Narrative:

Prologue: prior to the incident; I believe that both of us were a little on edge. On the flight to den we encountered a flock of large canadian geese and at first it seemed that we would take several direct hits to the windshield; wings and engines. Fortunately we only took an indirect hit that resulted in no damage. As we flew to den we encountered what I would call moderate turbulence; which at least for me; put me more on edge. Although it was a short and theoretically easy day; I was finding it to be stressful. Event:about thirty miles from den we were instructed to join the localizer for runway 16R at den. About 10-15 miles out we were cleared for the ILS approach to 16R. Although it was VMC and I could see the airport; I never called it in sight and was never given a visual approach. Within 6-8 miles of the airport we were told by denver approach that a B737 would be above us and going to the parallel runway; 16L. I noticed what I believed to be that aircraft on the TCAS display. About six to eight miles from the runway; we received the first of four TCAS RA alerts (looking back; it was probably only two ras but I'm not sure and I told ATC and the chief pilot on duty that I encountered four ras). I don't believe there was ever a TA. The TCAS just went straight to an RA and we were commanded to go down below the glide slope. The entire top half of the vsi was red and the bottom first 1;000 feet or so of the bottom of the vsi was red. At first [the first officer] didn't react at all to the RA. I told him that he needed to go down 'now'. So he started down but not nearly enough. Then I realized that the auto pilot was still engaged and I told him to turn it off and get down. He didn't react quickly enough in my opinion so I immediately turned off the auto pilot and aggressively forced the nose down and I got us out of the red zone on the vsi and the TCAS stopped commanding us down but told us to maintain the descent rate we were doing. At this point I should have just taken total control of the aircraft; but I did not. I could see that [the first officer] had his hands on the yoke so I let go and I assumed that he would follow the TCAS instructions so I released the controls for him to continue flying. At this point my attention was diverted between monitoring the flight; looking for the [B737] traffic and talking to ATC. I believe that the first RA ended at this point and the vsi returned to normal. At this point [the first officer] started to allow the plane to pitch up and rejoin the glide slope. Then we received the second RA; again forcing us down below the glide slope. This time [the first officer] did start to pitch down but it wasn't enough and the TCAS kept commanding us to 'descend now'. Again I intervened and forced the nose down very aggressively to get us out of the red zone on the vsi. Once the TCAS stopped commanding us down; I again relinquished controls to [the first officer]. He allowed the plane to drift up and again the TCAS started to command us down. I pushed forward less aggressively than I had before and got the plane below the red zone. Once I removed my hands from the yoke; [the first officer] allowed the plane to drift upwards and once again the machine started commanding us down. At this point I started to feel that my life was in imminent danger and I felt the physical feeling that I get when I feel that I'm in grave damage. And I'm sure at this point the adrenaline was flowing. I was also pretty annoyed that my first officer couldn't follow the RA which I consider a relatively easy thing to do. So I yelled at [the first officer] very loudly 'get this plane down now' and simultaneously shoved the nose down very aggressively and got us out of the red zone on the vsi. [The first officer] then [asked] me if I wanted control and I responded in the affirmative.I took total control of the aircraft including communications with ATC. I held the attitude so we would descend just below the red zone onthe vsi. At this point; for the first time I could see the 737 and it was overtaking us. Despite the fact that we were doing 140 KIAS he was passing us at a pretty good clip. Now my concern was the possibility of a wake turbulence encounter; relatively close to the ground (which I couldn't see because it was pitch black out and was mostly unlit prairie land). Knowing that I was landing on the longest civilian runway in the country (16;000 feet) I increased airspeed to above 150 KIAS in an attempt to stay ahead of [the B737] and avoid wake turbulence. I decided that landing at a much higher airspeed was the lesser of the three threats I was facing. I still had the TCAS holding me below the glide slope and a go-around was impossible. Even though I could see the 737 in the corner of my eye and could tell that he was passing us; I still felt