Narrative:

Total event time approximately 15-18 minutes.as we climbed to FL320; passing FL270 a loud; but faint noise appeared. Initially I thought the galley chiller had spooled down and then immediately the lead flight attendant called and advised of a loud sound on the floor near row 7. The first officer then said he felt a vibration at his feet. We were climbing at approximately 337 knots; cost index (ci) of 120; so I slowed the aircraft thinking it might be airframe vibration in the nose gear or wing root and advised both first officer and flight attendant of that.slowing through 280 KIAS the noise cleared. I then began to accelerate the aircraft again to normal speed to confirm the vibration for maintenance. As we began to increase speed the first officer again stated the vibration at his feet and within seconds of that a flow of 'smoke' from behind me and above was moving forward and it began to fill the cockpit. Immediately recognizing the 'threat' I directed the first officer to 'put your oxygen mask on;' I announced I had the airplane (recognizing he was new on the plane); advised him to [advise ATC of the situation] and to get a direction to the nearest airport to land.within seconds of that the lead flight attendant called to advise 'smoke' in the cabin and I told her we also had 'smoke' in the cockpit and we had [advised ATC] and would be landing in about 15 minutes. I immediately sent an ACARS; in the blind to dispatch; advising 'smoke' and we had [advised ATC of the situation] and are landing at ZZZ1.' no reply was made by dispatch as our ACARS was inoperative. No attempt to communicate via arinc was made due to being extremely busy trying to land as soon as possible.I followed ATC altitudes and headings as best as possible and the first officer began to go through the QRH for smoke/fumes. Communication was quite challenging with smoke; loud noise from aircraft flying speed; small text on the QRH and irritated eyes from the initial smoke exposure and the first officer and I at several moments had to communicate via hand signals (ironically the first officer had complained of his eye contacts bothering him and irritating his eyes a few minutes prior to event and transferring the airplane to me in order to change contacts).I would like to point that in spite of a lack of ECAM warning and guidance to the initial cause; the first officer went through the QRH checklist and deciphered as to the best steps to take in an exemplary and decisive manner; although the text should be bigger! I was given a heading towards ZZZ1 which I had requested and ATC gave me the weather as low ovc and visibility. ATC then gave me the weather to ZZZ2; clear 180/04 runway 25 and they said it was only a few miles further if we needed it. I looked outside the window and saw a blanket of low clouds/ceilings; I saw the first officer had run the checklist and I glanced up at the overhead panel switches and noticed the smoke had neutralized; still present; but not filling in the cockpit (I kept mask on due to concern for risk of not knowing contamination could cause us to black out); so I stated we should head for ZZZ2 and I told him I was very familiar with ZZZ2 and he said the same.I did not think it would be safe to go into ZZZ1 in case navigation equipment may be degrading with low ceilings; thinking maybe it was a fire in the east and east compartment. We were advised by ATC that ZZZ1 runway was 6;000 feet and we acknowledged; both of us feeling more confident that the smoke had been neutralized and that we could safely make it to ZZZ2.several communication challenges occurred; once when the first officer was trying to confirm a part of the checklist and another time when the lead flight attendant called the cockpit three times; each time hanging up when the first officer answered because she had thought it was the aft flight attendants answering until the first officer made it clear that she was reaching the cockpit. The first officer at that point told her we were going to land at ZZZ2 and no evacuation was needed. (Later after our debrief the lead flight attendant had explained how the captain on the prior flight on the same airplane had asked that anytime the cockpit called the cabin all the flight attendants; forward and aft pick up thus adding to the confusion. Also; the aft flight attendants thought the aircraft might have a belly up landing because the prior flight on the same airplane the captain briefed them on the wheels being hot).we were then offered runway xx to ZZZ2 with light and variable winds and I accepted. The first officer had already entered the new destination and runway xx ILS was selected and the approach and landing with medium brakes was made safely. We exited the runway and immediately came to a stop; shut