Narrative:

After liftoff on an IFR clearance the engine began to run rough. At approximately 1000' MSL I called the tower controller and advised I would need to return for an immediate landing, as I was having a problem. I was instructed to turn left downwind which I did, while continuing to climb to assure a safe landing in the event of a total engine failure. The tower controller asked if I needed assistance, to which I replied I believed I would be able to return and land. The tower controller never asked what the nature of my problem was. Upon turning downwind, I asked the controller to allow me to climb as high as possible. There was no response to my request. Shortly thereafter, the controller called and told me she needed me at 800' MSL or lower as I was in the sea TCA at my altitude. I might add the frequency was very busy during this entire incident. I immediately initiated a descent to 800' MSL from my current altitude of approximately 1400' MSL, hoping for continued engine power to assure a safe return for landing. Upon landing, I was able to determine I had severely fouled plugs due to the lengthy delay I experienced in obtaining my IFR release. After clearing the plugs, I requested to taxi back to the active runway and departed on my IFR clearance and completed my trip. Upon request for my taxi for my second takeoff, the controller then did ask the nature of my problem, to which I responded was a rough running engine. During this incident, I did not declare an emergency. In a situation with a single engine aircraft experiencing engine difficulty, it seems safety should be the first concern. The actions and attitudes of ATC in this incident would appear otherwise. The greatest concern was not if a safe return and landing could be made, but adherence to ATC procedures within the sea TCA. Altitude is safety. By restricting altitude and being concerned with operation in the base of the TCA, well under the high performance air transport traffic departing sea-tac, safety was compromised. In future situations of this nature, a climb to an altitude sufficient to assure a safe return to an airport should be encouraged and authority/authorized, not restr by ATC. When a situation of this nature is occurring and the frequency is busy, the priority should be to handle the aircraft in distress first and the other traffic second. This was not the case. Additionally, the declaration of an emergency should not result in the mountain of paperwork and hassles as currently is the practice of the FAA. The paperwork and hassles should be based upon the seriousness of the incident. Some simple old-fashioned good judgement should be used in these types of situations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: SMA X ROUGH RUNNING ENGINE AFTER TKOF. EMERGENCY. SMA X FAILED TO CONFORM TO TRAFFIC PATTERN ALT. TCA VIOLATION. PLT DEVIATION.

Narrative: AFTER LIFTOFF ON AN IFR CLRNC THE ENG BEGAN TO RUN ROUGH. AT APPROX 1000' MSL I CALLED THE TWR CTLR AND ADVISED I WOULD NEED TO RETURN FOR AN IMMEDIATE LNDG, AS I WAS HAVING A PROB. I WAS INSTRUCTED TO TURN LEFT DOWNWIND WHICH I DID, WHILE CONTINUING TO CLB TO ASSURE A SAFE LNDG IN THE EVENT OF A TOTAL ENG FAILURE. THE TWR CTLR ASKED IF I NEEDED ASSISTANCE, TO WHICH I REPLIED I BELIEVED I WOULD BE ABLE TO RETURN AND LAND. THE TWR CTLR NEVER ASKED WHAT THE NATURE OF MY PROB WAS. UPON TURNING DOWNWIND, I ASKED THE CTLR TO ALLOW ME TO CLB AS HIGH AS POSSIBLE. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE TO MY REQUEST. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, THE CTLR CALLED AND TOLD ME SHE NEEDED ME AT 800' MSL OR LOWER AS I WAS IN THE SEA TCA AT MY ALT. I MIGHT ADD THE FREQ WAS VERY BUSY DURING THIS ENTIRE INCIDENT. I IMMEDIATELY INITIATED A DSCNT TO 800' MSL FROM MY CURRENT ALT OF APPROX 1400' MSL, HOPING FOR CONTINUED ENG PWR TO ASSURE A SAFE RETURN FOR LNDG. UPON LNDG, I WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE I HAD SEVERELY FOULED PLUGS DUE TO THE LENGTHY DELAY I EXPERIENCED IN OBTAINING MY IFR RELEASE. AFTER CLEARING THE PLUGS, I REQUESTED TO TAXI BACK TO THE ACTIVE RWY AND DEPARTED ON MY IFR CLRNC AND COMPLETED MY TRIP. UPON REQUEST FOR MY TAXI FOR MY SECOND TKOF, THE CTLR THEN DID ASK THE NATURE OF MY PROB, TO WHICH I RESPONDED WAS A ROUGH RUNNING ENGINE. DURING THIS INCIDENT, I DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. IN A SITUATION WITH A SINGLE ENG ACFT EXPERIENCING ENG DIFFICULTY, IT SEEMS SAFETY SHOULD BE THE FIRST CONCERN. THE ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF ATC IN THIS INCIDENT WOULD APPEAR OTHERWISE. THE GREATEST CONCERN WAS NOT IF A SAFE RETURN AND LNDG COULD BE MADE, BUT ADHERENCE TO ATC PROCS WITHIN THE SEA TCA. ALT IS SAFETY. BY RESTRICTING ALT AND BEING CONCERNED WITH OPERATION IN THE BASE OF THE TCA, WELL UNDER THE HIGH PERFORMANCE AIR TRANSPORT TFC DEPARTING SEA-TAC, SAFETY WAS COMPROMISED. IN FUTURE SITUATIONS OF THIS NATURE, A CLB TO AN ALT SUFFICIENT TO ASSURE A SAFE RETURN TO AN ARPT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND AUTH, NOT RESTR BY ATC. WHEN A SITUATION OF THIS NATURE IS OCCURRING AND THE FREQ IS BUSY, THE PRIORITY SHOULD BE TO HANDLE THE ACFT IN DISTRESS FIRST AND THE OTHER TFC SECOND. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. ADDITIONALLY, THE DECLARATION OF AN EMER SHOULD NOT RESULT IN THE MOUNTAIN OF PAPERWORK AND HASSLES AS CURRENTLY IS THE PRACTICE OF THE FAA. THE PAPERWORK AND HASSLES SHOULD BE BASED UPON THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INCIDENT. SOME SIMPLE OLD-FASHIONED GOOD JUDGEMENT SHOULD BE USED IN THESE TYPES OF SITUATIONS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.