that a go-around would be unsafe. We were switched from approach to tower frequency. I never informed approach what was happening. When I checked in with tower I informed him that we had received four ras and that we were forced below the glide slope and had to stay below it. He acknowledged my transmission and said something about seeing us. He then cleared us to land. As we got closer to the runway; the TCAS was allowing me back up; since the 737 was already past us and was less of a mid-air threat. Of course the threat of a wake turbulence encounter was still a possibility. Within a mile or two we were able to rejoin the glide slope and I started slowing down to our proper approach speed of vref + 10. The TCAS finally went away and I was able to land the aircraft in a normal; stable manner despite the fact that we were not properly stabilized at 1;000 AGL or 500 AGL. The rest of the flight was uneventful and the passengers thanked us for the flight and didn't say anything negative and acted as though everything was normal. I attempted to apologize to the lead passenger but he either didn't hear me or ignored me as he deplaned. I opted not to force the issue and didn't say anything further to him. Some key Points1. I feel that this whole incident was the fault of denver approach. I feel that they did a very poor job of vectoring us and the 737. Like I stated earlier; I was cleared for an ILS approach and I never called the airport in sight even though I could see it. Perhaps the 737 was on a visual approach. I don't know. I felt that ATC should have provided proper IFR separation which I seriously doubt they did. 2. Although I can't prove it; I have to believe that the 737 crew was also receiving a TA or RA. It wouldn't surprise me if they got an RA and elected to ignore it. They probably saw us since we were in front of them and maybe they felt it was safe to proceed as normal. I couldn't see them until I took control of the airplane. It seems that [air carrier] crews are always in a hurry and I'm sure that a go-around caused by a RA climb command would be highly undesirable to the [air carrier] crew. Of course this is pure conjecture on my part. 3. It was pitch black outside; other than the airport itself. It was like approaching a tiny island in the middle of the ocean on a moonless night. We really couldn't see any ground at all until the runway itself. However; I could easily see the four bright red PAPI lights; which was a little disconcerting. 4. After the flight was concluded and my nerves had calmed down a bit; [the first officer] and I discussed what had happened. He asked me what I think he did wrong. I told him honestly that he didn't react to the TCAS RA properly; the way we are trained to. I told him that we were supposed to do as the TCAS told us and only the egpws takes precedence over a TCAS RA. And I told him that he was supposed to keep the airplane out of the red zone on the vsi which he didn't do. He kept trying to rejoin the glide slope which is a natural instinct but in this case the wrong thing to do. [The first officer] responded that he was unfamiliar with the area and was afraid to pitch down too much because he thought of denver as a mountainous area. And since he couldn't see the ground he was afraid to be as aggressive as necessary to follow the TCAS commands. On this point; I can understand and relate to his concerns. However; I knew that we were over prairie land that was pretty flat and had no man-made obstructions. I had no problem obeying the TCAS commands since I was monitoring the radar altitude read out on the pfd and also the terrain display on the mfd. I can understand [the first officer's] concerns but the fact is that he didn't properly perform the TCAS maneuver. The first step is to turn off the autopilot which I told him to do and then did myself. And he was totally unwilling to stay below the red zone on the vsi. Suggestions:1. Training. Not just pilots but ATC as well. I honestly believe that denver approach is totally at fault for what happened. My first officer's inability to properly execute a TCAS RA maneuver just compounded the problem. I do believe that [our flight training center] and the training department is seriously lacking in TCAS training and in future training events there needs to be more emphasis placed on the TCAS system. TCAS is a wonderful; life saving device that I feel that many pilots don't fully understand or how to use. TCAS is a tool that is only useful if used properly. Why do I say this? Because; this is the third time in a span of five or six years that I had a junior sic improperly execute a RA maneuver. The last time I had an event like this I remember vividly; I had a first officer who is from a spanish speaking country. We were departing north out of jackson hole and a C172 had departed