down the number 2 engine and emergency crew and tower confirmed no smoke anywhere after a 360 degree inspection.we then taxied into a ramp position and evacuation was kept on hold; but flight attendants were advised that at any time they saw the need to evacuate to do so; engines were off and only APU with electric no packs on. It took some effort and time to get an rj airstair; but it would not safely allow for deplaning; so I requested we be towed to the jet bridge suitable for our airplane. We were towed; jet bridge brought up and all passengers were deplaned safely. We secured the aircraft; I spoke with local police and emergency personnel; dispatch; maintenance (filed a smoke report); assistant chief pilot; discussed and reviewed event with crew.the crew I had; first officer and flight attendants; on this particular event was nothing short of professional and executed their safety items in a very effective manner in spite of the many challenges and time constraint; their experience and CRM training was evident (first officer; although a new hire; certainly used his prior experience in this event). We confirmed that the passengers were safe in the terminal; offering them all available food/drinks from the airplane and once we were told that a rescue jet would be landing shortly to get them safely to [the intended destination] we went to get rest at a hotel.the following day the entire crew went to an urgent care for a checkup; I had very irritated eyes and sinus irritation; first officer woke up with irritated eyes and coughing; flight attendants complained of some irritation to eyes and sinus. There was 33 pounds of dry ice boarded and packs had been turned off; in addition to the smoke/chemical exposure. Med link was contacted and approved our return to work.the event; procedure follow up with all departments and proper care for everyone's safety was very exhausting and taxiing. We finally left ZZZ2 on the flight back to our domicile and everyone felt a great sense of relief once back to normalcy. A delay to return to work for the entire crew was a prudent course of action. A tremendous crew; I was proud to have worked with that day; and an asset to the safe operation for passengers.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 flight crew reported during climb the First Officer's eyes became irritated; a floor vibration developed; and then the aircraft filled with sulfur smelling smoke. A diversion was made to the nearest suitable airport. An air conditioning system fault was suspected.

Narrative: Total event time approximately 15-18 minutes.As we climbed to FL320; passing FL270 a loud; but faint noise appeared. Initially I thought the galley chiller had spooled down and then immediately the Lead Flight Attendant called and advised of a loud sound on the floor near Row 7. The First Officer then said he felt a vibration at his feet. We were climbing at approximately 337 knots; Cost Index (CI) of 120; so I slowed the aircraft thinking it might be airframe vibration in the nose gear or wing root and advised both First Officer and flight attendant of that.Slowing through 280 KIAS the noise cleared. I then began to accelerate the aircraft again to normal speed to confirm the vibration for maintenance. As we began to increase speed the First Officer again stated the vibration at his feet and within seconds of that a flow of 'smoke' from behind me and above was moving forward and it began to fill the cockpit. Immediately recognizing the 'threat' I directed the First Officer to 'put your oxygen mask on;' I announced I had the airplane (recognizing he was new on the plane); advised him to [advise ATC of the situation] and to get a direction to the nearest airport to land.Within seconds of that the Lead Flight Attendant called to advise 'smoke' in the cabin and I told her we also had 'smoke' in the cockpit and we had [advised ATC] and would be landing in about 15 minutes. I immediately sent an ACARS; in the blind to Dispatch; advising 'smoke' and we had [advised ATC of the situation] and are landing at ZZZ1.' No reply was made by Dispatch as our ACARS was inoperative. No attempt to communicate via ARINC was made due to being extremely busy trying to land as soon as possible.I followed ATC altitudes and headings as best as possible and the First Officer began to go through the QRH for smoke/fumes. Communication was quite challenging with smoke; loud noise from aircraft flying speed; small text on the QRH and irritated eyes from the initial smoke exposure and the First Officer and I at several moments had to communicate via hand signals (Ironically the First Officer had complained of his eye contacts bothering him and irritating his eyes a few minutes prior to event and transferring the airplane to me in order to change