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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1393005 |
Time | |
Date | 201610 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | PCT.TRACON |
State Reference | VA |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | Light Transport Low Wing 2 Turboprop Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Final Approach |
Route In Use | Other RNAV 14 |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Make Model Name | Medium Transport Low Wing 2 Turbojet Eng |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Route In Use | None |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Approach |
Qualification | Air Traffic Control Fully Certified |
Experience | Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 8.5 |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | ATC Issue All Types Conflict Airborne Conflict Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Working final east. Mulrr sector tells me he approved a point out (po) for RNAV 14 at gai because wooly obviously didn't care to look at which way iad was landing and did not follow SOP by calling mulrr instead of dulles final east (iadfe) for the point out to gai. Mulrr points the gai arrival out to me on the mulrr scope; no altitude was discussed; and I say 'yeah; that's good' and decide to keep all my downwind traffic at 4;000 feet to miss the gai arrival. I'm getting fed at 4;000 from mulrr and barin; downwind is at 4;000. All the sudden I see this aircraft X that is the po aircraft due west bound at 4;000 about to enter my airspace and within 60 seconds of losing separation with my aircraft Y who is in the departure west at 4;000 because I'm thinking the gai arrival will be at the initial approach altitude of 3;000. I base the aircraft Y and turn him to final and have to keep him at 4000 now that the wooly controller is at the correct alt of 3;000 and inbound to begka. I'm now a little higher with aircraft Y than I want to be since dulles final center (iadfc) needs me to be descending; although I did point the gai arrival out and explain that I will be a little high with aircraft Y. As soon as the gai arrival hits begka and diverges with my aircraft Y I rush aircraft Y down to 2500 or 2000. I can't remember what I issued initially; but I did ask him to hurry down because I felt I needed to be out of iadfc's way vertically. It was about this time that aircraft Z caught my attention. I had not been looking much south of dadey because all my attention was being given to miss wooly's gai traffic and get my aircraft Y out of the way and onto the 19L final. When I saw aircraft Z start to climb I stopped aircraft Y's descent at 3000; and aircraft Z was about 2500 and climbing. Aircraft Y then responded with the RA climb which I didn't' understand the pilot the first time. I then told iadfc that he was climbing and turning southeast away from iadfc airspace.aircraft Z never checked on to my frequency; nor did I try to reach out to him.this and 9 out of 10 RA's could be solved around this airspace if the bravo airspace wasn't the cookie cutter; plain; generic class bravo. The approach altitudes and IAF altitudes don't even comply with the bravo. There is no reason the iad bravo shouldn't be lowered at least 500' more in the areas surrounding the final approach courses. The fact that the airports have the most generic bravo and the most non generic airspace and approaches baffles me still. This bravo has been an issue since I've been in the building years ago and I know we've tried to change it several times for safety concerns like this. Yes; I could have helped avoid this situation; but I needed to be descending and I needed to be at 2500 and then 2000 for procedures and traffic and the insufficient bravo airspace does not safely allow that to happen.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PCT Tracon Controller reported a loss of separation between an IFR and VFR aircraft. He recommended modification to the Bravo airspace.
Narrative: Working Final East. MULRR sector tells me he approved a Point Out (PO) for RNAV 14 at GAI because WOOLY obviously didn't care to look at which way IAD was landing and did not follow SOP by calling MULRR instead of Dulles Final East (IADFE) for the point out to GAI. MULRR points the GAI arrival out to me on the MULRR scope; no altitude was discussed; and I say 'yeah; that's good' and decide to keep all my downwind traffic at 4;000 feet to miss the GAI arrival. I'm getting fed at 4;000 from MULRR and BARIN; downwind is at 4;000. All the sudden I see this Aircraft X that is the PO aircraft due west bound at 4;000 about to enter my airspace and within 60 seconds of losing separation with my Aircraft Y who is in the Departure West at 4;000 because I'm thinking the GAI arrival will be at the initial approach altitude of 3;000. I base the Aircraft Y and turn him to final and have to keep him at 4000 now that the WOOLY controller is at the correct alt of 3;000 and inbound to BEGKA. I'm now a little higher with Aircraft Y than I want to be since Dulles Final Center (IADFC) needs me to be descending; although I did point the GAI arrival out and explain that I will be a little high with Aircraft Y. As soon as the GAI arrival hits BEGKA and diverges with my Aircraft Y I rush Aircraft Y down to 2500 or 2000. I can't remember what I issued initially; but I did ask him to hurry down because I felt I needed to be out of IADFC's way vertically. It was about this time that Aircraft Z caught my attention. I had not been looking much South of DADEY because all my attention was being given to miss WOOLY's GAI traffic and get my Aircraft Y out of the way and onto the 19L final. When I saw Aircraft Z start to climb I stopped Aircraft Y's descent at 3000; and Aircraft Z was about 2500 and climbing. Aircraft Y then responded with the RA climb which I didn't' understand the pilot the first time. I then told IADFC that he was climbing and turning southeast away from IADFC airspace.Aircraft Z never checked on to my frequency; nor did I try to reach out to him.This and 9 out of 10 RA's could be solved around this airspace if the Bravo airspace wasn't the cookie cutter; plain; generic Class Bravo. The approach altitudes and IAF altitudes don't even comply with the Bravo. There is no reason the IAD Bravo shouldn't be lowered at least 500' more in the areas surrounding the final approach courses. The fact that the airports have the most generic Bravo and the most non generic airspace and approaches baffles me still. This Bravo has been an issue since I've been in the building years ago and I know we've tried to change it several times for safety concerns like this. Yes; I could have helped avoid this situation; but I needed to be descending and I needed to be at 2500 and then 2000 for procedures and traffic and the insufficient Bravo airspace does not safely allow that to happen.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.