prior to us. I knew that the skyhawk was out there but I could not see him. We got a RA to descend; (we were already fairly low and a descent got us pretty close to the ground but it was day VMC) and the first officer actually started to climb. I had to intervene aggressively and force the plane down out of the red zone. I always wondered if he truly had a complete grasp of the english language. I also had another event in socal in which we received a RA and the first officer did nothing even though he was the pilot flying and I had to intervene and respond to the RA. Another thing I have noticed over the years is that a lot of our pilots don't know how to use the TCAS to make tactical decisions. For example; supposed you are cleared to 5;000 ft and you are at 7;000 ft and the TCAS display is showing a plane at 4;000 ft. A lot of guys like to descend and climb at high rates for some strange reason. So if the flying pilot is descending at 3;000 fpm guess what is going to happen? The TCAS computer can't read your mind and it doesn't care that in this case the altitude alerter is set to 5;000 ft. It has to work with the real time information available and it will command an RA. So the oblivious pilot flying just caused an RA with his sloppy flying technique. I have probably observed this at least ten times in my 15 year career. I always try to point out to the PF that we will probably get a RA but usually it is too late and we get the RA. I know that in the fom we are advised to only climb or descend at 1;500 FPM for the last thousand feet. A lot of guys either ignore or are ignorant of this. I think that we need better training on how to properly use TCAS and also how to properly climb and descend the aircraft; especially in congested airspace. 2. Also; I fault myself for not taking control of the aircraft sooner. When I had to turn off the autopilot and execute the RA maneuver I should have just taken control at that point. For whatever reason; I'm usually reticent to take control away from the flying pilot (not that I encounter many situations where it is necessary to take control). I'll only do it when I feel that I absolutely have to. I suppose that I do not want to offend anybody unnecessarily. Pilots often have fragile egos. I will focus on being more proactive

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Fractional Captain reported multiple RA alerts on approach to DEN in conflict with a B737 on a parallel arrival. Reporter stated he felt D01 TRACON could have done a better job in sequencing.

Narrative: Prologue: Prior to the incident; I believe that both of us were a little on edge. On the flight to DEN we encountered a flock of large Canadian Geese and at first it seemed that we would take several direct hits to the windshield; wings and engines. Fortunately we only took an indirect hit that resulted in no damage. As we flew to DEN we encountered what I would call moderate turbulence; which at least for me; put me more on edge. Although it was a short and theoretically easy day; I was finding it to be stressful. Event:About thirty miles from DEN we were instructed to join the localizer for runway 16R at DEN. About 10-15 miles out we were cleared for the ILS approach to 16R. Although it was VMC and I could see the airport; I never called it in sight and was never given a visual approach. Within 6-8 miles of the airport we were told by Denver Approach that a B737 would be above us and going to the parallel runway; 16L. I noticed what I believed to be that aircraft on the TCAS display. About six to eight miles from the runway; we received the first of four TCAS RA alerts (Looking back; it was probably only two RAs but I'm not sure and I told ATC and the chief pilot on duty that I encountered four RAs). I don't believe there was ever a TA. The TCAS just went straight to an RA and we were commanded to go down below the glide slope. The entire top half of the VSI was red and the bottom first 1;000 feet or so of the bottom of the VSI was red. At first [the First Officer] didn't react at all to the RA. I told him that he needed to go down 'now'. So he started down but not nearly enough. Then I realized that the auto pilot was still engaged and I told him to turn it off and get down. He didn't react quickly enough in my opinion so I immediately turned off the auto pilot and aggressively forced the nose down and I got us out of the red zone on the VSI and the TCAS stopped commanding us down but told us to maintain the descent rate we were doing. At this point I should have just taken total control of the aircraft; but I did not. I could see that [the First Officer] had his hands on the yoke so I let go and I assumed that he would follow the TCAS instructions so I released the controls for him to continue flying. At this point my attention was diverted between