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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1390535 |
Time | |
Date | 201609 |
Local Time Of Day | 0601-1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZNY.ARTCC |
State Reference | NY |
Environment | |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Large Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Cruise |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Instructor Enroute |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 30 |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
We were training on the RA (radar assist) position at sector 75. We handed off aircraft X to sector 73 at FL300; the pilot then requested FL280. The trainee verbally coordinated that aircraft X would be descending to FL280 and the sector 73 controller updated the data block to reflect that. Since we had traffic at FL290 we could not descend the aircraft right away; but the conflict alert flashed as soon as the data block was updated. A little while later I noticed that the data block had been changed to show an interim altitude of FL300. I asked the trainee and the radar controller if either of them had changed it and they both said that they had not. I then asked the sector 73 controller (offline) if they had changed the data block and they said that they had. This caused some confusion as to what altitude the aircraft should be cleared to. When I asked the sector 73 controller why they had changed the data block; they stated that they did it because the conflict alert was flashing and that they were going to wait until they heard us clear the aircraft to FL280 and then update the data block to reflect that.in my 30 plus years as an air traffic controller I have never seen anyone do something like this and I hope I never see it again as it caused confusion and could have led to a possible incident if it wasn't caught. The sector 73 controller needs to be made aware that this is an unacceptable practice.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: ZNY Controller reported of an unsafe practice where another Controller changed the data block altitude of an aircraft they were to receive before the transferring Controller issued the altitude and communications to the aircraft.
Narrative: We were training on the RA (Radar Assist) position at Sector 75. We handed off Aircraft X to Sector 73 at FL300; the pilot then requested FL280. The trainee verbally coordinated that Aircraft X would be descending to FL280 and the Sector 73 controller updated the data block to reflect that. Since we had traffic at FL290 we could not descend the aircraft right away; but the conflict alert flashed as soon as the data block was updated. A little while later I noticed that the data block had been changed to show an interim altitude of FL300. I asked the trainee and the radar controller if either of them had changed it and they both said that they had not. I then asked the sector 73 controller (offline) if they had changed the data block and they said that they had. This caused some confusion as to what altitude the aircraft should be cleared to. When I asked the Sector 73 controller why they had changed the data block; they stated that they did it because the conflict alert was flashing and that they were going to wait until they heard us clear the aircraft to FL280 and then update the data block to reflect that.In my 30 plus years as an air traffic controller I have never seen anyone do something like this and I hope I never see it again as it caused confusion and could have led to a possible incident if it wasn't caught. The Sector 73 controller needs to be made aware that this is an unacceptable practice.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.