Narrative:

As we were getting ready for push; the lead ramper approached the small hatch to the left of the captain's seat. I had been planning to get up and brief him outside; but he initiated the brief himself. I am familiar with this ramper as I see him most of the days when I fly this assignment; and I know that he is a competent and safe employee. This was the second time I have been the captain of an aircraft being pushed back from a gate.the ramper seemed to cover all the bases during the brief; but there was a lot of 'shouting' as the high noise environment and small aperture for conversation required a few requests to repeat items--on both our parts. We began the push but the aircraft was pushed too far; placing the nose wheel on the taxi line (rather than the main gear being placed on the line; as had been agreed upon). I was waving at the ramper to stop the push; and then to pull us forward some; but he apparently didn't see me. He signaled me to set the brakes and I did so. At this point; an air carrier flight complained to ramp control that we had pushed too far and ramp control queried us as to why. We told ramp control about the lack of ability to communicate with our rampers and assured them we would be out of the way shortly. However; the rampers could not disconnect the tow bar for what seemed like several minutes. They were manually yanking on it so hard the whole aircraft was shaking. Meanwhile; we were getting more complaints because we had been pushed too far (external pressures were building).I kept trying to wave at the lead ramper to get his attention so that he could pull us forward some; but again he either didn't see me or was ignoring me. At some point he gave a certain vague wave or thumbs up which I could not interpret. I gave the 'brakes off' signal back to him; but it was meant more as a query. I'm pretty sure he gave me the 'brakes off' signal back; however it may have just been another wave. I am aware this signal is supposed to be a two-handed signal but I have seen many two-handed signals become one-handed signals for one reason or another. Keep in mind that at this point the tug was still right in front of the aircraft and the ramper was outside of the tug; returning to the driver's seat. The tug was not pulled away--back from the aircraft--where I had previously expected to get the thumbs up for 'all clear/ready to taxi.' meanwhile the external pressures from ramp control; other airlines; and wanting to achieve on time performance were also mounting. I thought the ramper wanted the brakes off again because he had either seen my signals to move us forward while he solved the tow bar problem; or that he had determined that the tow bar was not going to disconnect from the aircraft and had therefore decided to bring us back to the gate while the issue was resolved. I therefore disengaged the parking brake. We started rolling in complete conjunction with the tug. It looked; for all intents and purposes; as though we were under tow.after a few moments it became clear that we were not; in fact; connected to the tug. I stopped the aircraft; informed ramp of our situation; continued with the checklists; and cleared the area. All involved are incredibly lucky that the aircraft did not contact the tow bar; tug; or rampers. Significant damage to equipment and egregious injuries or even a death could have occurred. The only real issue here is the lack of ability to communicate verbally with the rampers. We absolutely must be able to talk to them via a headset. If they can't find the proper adapter to connect their headsets to our aircraft; why not provide a handheld radio through which we could communicate? We could use their company frequency or ours. Alternatively; require their company to provide a handheld radio for communication.this is also a very high workload evolution with a lot of time pressure. Industry standard is to have the fos call ramp control for permission to push while the captains coordinate with the rampers. Then the engine start checklist is performed by both flight crew member (as always); but the fos perform/monitor the actual engine start during push. The captains will; of course; keep one eye out for hot or hung starts; etc... But they are primarily concerned with the movement of the aircraft and the coordination of all personnel. Perhaps we could change the sops so that the fos start the engines while the captains are in charge of the aircraft; monitoring the push; and talking to ramp agents. This would work even in our normal operating environment of 'taxi out' rather than 'push back.' checklists would still be challenge/response. Again; this is industry standard.the change transmittal that went out to day will address most of the 'hand signal' problems but I honestly believe that this would have happened anyway. I intended to write this hazard report even before the change transmittal; because I think this could have happened at any time--even to someone experienced in performing push backs using only hand signals (is there such a thing?). For my own part; I have seen hundreds of pushes (albeit as an first officer and for an entirely different type of airline) and therefore I assumed certain things. I furthermore believe that the rampers have seen perhaps even more pushes and assumed certain other things. The first officer assumed we all knew what we were doing; but clearly that was not the case. Again; the ability to communicate verbally would have prevented this entirely. However; considering changing the sops so that the fos perform/monitor engine starts is also highly advisable.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DO328-300 Captain and Ramp Agent miscommunicated about pushback procedures which resulted in the aircraft being pushed onto an active taxiway then blocking other taxiing air carrier aircraft. The major problem was lack of an active communications method.