monitoring the flight; looking for the [B737] traffic and talking to ATC. I believe that the first RA ended at this point and the VSI returned to normal. At this point [the First Officer] started to allow the plane to pitch up and rejoin the glide slope. Then we received the second RA; again forcing us down below the glide slope. This time [the First Officer] did start to pitch down but it wasn't enough and the TCAS kept commanding us to 'Descend Now'. Again I intervened and forced the nose down very aggressively to get us out of the red zone on the VSI. Once the TCAS stopped commanding us down; I again relinquished controls to [the First Officer]. He allowed the plane to drift up and again the TCAS started to command us down. I pushed forward less aggressively than I had before and got the plane below the red zone. Once I removed my hands from the yoke; [the First Officer] allowed the plane to drift upwards and once again the machine started commanding us down. At this point I started to feel that my life was in imminent danger and I felt the physical feeling that I get when I feel that I'm in grave damage. And I'm sure at this point the adrenaline was flowing. I was also pretty annoyed that my FO couldn't follow the RA which I consider a relatively easy thing to do. So I yelled at [the First Officer] very loudly 'get this plane down now' and simultaneously shoved the nose down very aggressively and got us out of the red zone on the VSI. [The First Officer] then [asked] me if I wanted control and I responded in the affirmative.I took total control of the aircraft including communications with ATC. I held the attitude so we would descend just below the red zone onthe VSI. At this point; for the first time I could see the 737 and it was overtaking us. Despite the fact that we were doing 140 KIAS he was passing us at a pretty good clip. Now my concern was the possibility of a wake turbulence encounter; relatively close to the ground (which I couldn't see because it was pitch black out and was mostly unlit prairie land). Knowing that I was landing on the longest civilian runway in the country (16;000 feet) I increased airspeed to above 150 KIAS in an attempt to stay ahead of [the B737] and avoid wake turbulence. I decided that landing at a much higher airspeed was the lesser of the three threats I was facing. I still had the TCAS holding me below the glide slope and a go-around was impossible. Even though I could see the 737 in the corner of my eye and could tell that he was passing us; I still felt that a go-around would be unsafe. We were switched from Approach to Tower frequency. I never informed Approach what was happening. When I checked in with Tower I informed him that we had received four RAs and that we were forced below the glide slope and had to stay below it. He acknowledged my transmission and said something about seeing us. He then cleared us to land. As we got closer to the runway; the TCAS was allowing me back up; since the 737 was already past us and was less of a mid-air threat. Of course the threat of a wake turbulence encounter was still a possibility. Within a mile or two we were able to rejoin the glide slope and I started slowing down to our proper approach speed of Vref + 10. The TCAS finally went away and I was able to land the aircraft in a normal; stable manner despite the fact that we were not properly stabilized at 1;000 AGL or 500 AGL. The rest of the flight was uneventful and the passengers thanked us for the flight and didn't say anything negative and acted as though everything was normal. I attempted to apologize to the lead passenger but he either didn't hear me or ignored me as he deplaned. I opted not to force the issue and didn't say anything further to him. Some Key Points1. I feel that this whole incident was the fault of Denver Approach. I feel that they did a very poor job of vectoring us and the 737. Like I stated earlier; I was cleared for an ILS approach and I never called the airport in sight even though I could see it. Perhaps the 737 was on a visual approach. I don't know. I felt that ATC should have provided proper IFR separation which I seriously doubt they did. 2. Although I can't prove it; I have to believe that the 737 crew was also receiving a TA or RA. It wouldn't surprise me if they got an RA and elected to ignore it. They probably saw us since we were in front of them and maybe they felt it was safe to proceed as normal. I couldn't see them until I took control of the airplane. It seems that [air carrier] crews are always in a hurry and I'm sure that a go-around caused by a RA climb command would be highly undesirable to the [air carrier] crew. Of course this is pure conjecture on my part. 3. It was pitch black outside; other than the airport itself. It was like approaching a tiny island in the middle of the ocean on a moonless night. We really couldn't see any ground at all until the runway itself. However; I could easily see the four bright red PAPI lights; which was a little disconcerting. 