). I HAD PLANNED TO FLY TO FLORIDA WITH 3 PAX BUT A SNOW STORM STARTED SO I CANCELLED DEP AND KEPT LOGGING ONTO DTC DUAT THROUGHOUT THE DAY TO WAIT FOR BETTER WX. RATHER THAN MAKE A NIGHT FLT, I DECIDED TO DEPART EARLY THE NEXT MORNING. THE ACFT IS KEPT IN AN UNHEATED HANGAR AND SINCE THE TEMPERATURE WAS FORECAST TO DROP TO -5F OVERNIGHT, I PUT A SMALL ELECTRIC PREHEATER IN THE COWLING, UNDER THE ENGINE FOR 12 HRS. I DID A THOROUGH PREFLT INCLUDING DRAINING THE WING SUMPS. THE WING SUMPS WERE LIGHTLY FROZEN BUT DID DRAIN AND RESEAL. THE DRAIN FOR THE GASCOLATOR IS A HANDLE INSIDE THE CABIN BY THE FUEL SELECTOR ON THE FLOOR. THE LEVER PULLED NORMALLY BUT I DID NOT GET OUT AND VERIFY THAT ANY FUEL HAD DRAINED. I SELECTED THE LEFT TANK AND STARTED THE ENGINE. IT STARTED NORMALLY AND IDLED SMOOTHLY. I WARMED IT FOR 10 MINS BEFORE RUN-UP. DURING RUN-UP I DID THE FULL CHECKLIST FROM THE OPERATOR'S HANDBOOK AS I ALWAYS DO. THE OIL AND CYLINDER TEMPERATURES WERE IN THE GREEN BEFORE I STARTED THE TKOF ROLL. I HAD DONE A WEIGHT AND BALANCE CALCULATION AND WAS VERY NEAR GROSS WEIGHT BUT WITH THE COLD AIR AND THE ENGINE UP TO TEMPERATURE, I EXPECTED NO TROUBLE WITH THE TKOF. THE ELEVATION AT 2MI9 IS 890' AND RWY 6 IS 2120' LONG. THE SOD SURFACE WAS FROZEN AND THE SNOW AS BLOWN OFF BY THE STRONG WINDS THE NIGHT BEFORE. WHEN I STARTED THE TKOF ROLL, THE TEMPERATURE WAS -1F AND THE WINDSOCK WAS SHOWING A LIGHT WIND FROM THE N. I WAS EXPECTING LIFTOFF AT MIDFIELD BUT THE PLANE WOULD NOT FLY UNTIL ABOUT 1500'. I CHECKED THE TACHOMETER AND CONFIRMED 2700 RPM. THE CLIMB WAS SURPRISINGLY POOR CONSIDERING THE DENSITY ALT WAS -3000'. I HELD THE NOSE LOW AFTER I CLRED THE OBSTACLES AND LET THE SPEED INCREASE TO 95 KTS BEFORE I TURNED OR CLIMBED. I STARTED A SHALLOW CLIMBING TURN TO THE RIGHT AND AS I CAME THROUGH S I HEARD A BACKFIRE. I LEVELED THE WINGS AND STARTED THE EMER CHECKLIST. THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING TO THE ARPT. THE BACKFIRING CONTINUED AND GOT WORSE. I TRIED BOTH MAGS, CONFIRMED THE BOOST PUMP WAS STILL ON, AND MADE SURE THE THROTTLE, MIXTURE, AND PROPELLER WERE FULL FORWARD. I SWITCHED TO THE RIGHT TANK AND TRIED DIFFERENT THROTTLE SETTINGS AND EVEN PULLED THE MIXTURE FOR A SECOND TO BE SURE I WAS DEALING WITH FUEL STARVATION. WITHIN 10 SECONDS I WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN ALT. I HAD ONLY ATTAINED AN ALT OF 300-400'. THE 1ST CLEARING WAS NEARLY A MI AHEAD AND WAS A ROLLING WHEAT FIELD COVERED BY 6' OF HARD CRUSTED SNOW. I ESTIMATE THERE WAS 1200' OF FIELD FROM THE EDGE OF A SWAMP ON THE NEAR SIDE TO A FENCE ON THE FAR SIDE. I LEFT THE ACFT CLEAN TO STRETCH THE GLIDE AND THREW THE MANUAL LNDG GEAR DOWN AT THE LAST SECOND. THE TRACKS SHOWED THE TOUCHDOWN TO BE 3' INTO THE FIELD. I APPARENTLY DIDN'T GET THE GEAR HANDLE TO LATCH BECAUSE THE GEAR HANDLE WENT BACK TO THE FLOOR AND THE GEAR COLLAPSED (RETRACTED) AFTER ONLY A FEW FT. THE PLANE SLID TO A STOP ON ITS BELLY IN ABOUT 500'. AFTER EVACUATING THE PAX AND CONFIRMING MASTER, MAGS, AND FUEL WERE OFF, WE WALKED TO A NEARBY FARMHOUSE. I DIDN'T THINK THE EVENT NEEDED TO BE REPORTED BECAUSE I BELIEVED THE ENGINE DIED FROM FUEL ICE AND THE LNDG WAS SMOOTH. THIS WAS MY 1ST MISTAKE. MY NEXT MISTAKE WAS BRINGING IN A CRANE THE NEXT MORNING AND MOVING THE ACFT. THAT WAS WHEN 2 INSPECTORS FROM THE DETROIT FSDO ARRIVED. THEY INFORMED ME THAT I SHOULD HAVE REPORTED THE EVENT TO THEM AND GAVE ME AN NTSB FORM TO COMPLETE. AFTER TAKING PICTURES, THEY ALLOWED ME TO REMOVE THE ACFT. THEY LATER EXAMINED THE ACFT AND FOUND ICE IN A FUEL LINE IN THE ENGINE COMPARTMENT. AFTERWARD, I WENT TO THE FSDO TO MEET WITH THE INSPECTORS. DURING THE 2 HRS OF DISCUSSION, I ADMITTED THAT I HAD MADE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN DISTURBING THE SCENE AND NOT REPORTING THEEVENT TO THE FAA. THEY TOLD ME THE ACCIDENT WOULD BE DOWNGRADED TO AN INCIDENT AND THAT I NEEDED TO BECOME MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE REGS, ESPECIALLY NTSB 830. I AGREED AND THE MATTER WAS CLOSED. IN THE CASE OF THE ENGINE FAILURE, CHECKING THE GASCOLATOR SAMPLE MAY HAVE UNCOVERED THE WATER CONTAMINATION. I HAVE SEEN RENTAL PLANES WHERE THE WING SUMPS WOULD NOT DRAIN ON A COLD DAY AND IT WAS NOT CONSIDERED A PROBLEM BY THE FBO. I BELIEVE THIS ADDED TO MY NEGLECT. MORE INFO ON FUEL CONTAMINATION AND FUEL ICE NEEDS TO BE DISSEMINATED TO PLTS. IN THE CASE OF REPORTING ACCIDENTS AND INCIDENTS I BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A PARANOIA AMONG PLTS THAT CAUSES AN INDIVIDUAL THAT IS INVOLVED IN A VIOLATION TO THINK ABOUT THEIR LAWYER 1ST AND THE FAA 2ND. I WAS TOLD AT THE FSDO THAT THEY ARE AWARE OF THIS AND WOULD LIKE TO SEE A MORE COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE ON BOTH SIDES. I WAS TREATED FAIRLY BY THE FAA, EVEN THOUGH I WAS NOT COMPLETELY HONEST WITH THEM AT FIRST. I FEEL THERE IS A NEED FOR PLTS TO RECEIVE MORE INFO ON ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.