Narrative:

TRACON gave us a release through our automated system for aircraft X off runway 13 climbing to 3000 feet on a 180 degree heading. Then they gave us a release 1 minute later for aircraft Y on a SID climbing to 3000 feet heading 180 degrees. I had cleared aircraft X for takeoff runway 13 on the south heading and put aircraft Y in position on runway 10. I shipped aircraft X to TRACON and waited about 1 minute for spacing then launched aircraft Y runway heading before turning to the 180 heading to give departure more room to clear aircraft X. As aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff on runway 10 heading I was doing my runway scan. As aircraft Y was rolling I noticed aircraft X turn eastbound still in my airspace south of the field at 2400 feet. Cab coordinator was quick to request runway heading for aircraft Y via the shout line. TRACON response was 'you asked for 180' and 'unable' at this time. Aircraft Y was already airborne and aircraft X was northbound 1 mile off the departure corridor. At this time cab coordinator and controller in charge were made aware of situation and were in communication with TRACON which provided us no answers. No coordination for turning aircraft X below the minimum vectoring altitude and crossing the departure corridor for a jet they had given us a release on that was already airborne. All I could do was point out the traffic to aircraft Y which advised the traffic was in sight. I apologized to the aircraft and advised we were not made aware of the aircraft that turned across his departure path. Once aircraft Y was clear TRACON had us turn aircraft Y to a 360 heading. Letter of agreements give control for turns on contact to TRACON with IFR departures. We are to assume IFR separation for successive departures. However in this circumstance TRACON turned an IFR aircraft below the minimum vectoring altitude and across a departure path of another release they had given without any coordination. In this circumstance when aircraft Y was cleared; aircraft X was still southbound. I noticed aircraft X turn east as aircraft Y rolled. We quickly tried to correct the situation with TRACON departure control. As aircraft Y was airborne aircraft X was northbound crossing its flight path. The aircraft had to have crossed paths with less than 300 feet vertical; leaving us with nothing but a traffic call due to poor coordination or a letter of agreement rule used it in an unsafe manner. My recommendation is cancel the letter of agreement for automated releases until TRACON and tower can coordinate proper IFR separation of departures or come to a better understanding of letter of agreements. This was an unsafe situation and I have been left searching for answers. As a controller I have always asked what else could I have done. In this situation with the aircraft already cleared there was nothing I could have done. I do not and cannot accept this answer when we are to be in safety atmosphere. Why did TRACON not coordinate the turn across the departure corridor knowing that an aircraft was coming off runway 10? Why did they continue to cross aircraft X when aircraft Y was departing and they were advised?

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AGC Tower Controller reported the PIT TRACON Controller turned a departing aircraft to a conflicting heading with another departing aircraft.

Narrative: TRACON gave us a release through our automated system for Aircraft X off Runway 13 climbing to 3000 feet on a 180 degree heading. Then they gave us a release 1 minute later for Aircraft Y on a SID climbing to 3000 feet heading 180 degrees. I had cleared Aircraft X for takeoff Runway 13 on the south heading and put Aircraft Y in position on Runway 10. I shipped Aircraft X to TRACON and waited about 1 minute for spacing then launched Aircraft Y runway heading before turning to the 180 heading to give departure more room to clear Aircraft X. As Aircraft Y was cleared for takeoff on Runway 10 heading I was doing my runway scan. As Aircraft Y was rolling I noticed Aircraft X turn eastbound still in my airspace south of the field at 2400 feet. Cab Coordinator was quick to request runway heading for Aircraft Y via the shout line. TRACON response was 'you asked for 180' and 'unable' at this time. Aircraft Y was already airborne and Aircraft X was northbound 1 mile off the departure corridor. At this time Cab Coordinator and Controller in Charge were made aware of situation and were in communication with TRACON which provided us no answers. No coordination for turning Aircraft X below the Minimum Vectoring Altitude and crossing the departure corridor for a jet they had given us a release on that was already airborne. All I could do was point out the traffic to Aircraft Y which advised the traffic was in sight. I apologized to the aircraft and advised we were not made aware of the aircraft that turned across his departure path. Once Aircraft Y was clear TRACON had us turn Aircraft Y to a 360 heading. Letter of Agreements give control for turns on contact to TRACON with IFR departures. We are to assume IFR separation for successive departures. However in this circumstance TRACON turned an IFR aircraft below the Minimum vectoring Altitude and across a departure path of another release they had given without any coordination. In this circumstance when Aircraft Y was cleared; Aircraft X was still southbound. I noticed Aircraft X turn east as Aircraft Y rolled. We quickly tried to correct the situation with TRACON Departure Control. As Aircraft Y was airborne Aircraft X was northbound crossing its flight path. The aircraft had to have crossed paths with less than 300 feet vertical; leaving us with nothing but a traffic call due to poor coordination or a Letter of Agreement rule used it in an unsafe manner. My recommendation is cancel the Letter of Agreement for automated releases until TRACON and Tower can coordinate proper IFR separation of departures or come to a better understanding of Letter of Agreements. This was an unsafe situation and I have been left searching for answers. As a controller I have always asked what else could I have done. In this situation with the aircraft already cleared there was nothing I could have done. I do not and cannot accept this answer when we are to be in safety atmosphere. Why did TRACON not coordinate the turn across the departure corridor knowing that an aircraft was coming off Runway 10? Why did they continue to cross Aircraft X when Aircraft Y was departing and they were advised?

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.