Narrative:

We departed with the first officer (first officer) as the pilot flying (PF). Passing through 5000' MSL; AP2 and autothottles disengaged. I attempted to re-engage the pitch trim 2; rudder travel 2; and ats paddles with no success. I then checked in with ATC; and completed the after takeoff checklist. The first officer continued to fly the SID by hand. We then got an ECAM indicating dc norm bus off; and this was confirmed on the overhead panel. I then noticed that I was missing several lights on fuel panel on the overhead; and the ECAM noted 'no feedback on ECAM.' I completed the ECAM for dc norm bus off by selecting land recovery; and noted no change on the overhead. I was unable to determine if fuel x-feed was necessary or occurring because most of my tank quantity indications were missing. I attempted to select the affected equipment off; but the lights either didn't indicate a change or indicate that they were off at all. The weather was clear & unrestricted (twilight); so anti-ice & fuel management were not required. I noticed that our jump seater (who was a mechanic) was looking at our situation from the jumpseat area; and I told him to come forward to aid us and check for circuit breakers. He confirmed with me that the switches did not appear to be responding. I pulled out the QRH to complete the procedure items. I sent an ACARS in-range message to indicate that we had a maintenance discrepancy of dc norm bus off. I also noticed that VHF2 control head was blank; indicating that it was inoperative. At this point we had also received a 'kruger extended' and 'engine 2 fadec' warning on the ECAM; so I ran those items. In the course of dealing with these items plus the lack of lighting in the cockpit I had forgotten that the eng 2 fadec had been deferred. I attempted to regain the fadec unsuccessfully; and decided to place both engines in N1 mode. I referred to the QRH and determined a maximum N1 in case of a go-around. I then attempted to retrieve data for landing; and realized that the ACARS was inoperative also. I then used the tables to determine our landing distance. At this point we had leveled off at fl 250; engaged AP1; and maintained our speed below 300 KIAS. We began our descent and had cleaned up most of the secondary's. At this point I noted a 'no flap no slat' message on the ECAM & ran the checklist from the QRH (which was in hand). Land recovery was still on; so I turned it off per the checklist. No changes were noted; so I turned it back on. I determined that we were approximately 273;000 lbs; which meant we were below max landing weight. I calculated our green dot speed to be 207 and vapp to be 187 with the increment of 60 knots added. I confirmed the ats lever was still off; toga was indicated on the trp; and I selected the GPWS to flap override. I then estimated our flaps 40 dry landing distance to be 3800 feet; so with the increment factor of 1.8 I estimated our landing distance to be about 8000 feet. I reviewed the no flap no slat pattern tab with the first officer from the QRH; and then completed the rest of the descent checklist items. We confirmed with them fuel; souls on board; and intentions to land. I then received clearance for the visual approach; and assumed PF duties. The aircraft was configured for landing; checklist was completed; and I intercepted the ILS glidepath for the runway. I crossed the threshold at approximately 185 KIAS; and due to the clean wing; touched down about 3000 feet down the runway. The first officer stated 'no reversers' and I began to brake manually. I needed to apply more brake pressure than I would have liked as we approached 3000 feet remaining just below 100 KIAS. We cleared the runway and immediately received a 'hot brakes' indication. All wheels indicated 700 degrees. We attempted to select the brake fans; but they would not turn on. We taxied clear; and crash; fire; and rescue (crash fire rescue equipment) was waiting for us. We were able to communicate with them on ground frequency. I came to a stop; and two firemen approached the aircraft to inspect the landing gear. They informed us that the wheels were 'cherry red.' I cleared off frequency to talk to the gateway to inform them that we were on the ground; and they replied that they would coordinate with company. I then returned to ground frequency and asked crash fire rescue equipment if they had chocks & could chock the nose gear. They replied yes; although I don't recall them being put into place. The first officer then suggested that we start the APU; which we did. Once online; the engines were shut down; and most of our normal indications returned. We selected brake fans; and they indicated on. Shortly after this crash fire rescue equipment notified us over the radio that we had a wheel fire. I confirmed this with him; and then stated that we were ground egressing the aircraft. We ran the evacuation checklist; and then deployed the slide successfully. The three of us then egressed the aircraft safely.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A heavy jet transport crew experienced a significant electrical failure resulting in the loss of multiple systems. A no-flap landing was conducted to a safe conclusion; but a resulting brake fire which started after clearing the runway necessitated an evacuation.

