Narrative:

Myself, as instrument, and mr. A, an INS rated commercial pilot, were conducting local twin engine training in an small aircraft at phk. As his instrument, I had been training mr. A in single engine procedures for the past several days. About 1 hour into our flight I pulled the right throttle back to idle on downwind and mr. A went through his engine failure procedures--mixture, propellers, throttles full forward, gear and flaps up, identify, verify, and as per my previous instructions, only point at the propeller control. I then gave mr. A 10 inches of manifold pressure to simulate feather with a 0 thrust setting. Continuing the approach, mr. A began to add flaps and reduce the throttle as he turned onto base leg. At this point another aircraft turned a short base in front of us and announced he was touch and go. Mr. A continued with (as per my previous instructions) a secure procedure involving only pointing and saying what he would do in an actual situation. At this point my attention was focused mainly on the aircraft about to touch down in front of us. As that aircraft was on the runway, mr. A finished a final gump checklist and we continued the approach to approximately 300 ft AGL. As I called for the GA, I scanned the INS and noticed we had 10 inches of manifold pressure (enough for a 180 FPM climb with 1 at full power). Mr. A pushed the left throttle forward to full, raised the flaps to 10 degrees and raised the gear. He then maintained blue line (vyse), retracted the last 10 degrees of flap and rolled in approximately 3 degree bank toward the left engine. We both had noticed a climb prior to him raising the gear, but at this point we were now descending rapidly. I told mr. A that I had control and he turned the yoke over to me. I pushed both throttles full forward (manifold pressures both indicated normal) but we were still descending. I did not feel any control pressures (dead foot, etc), so therefore did not have an indication of a failed engine. I then made sure that the gear and flaps were up and they were. The problem was detected about 50 ft AGL when I began to fight asymmetrical forces that had apparently overcome rudder trim or the student's pressures on the rudders. At this point I elected to not feather the engine because we were too close to the trees and houses in front of us. I proceeded with a restart and found the right fuel tank in the off position. I then turned it on, but th engine did not start before we landed gear up in a low cut field about 1 mi northeast of the airport. The fact that mr. A had previously demonstrated on many occasions that he was competent to perform this task led me to rely on him as my attention was required on the aircraft in front of us. What I just stated, and the fact that he held control pressure after I took control, contributed to and ultimately caused this incident. To prevent a recurrence, there should be a safety bar placed across the fuel selectors to make the pilot realize what he is doing, instrs should never take their eyes off of the student unless absolutely necessary, pilots should be penalized by the FAA for cutting in front of others in the traffic pattern, and a student should never be allowed to rudder trim a multi-engine aircraft while maneuvering with 1 engine pulled to idle or a 0 thrust setting.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: WHILE TRAINING IN MULTI-ENGINE PROCS, INSTRUCTOR AND STUDENT INDUCE LOSS OF ACFT CONTROL, RESULTING IN GEAR UP OFF ARPT LNDG.

