Narrative:

Aircraft previously on MEL 28-40-xy; cleared on the day prior. Ferry flight with 11000lbs. Fuel on board received a fuel transfer inoperative message on the EICAS. Performed the fuel transfer system inoperative checklist from the QRH. Neither vtrl pump worked; despite indications to the contrary on the fuel systems page. Discovered that circuit breaker (circuit breaker) A1 behind the captain (ca) seat was pulled and collared. Apparently the clearing MEL 28-40-xy was not properly performed. As a cautionary measure the ca elected to manually turn off the vtrl pumps to prevent them from overheating.the ca pilot monitoring (pm) consulted with maintenance and dispatch via SELCAL; as ACARS messaging was not working (other aspects of ACARS seemed unaffected) on the merits of diverting; to the nearest suitable airport at that time. After consulting; the ca decided to continue to the destination as sufficient fuel remained in the wing tanks to safely complete the flight. Maintenance control requested the flight crew contact them after landing; but before parking at the gate. The flight crew called maintenance control after an uneventful flight to the destination. Maintenance control had the flight crew verify the status of the above mentioned circuit breaker A1 (behind the ca) and also circuit breaker D4 (behind the first officer); which also turned out to be pulled and collared. After resetting these cbs (per maintenance control) the ventral tank pumps performed normally in automatic; and override modes. The flight crew also operated this aircraft; earlier in the day. The situation could not be detected due to the lower fuel on board for that segment; which did not require the ventral tank to be fueled.1. ACARS text messaging not working. Other parts; i.e. ATIS; seemed unaffected.2. These cbs are visually hidden when performing a standard preflight scan. Additionally; a review of fom ii; electrical; reveal the pictures of the distribution boxes omit any reference to the above mentioned cbs for the ventral tank pumps. Flight crews don't even know to look for them.3. Wide variation in maintenance experience. The previous MEL was cleared by a junior employee.4. Should the philosophy of not 'resetting' fuel circuit breaker in flight apply to a situation; where cbs remain incorrectly collared after the MEL has been properly cleared. Should this qualify as an exemption to the rule? 1. [Suggest] plugging holes in documentation and junior staff supervision. 2. [Suggest] communications between operations and flight crews rely singularly on ACARS; which breaks too often without adequate back-up; i.e. All our eggs are in one basket.3. [Suggest] all documents on electronic flight bag must have active links from each table of content page (TOC) and index to the respective contents.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB145 Captain reported of maintenance not properly completing the procedure to clear an MEL; resulting in two ventral tank fuel pump circuit breakers remaining out and collared.

Narrative: Aircraft previously on MEL 28-40-XY; cleared on the day prior. Ferry flight with 11000lbs. fuel on board received a Fuel Transfer INOP message on the EICAS. Performed the FUEL TRANSFER SYSTEM INOPERATIVE checklist from the QRH. Neither VTRL PUMP worked; despite indications to the contrary on the fuel systems page. Discovered that Circuit Breaker (CB) A1 behind the Captain (CA) seat was pulled and collared. Apparently the clearing MEL 28-40-XY was NOT properly performed. As a cautionary measure the CA elected to manually turn off the VTRL PUMPs to prevent them from overheating.The CA Pilot Monitoring (PM) consulted with maintenance and Dispatch via SELCAL; as ACARS messaging was not working (other aspects of ACARS seemed unaffected) on the merits of diverting; to the nearest suitable airport at that time. After consulting; the CA decided to continue to the destination as sufficient fuel remained in the wing tanks to safely complete the flight. Maintenance control requested the flight crew contact them after landing; but before parking at the gate. The flight crew called maintenance control after an uneventful flight to the destination. Maintenance control had the flight crew verify the status of the above mentioned CB A1 (behind the CA) and also CB D4 (behind the FO); which also turned out to be pulled and collared. After resetting these CBs (per maintenance control) the ventral tank pumps performed normally in AUTO; and override modes. The flight crew also operated this aircraft; earlier in the day. The situation could not be detected due to the lower fuel on board for that segment; which did not require the ventral tank to be fueled.1. ACARS text messaging not working. Other parts; i.e. ATIS; seemed unaffected.2. These CBs are visually hidden when performing a standard preflight scan. Additionally; a review of FOM II; Electrical; reveal the pictures of the Distribution Boxes omit any reference to the above mentioned CBs for the ventral tank pumps. Flight crews don't even know to look for them.3. Wide variation in maintenance experience. The previous MEL was cleared by a junior employee.4. Should the philosophy of not 'resetting' fuel CB in flight apply to a situation; where CBs remain incorrectly collared after the MEL has been properly cleared. Should this qualify as an exemption to the rule? 1. [Suggest] Plugging holes in documentation and junior staff supervision. 2. [Suggest] Communications between Operations and flight crews rely singularly on ACARS; which breaks too often without adequate back-up; i.e. all our eggs are in one basket.3. [Suggest] All documents on Electronic Flight bag must have active links from each table of content page (TOC) and index to the respective contents.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.