Narrative: As we were getting ready for push; the lead ramper approached the small hatch to the left of the captain's seat. I had been planning to get up and brief him outside; but he initiated the brief himself. I am familiar with this ramper as I see him most of the days when I fly this assignment; and I know that he is a competent and safe employee. This was the second time I have been the captain of an aircraft being pushed back from a gate.The ramper seemed to cover all the bases during the brief; but there was a lot of 'shouting' as the high noise environment and small aperture for conversation required a few requests to repeat items--on both our parts. We began the push but the aircraft was pushed too far; placing the nose wheel on the taxi line (rather than the main gear being placed on the line; as had been agreed upon). I was waving at the ramper to stop the push; and then to pull us forward some; but he apparently didn't see me. He signaled me to set the brakes and I did so. At this point; an air carrier flight complained to ramp control that we had pushed too far and ramp control queried us as to why. We told ramp control about the lack of ability to communicate with our rampers and assured them we would be out of the way shortly. However; the rampers could not disconnect the tow bar for what seemed like several minutes. They were manually yanking on it so hard the whole aircraft was shaking. Meanwhile; we were getting more complaints because we had been pushed too far (external pressures were building).I kept trying to wave at the lead ramper to get his attention so that he could pull us forward some; but again he either didn't see me or was ignoring me. At some point he gave a certain vague wave or thumbs up which I could not interpret. I gave the 'brakes off' signal back to him; but it was meant more as a query. I'm pretty sure he gave me the 'brakes off' signal back; however it may have just been another wave. I am aware this signal is supposed to be a two-handed signal but I have seen many two-handed signals become one-handed signals for one reason or another. Keep in mind that at this point the tug was still right in front of the aircraft and the ramper was outside of the tug; returning to the driver's seat. The tug was not pulled away--back from the aircraft--where I had previously expected to get the thumbs up for 'all clear/ready to taxi.' Meanwhile the external pressures from ramp control; other airlines; and wanting to achieve on time performance were also mounting. I thought the ramper wanted the brakes off again because he had either seen my signals to move us forward while he solved the tow bar problem; or that he had determined that the tow bar was not going to disconnect from the aircraft and had therefore decided to bring us back to the gate while the issue was resolved. I therefore disengaged the parking brake. We started rolling IN COMPLETE CONJUNCTION with the tug. It looked; for all intents and purposes; as though we were under tow.After a few moments it became clear that we were not; in fact; connected to the tug. I stopped the aircraft; informed ramp of our situation; continued with the checklists; and cleared the area. All involved are incredibly lucky that the aircraft did not contact the tow bar; tug; or rampers. Significant damage to equipment and egregious injuries or even a death could have occurred. The only real issue here is the lack of ability to communicate verbally with the rampers. We absolutely must be able to talk to them via a headset. If they can't find the proper adapter to connect their headsets to our aircraft; why not provide a handheld radio through which we could communicate? We could use their company frequency OR ours. Alternatively; require their company to provide a handheld radio for communication.This is also a very high workload evolution with a lot of time pressure. Industry standard is to have the FOs call ramp control for permission to push while the captains coordinate with the rampers. Then the engine start checklist is performed by both flight crew member (as always); but the FOs perform/monitor the actual engine start during push. The captains will; of course; keep one eye out for hot or hung starts; etc... but they are primarily concerned with the movement of the aircraft and the coordination of all personnel. Perhaps we could change the SOPs so that the FOs start the engines while the captains are in charge of the aircraft; monitoring the push; and talking to ramp agents. This would work even in our normal operating environment of 'taxi out' rather than 'push back.' Checklists would still be challenge/response. Again; this is industry standard.The change transmittal that went out to day will address most of the 'hand signal' problems but I honestly believe that this would have happened anyway. I intended to write this hazard report even before the change transmittal; because I think this could have happened at any time--even to someone experienced in performing push backs using only hand signals (is there such a thing?). For my own part; I have seen hundreds of pushes (albeit as an FO and for an entirely different type of airline) and therefore I assumed certain things. I furthermore believe that the rampers have seen perhaps even more pushes and assumed certain other things. The FO assumed we all knew what we were doing; but clearly that was not the case. Again; the ability to communicate verbally would have prevented this entirely. HOWEVER; considering changing the SOPs so that the FOs perform/monitor engine starts is also highly advisable.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.