Narrative: MYSELF, AS INSTR, AND MR. A, AN INS RATED COMMERCIAL PLT, WERE CONDUCTING LCL TWIN ENG TRNING IN AN SMA AT PHK. AS HIS INSTR, I HAD BEEN TRNING MR. A IN SINGLE ENG PROCS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS. ABOUT 1 HR INTO OUR FLT I PULLED THE R THROTTLE BACK TO IDLE ON DOWNWIND AND MR. A WENT THROUGH HIS ENG FAILURE PROCS--MIXTURE, PROPS, THROTTLES FULL FORWARD, GEAR AND FLAPS UP, IDENT, VERIFY, AND AS PER MY PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS, ONLY POINT AT THE PROP CTL. I THEN GAVE MR. A 10 INCHES OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE TO SIMULATE FEATHER WITH A 0 THRUST SETTING. CONTINUING THE APCH, MR. A BEGAN TO ADD FLAPS AND REDUCE THE THROTTLE AS HE TURNED ONTO BASE LEG. AT THIS POINT ANOTHER ACFT TURNED A SHORT BASE IN FRONT OF US AND ANNOUNCED HE WAS TOUCH AND GO. MR. A CONTINUED WITH (AS PER MY PREVIOUS INSTRUCTIONS) A SECURE PROC INVOLVING ONLY POINTING AND SAYING WHAT HE WOULD DO IN AN ACTUAL SIT. AT THIS POINT MY ATTN WAS FOCUSED MAINLY ON THE ACFT ABOUT TO TOUCH DOWN IN FRONT OF US. AS THAT ACFT WAS ON THE RWY, MR. A FINISHED A FINAL GUMP CHKLIST AND WE CONTINUED THE APCH TO APPROX 300 FT AGL. AS I CALLED FOR THE GA, I SCANNED THE INS AND NOTICED WE HAD 10 INCHES OF MANIFOLD PRESSURE (ENOUGH FOR A 180 FPM CLB WITH 1 AT FULL PWR). MR. A PUSHED THE L THROTTLE FORWARD TO FULL, RAISED THE FLAPS TO 10 DEGS AND RAISED THE GEAR. HE THEN MAINTAINED BLUE LINE (VYSE), RETRACTED THE LAST 10 DEGS OF FLAP AND ROLLED IN APPROX 3 DEG BANK TOWARD THE LEFT ENG. WE BOTH HAD NOTICED A CLB PRIOR TO HIM RAISING THE GEAR, BUT AT THIS POINT WE WERE NOW DSNDING RAPIDLY. I TOLD MR. A THAT I HAD CTL AND HE TURNED THE YOKE OVER TO ME. I PUSHED BOTH THROTTLES FULL FORWARD (MANIFOLD PRESSURES BOTH INDICATED NORMAL) BUT WE WERE STILL DSNDING. I DID NOT FEEL ANY CTL PRESSURES (DEAD FOOT, ETC), SO THEREFORE DID NOT HAVE AN INDICATION OF A FAILED ENG. I THEN MADE SURE THAT THE GEAR AND FLAPS WERE UP AND THEY WERE. THE PROB WAS DETECTED ABOUT 50 FT AGL WHEN I BEGAN TO FIGHT ASYMMETRICAL FORCES THAT HAD APPARENTLY OVERCOME RUDDER TRIM OR THE STUDENT'S PRESSURES ON THE RUDDERS. AT THIS POINT I ELECTED TO NOT FEATHER THE ENG BECAUSE WE WERE TOO CLOSE TO THE TREES AND HOUSES IN FRONT OF US. I PROCEEDED WITH A RESTART AND FOUND THE R FUEL TANK IN THE OFF POS. I THEN TURNED IT ON, BUT TH ENG DID NOT START BEFORE WE LANDED GEAR UP IN A LOW CUT FIELD ABOUT 1 MI NE OF THE ARPT. THE FACT THAT MR. A HAD PREVIOUSLY DEMONSTRATED ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT HE WAS COMPETENT TO PERFORM THIS TASK LED ME TO RELY ON HIM AS MY ATTN WAS REQUIRED ON THE ACFT IN FRONT OF US. WHAT I JUST STATED, AND THE FACT THAT HE HELD CTL PRESSURE AFTER I TOOK CTL, CONTRIBUTED TO AND ULTIMATELY CAUSED THIS INCIDENT. TO PREVENT A RECURRENCE, THERE SHOULD BE A SAFETY BAR PLACED ACROSS THE FUEL SELECTORS TO MAKE THE PLT REALIZE WHAT HE IS DOING, INSTRS SHOULD NEVER TAKE THEIR EYES OFF OF THE STUDENT UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, PLTS SHOULD BE PENALIZED BY THE FAA FOR CUTTING IN FRONT OF OTHERS IN THE TFC PATTERN, AND A STUDENT SHOULD NEVER BE ALLOWED TO RUDDER TRIM A MULTI-ENG ACFT WHILE MANEUVERING WITH 1 ENG PULLED TO IDLE OR A 0 THRUST SETTING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.