Narrative:

We were filed from sea to oak but were requested by dispatch to ask ATC for a change in destination to sfo (this is our company's way of trying to make the best use of delays in flow form sea-sfo). The dispatcher told me in sea to call ZOA just before going to approach and request the change. When we did, center said we would have to hold for 60 mins at pye, so I told them we would stick with ZOA. I asked the so to call company and tell dispatch we were oak-bound. Dispatch told us to hold for sfo. I told the first officer to fly and decided to argue with dispatch myself. We climbed back up to 33000 ft. We were entering the hold with about 23000# of fuel with a 70 min efc time. We did not have enough fuel to hold. The WX in the bay area was much worse than forecast and our alternate (smf) had deteriorated. Dispatch asked me if I would hold for 15 mins, query center about sfo and call him back. I called dispatch back at the 15 min time and told him I would hold till I had 17000# of fuel, and then we were going to oak. He asked if I would hold to 12000 pounds. I very nicely told him no way in hell. We got clearance to oak with no delay and I talked to the passenger and cabin attendants while the first officer did the descent. I was very concerned with my argument with dispatch, moderate turbulence and ice on the descent, lying to the passenger (to my knowledge they were told in sea that they might end up in oak), my company putting me in this situation, the G/south being out at oak localizer approach in minimums and (deteriorating) WX, and the shortened runway at oak. I briefed the localizer approach but did not catch the step-down inside the FAF to 460 ' before descending to MDA inside plaza. I passed the approach plate back to the so and to large transport captain from another airline, who was setting in the first jump seat. No one else caught the step-down either. I took the jet from the first officer and did the approach. I used our HUD in the VMC mode (for visibility approachs) but was further distracted by the align HUD annunciator that would clear for several mins and then reappear. We saw the runway about 3 mi out and I could not tell where the displaced threshold started, nor did I see the runway #'south. I believe I was descending through about 400 ft when tower called a 'low altitude alert--check your altitude.' both the first officer and I checked the approach plate and felt comfortable with the approach, so we continued and landed.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT NON ADHERENCE TO ALT RESTRICTION ON IAP VOR APCH MSAW ACTIVATED.

Narrative: WE WERE FILED FROM SEA TO OAK BUT WERE REQUESTED BY DISPATCH TO ASK ATC FOR A CHANGE IN DEST TO SFO (THIS IS OUR COMPANY'S WAY OF TRYING TO MAKE THE BEST USE OF DELAYS IN FLOW FORM SEA-SFO). THE DISPATCHER TOLD ME IN SEA TO CALL ZOA JUST BEFORE GOING TO APCH AND REQUEST THE CHANGE. WHEN WE DID, CENTER SAID WE WOULD HAVE TO HOLD FOR 60 MINS AT PYE, SO I TOLD THEM WE WOULD STICK WITH ZOA. I ASKED THE SO TO CALL COMPANY AND TELL DISPATCH WE WERE OAK-BOUND. DISPATCH TOLD US TO HOLD FOR SFO. I TOLD THE FO TO FLY AND DECIDED TO ARGUE WITH DISPATCH MYSELF. WE CLBED BACK UP TO 33000 FT. WE WERE ENTERING THE HOLD WITH ABOUT 23000# OF FUEL WITH A 70 MIN EFC TIME. WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO HOLD. THE WX IN THE BAY AREA WAS MUCH WORSE THAN FORECAST AND OUR ALTERNATE (SMF) HAD DETERIORATED. DISPATCH ASKED ME IF I WOULD HOLD FOR 15 MINS, QUERY CENTER ABOUT SFO AND CALL HIM BACK. I CALLED DISPATCH BACK AT THE 15 MIN TIME AND TOLD HIM I WOULD HOLD TILL I HAD 17000# OF FUEL, AND THEN WE WERE GOING TO OAK. HE ASKED IF I WOULD HOLD TO 12000 LBS. I VERY NICELY TOLD HIM NO WAY IN HELL. WE GOT CLRNC TO OAK WITH NO DELAY AND I TALKED TO THE PAX AND CABIN ATTENDANTS WHILE THE FO DID THE DSCNT. I WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH MY ARGUMENT WITH DISPATCH, MODERATE TURB AND ICE ON THE DSCNT, LYING TO THE PAX (TO MY KNOWLEDGE THEY WERE TOLD IN SEA THAT THEY MIGHT END UP IN OAK), MY COMPANY PUTTING ME IN THIS SITUATION, THE G/S BEING OUT AT OAK LOC APCH IN MINIMUMS AND (DETERIORATING) WX, AND THE SHORTENED RWY AT OAK. I BRIEFED THE LOC APCH BUT DID NOT CATCH THE STEP-DOWN INSIDE THE FAF TO 460 ' BEFORE DSNDING TO MDA INSIDE PLAZA. I PASSED THE APCH PLATE BACK TO THE SO AND TO LGT CAPT FROM ANOTHER AIRLINE, WHO WAS SETTING IN THE FIRST JUMP SEAT. NO ONE ELSE CAUGHT THE STEP-DOWN EITHER. I TOOK THE JET FROM THE FO AND DID THE APCH. I USED OUR HUD IN THE VMC MODE (FOR VIS APCHS) BUT WAS FURTHER DISTRACTED BY THE ALIGN HUD ANNUNCIATOR THAT WOULD CLEAR FOR SEVERAL MINS AND THEN REAPPEAR. WE SAW THE RWY ABOUT 3 MI OUT AND I COULD NOT TELL WHERE THE DISPLACED THRESHOLD STARTED, NOR DID I SEE THE RWY #'S. I BELIEVE I WAS DSNDING THROUGH ABOUT 400 FT WHEN TWR CALLED A 'LOW ALT ALERT--CHK YOUR ALT.' BOTH THE FO AND I CHKED THE APCH PLATE AND FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE APCH, SO WE CONTINUED AND LANDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.