Narrative: We departed with the First Officer (FO) as the Pilot Flying (PF). Passing through 5000' MSL; AP2 and autothottles disengaged. I attempted to re-engage the Pitch Trim 2; Rudder Travel 2; and ATS paddles with no success. I then checked in with ATC; and completed the After Takeoff checklist. The FO continued to fly the SID by hand. We then got an ECAM indicating DC NORM BUS OFF; and this was confirmed on the overhead panel. I then noticed that I was missing several lights on fuel panel on the overhead; and the ECAM noted 'No feedback on ECAM.' I completed the ECAM for DC NORM BUS OFF by selecting LAND RECOVERY; and noted no change on the overhead. I was unable to determine if Fuel X-feed was necessary or occurring because most of my tank quantity indications were missing. I attempted to select the affected equipment off; but the lights either didn't indicate a change or indicate that they were off at all. The weather was clear & unrestricted (twilight); so anti-ice & fuel management were not required. I noticed that our jump seater (who was a mechanic) was looking at our situation from the jumpseat area; and I told him to come forward to aid us and check for circuit breakers. He confirmed with me that the switches did not appear to be responding. I pulled out the QRH to complete the PROC items. I sent an ACARS in-range message to indicate that we had a maintenance discrepancy of DC NORM BUS OFF. I also noticed that VHF2 control head was blank; indicating that it was inoperative. At this point we had also received a 'Kruger Extended' and 'Engine 2 FADEC' warning on the ECAM; so I ran those items. In the course of dealing with these items plus the lack of lighting in the cockpit I had forgotten that the Eng 2 FADEC had been deferred. I attempted to regain the FADEC unsuccessfully; and decided to place both engines in N1 mode. I referred to the QRH and determined a maximum N1 in case of a go-around. I then attempted to retrieve Data for landing; and realized that the ACARS was inoperative also. I then used the tables to determine our landing distance. At this point we had leveled off at FL 250; engaged AP1; and maintained our speed below 300 KIAS. We began our descent and had cleaned up most of the secondary's. At this point I noted a 'No Flap No Slat' message on the ECAM & ran the checklist from the QRH (which was in hand). LAND RECOVERY was still on; so I turned it off per the checklist. No changes were noted; so I turned it back on. I determined that we were approximately 273;000 lbs; which meant we were below max landing weight. I calculated our green dot speed to be 207 and Vapp to be 187 with the increment of 60 knots added. I confirmed the ATS lever was still off; TOGA was indicated on the TRP; and I selected the GPWS to Flap Override. I then estimated our Flaps 40 Dry landing distance to be 3800 feet; so with the increment factor of 1.8 I estimated our landing distance to be about 8000 feet. I reviewed the No Flap No Slat pattern tab with the FO from the QRH; and then completed the rest of the Descent checklist items. We confirmed with them fuel; souls on board; and intentions to land. I then received clearance for the visual approach; and assumed PF duties. The aircraft was configured for landing; checklist was completed; and I intercepted the ILS glidepath for the runway. I crossed the threshold at approximately 185 KIAS; and due to the clean wing; touched down about 3000 feet down the runway. The FO stated 'No reversers' and I began to brake manually. I needed to apply more brake pressure than I would have liked as we approached 3000 feet remaining just below 100 KIAS. We cleared the runway and immediately received a 'Hot Brakes' indication. All wheels indicated 700 degrees. We attempted to select the brake fans; but they would not turn on. We taxied clear; and Crash; Fire; and Rescue (CFR) was waiting for us. We were able to communicate with them on ground frequency. I came to a stop; and two firemen approached the aircraft to inspect the landing gear. They informed us that the wheels were 'cherry red.' I cleared off frequency to talk to the gateway to inform them that we were on the ground; and they replied that they would coordinate with company. I then returned to ground frequency and asked CFR if they had chocks & could chock the nose gear. They replied yes; although I don't recall them being put into place. The FO then suggested that we start the APU; which we did. Once online; the engines were shut down; and most of our normal indications returned. We selected brake fans; and they indicated on. Shortly after this CFR notified us over the radio that we had a wheel fire. I confirmed this with him; and then stated that we were ground egressing the aircraft. We ran the evacuation checklist; and then deployed the slide successfully. The three of us then egressed the aircraft safely.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.