4. After the flight was concluded and my nerves had calmed down a bit; [the First Officer] and I discussed what had happened. He asked me what I think he did wrong. I told him honestly that he didn't react to the TCAS RA properly; the way we are trained to. I told him that we were supposed to do as the TCAS told us and only the EGPWS takes precedence over a TCAS RA. And I told him that he was supposed to keep the airplane out of the red zone on the VSI which he didn't do. He kept trying to rejoin the glide slope which is a natural instinct but in this case the wrong thing to do. [The First Officer] responded that he was unfamiliar with the area and was afraid to pitch down too much because he thought of Denver as a mountainous area. And since he couldn't see the ground he was afraid to be as aggressive as necessary to follow the TCAS commands. On this point; I can understand and relate to his concerns. However; I knew that we were over prairie land that was pretty flat and had no man-made obstructions. I had no problem obeying the TCAS commands since I was monitoring the radar altitude read out on the PFD and also the terrain display on the MFD. I can understand [the First Officer's] concerns but the fact is that he didn't properly perform the TCAS maneuver. The first step is to turn off the autopilot which I told him to do and then did myself. And he was totally unwilling to stay below the red zone on the VSI. Suggestions:1. Training. Not just pilots but ATC as well. I honestly believe that Denver Approach is totally at fault for what happened. My FO's inability to properly execute a TCAS RA maneuver just compounded the problem. I do believe that [our flight training center] and the Training Department is seriously lacking in TCAS training and in future training events there needs to be more emphasis placed on the TCAS system. TCAS is a wonderful; life saving device that I feel that many pilots don't fully understand or how to use. TCAS is a tool that is only useful if used properly. Why do I say this? Because; this is the third time in a span of five or six years that I had a junior SIC improperly execute a RA maneuver. The last time I had an event like this I remember vividly; I had a FO who is from a Spanish speaking country. We were departing north out of Jackson Hole and a C172 had departed prior to us. I knew that the Skyhawk was out there but I could not see him. We got a RA to descend; (we were already fairly low and a descent got us pretty close to the ground but it was day VMC) and the FO actually started to climb. I had to intervene aggressively and force the plane down out of the red zone. I always wondered if he truly had a complete grasp of the English language. I also had another event in SOCAL in which we received a RA and the FO did nothing even though he was the Pilot Flying and I had to intervene and respond to the RA. Another thing I have noticed over the years is that a lot of our pilots don't know how to use the TCAS to make tactical decisions. For example; supposed you are cleared to 5;000 ft and you are at 7;000 ft and the TCAS display is showing a plane at 4;000 ft. A lot of guys like to descend and climb at high rates for some strange reason. So if the flying pilot is descending at 3;000 fpm guess what is going to happen? The TCAS computer can't read your mind and it doesn't care that in this case the altitude alerter is set to 5;000 ft. It has to work with the real time information available and it will command an RA. So the oblivious pilot flying just caused an RA with his sloppy flying technique. I have probably observed this at least ten times in my 15 year career. I always try to point out to the PF that we will probably get a RA but usually it is too late and we get the RA. I know that in the FOM we are advised to only climb or descend at 1;500 FPM for the last thousand feet. A lot of guys either ignore or are ignorant of this. I think that we need better training on how to properly use TCAS and also how to properly climb and descend the aircraft; especially in congested airspace. 2. Also; I fault myself for not taking control of the aircraft sooner. When I had to turn off the autopilot and execute the RA maneuver I should have just taken control at that point. For whatever reason; I'm usually reticent to take control away from the flying pilot (Not that I encounter many situations where it is necessary to take control). I'll only do it when I feel that I absolutely have to. I suppose that I do not want to offend anybody unnecessarily. Pilots often have fragile egos. I will focus on being more proactive

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.