contacts).I would like to point that in spite of a lack of ECAM warning and guidance to the initial cause; the First Officer went through the QRH checklist and deciphered as to the best steps to take in an exemplary and decisive manner; although the text should be bigger! I was given a heading towards ZZZ1 which I had requested and ATC gave me the weather as low OVC and visibility. ATC then gave me the weather to ZZZ2; CLR 180/04 Runway 25 and they said it was only a few miles further if we needed it. I looked outside the window and saw a blanket of low clouds/ceilings; I saw the First Officer had run the checklist and I glanced up at the overhead panel switches and noticed the smoke had neutralized; still present; but not filling in the cockpit (I kept mask on due to concern for risk of not knowing contamination could cause us to black out); so I stated we should head for ZZZ2 and I told him I was very familiar with ZZZ2 and he said the same.I did not think it would be safe to go into ZZZ1 in case navigation equipment may be degrading with low ceilings; thinking maybe it was a fire in the E and E compartment. We were advised by ATC that ZZZ1 runway was 6;000 feet and we acknowledged; both of us feeling more confident that the smoke had been neutralized and that we could safely make it to ZZZ2.Several communication challenges occurred; once when the First Officer was trying to confirm a part of the checklist and another time when the Lead Flight Attendant called the cockpit three times; each time hanging up when the First Officer answered because she had thought it was the aft flight attendants answering until the First Officer made it clear that she was reaching the cockpit. The First Officer at that point told her we were going to land at ZZZ2 and no evacuation was needed. (Later after our debrief the lead flight attendant had explained how the Captain on the prior flight on the same airplane had asked that anytime the cockpit called the cabin all the flight attendants; forward and aft pick up thus adding to the confusion. Also; the aft flight attendants thought the aircraft might have a belly up landing because the prior flight on the same airplane the Captain briefed them on the wheels being hot).We were then offered Runway XX to ZZZ2 with light and variable winds and I accepted. The First Officer had already entered the new destination and Runway XX ILS was selected and the approach and landing with medium brakes was made safely. We exited the runway and immediately came to a stop; shut down the number 2 engine and emergency crew and Tower confirmed no smoke anywhere after a 360 degree inspection.We then taxied into a ramp position and evacuation was kept on hold; but flight attendants were advised that at any time they saw the need to evacuate to do so; engines were off and only APU with electric no PACKS on. It took some effort and time to get an RJ airstair; but it would not safely allow for deplaning; so I requested we be towed to the jet bridge suitable for our airplane. We were towed; jet bridge brought up and all passengers were deplaned safely. We secured the aircraft; I spoke with local Police and emergency personnel; Dispatch; Maintenance (filed a smoke report); Assistant Chief Pilot; discussed and reviewed event with crew.The crew I had; First Officer and flight attendants; on this particular event was nothing short of professional and executed their safety items in a very effective manner in spite of the many challenges and time constraint; their experience and CRM training was evident (First Officer; although a new hire; certainly used his prior experience in this event). We confirmed that the passengers were safe in the terminal; offering them all available food/drinks from the airplane and once we were told that a rescue jet would be landing shortly to get them safely to [the intended destination] we went to get rest at a hotel.The following day the entire crew went to an Urgent care for a checkup; I had very irritated eyes and sinus irritation; First Officer woke up with irritated eyes and coughing; flight attendants complained of some irritation to eyes and sinus. There was 33 LBS of dry ice boarded and PACKS had been turned off; in addition to the smoke/chemical exposure. Med link was contacted and approved our return to work.The event; procedure follow up with all departments and proper care for everyone's safety was very exhausting and taxiing. We finally left ZZZ2 on the flight back to our domicile and everyone felt a great sense of relief once back to normalcy. A delay to return to work for the entire crew was a prudent course of action. A tremendous crew; I was proud to have worked with that day; and an asset to the safe operation for passengers.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.