Narrative:

I was administering captain IOE during this flight. According to the instructor/check airman guide; part of my duty as a line check airman is to report safety issues within the national airspace system when I become aware of them.due to weather; we had been on the ground in lse nearly two hours awaiting an estimated departure clearance time before finally leaving the gate. Once receiving a taxi clearance; the lse ATCT controller informed us the ATCT would be closing within a few minutes. As we taxied for runway 36; the controller gave us the most recent weather; told us to use the CTAF for traffic advisories and to adjust the runway lights; and cleared us for takeoff as we approached the hold short line. As we taxied onto runway 36 for takeoff the controller made the standard 'la crosse tower is now closed...' announcement reverting the airspace to class east. I was the pilot flying and began the takeoff roll with all airport surface lights illuminated; including the lights of runway 36. Well into the takeoff roll and without any warning; all lights on the airport including the edge lights for runway 36 suddenly went off. To avoid a high speed abort on a completely dark runway and in the overall interest of safety; I elected to continue the takeoff and turn the lights back on myself. Using the mic switch on my yoke; I had all the airport surface lights back on within a few seconds. The runway 36 edge lights were on before rotation and remainder of the takeoff was uneventful. I certainly understand that; like pilots; ATC controllers have work rules governing their roles and responsibilities as well as their working hours. I also understand that the tower had officially closed and I'm sure this controller was just accomplishing his standard procedures to close down the tower. But whether inadvertent or intentional; the lse ATCT controller created an extremely dangerous and potentially catastrophic situation for a departing airliner full of passengers. All of us who work in the national airspace system must never allow the level of safety to degrade; even if it is temporarily inconvenient. Had the lse ATCT controller waited just a few more seconds before turning off the airport lights; we would have been airborne and there would have been no degradation of safety.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air Carrier flight crew reported being cleared for takeoff at LSE just before the Tower closed. During the takeoff roll the runway lights extinguished and the takeoff was continued. The lights were brought back up with mic clicks.

Narrative: I was administering Captain IOE during this flight. According to the Instructor/Check Airman Guide; part of my duty as a Line Check Airman is to report safety issues within the national airspace system when I become aware of them.Due to weather; we had been on the ground in LSE nearly two hours awaiting an Estimated Departure Clearance Time before finally leaving the gate. Once receiving a taxi clearance; the LSE ATCT controller informed us the ATCT would be closing within a few minutes. As we taxied for runway 36; the controller gave us the most recent weather; told us to use the CTAF for traffic advisories and to adjust the runway lights; and cleared us for takeoff as we approached the hold short line. As we taxied onto runway 36 for takeoff the controller made the standard 'La Crosse Tower is now closed...' announcement reverting the airspace to Class E. I was the pilot flying and began the takeoff roll with all airport surface lights illuminated; including the lights of runway 36. Well into the takeoff roll and without any warning; all lights on the airport including the edge lights for runway 36 suddenly went off. To avoid a high speed abort on a completely dark runway and in the overall interest of safety; I elected to continue the takeoff and turn the lights back on myself. Using the mic switch on my yoke; I had all the airport surface lights back on within a few seconds. The runway 36 edge lights were on before rotation and remainder of the takeoff was uneventful. I certainly understand that; like pilots; ATC controllers have work rules governing their roles and responsibilities as well as their working hours. I also understand that the tower had officially closed and I'm sure this controller was just accomplishing his standard procedures to close down the tower. But whether inadvertent or intentional; the LSE ATCT controller created an extremely dangerous and potentially catastrophic situation for a departing airliner full of passengers. All of us who work in the National Airspace System must never allow the level of safety to degrade; even if it is temporarily inconvenient. Had the LSE ATCT controller waited just a few more seconds before turning off the airport lights; we would have been airborne and there would have been no degradation of safety.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.