Narrative:

I was pilot in command PIC on a reposition flight. I thought the aircraft maintenance logbook was complete and I thought the ferry permit was adequate. We departed without a ferry write-up placed in the aircraft maintenance logbook.we were missing the statement in the logbook of 'released for ferry flight' entry as well as missing the statement of 'aircraft determined to be capable of safe flight per the attached ferry permit'. I thought the aircraft maintenance logbook was in compliance at the time I accepted the aircraft for flight. I also gave a detailed look-over of the ferry permit form. I checked the effective date; expiration date; the aircraft tail number; the two flight crewmember's names; and the purpose for the ferry preposition trip. And had a signature. With the logbook and the ferry permit in the flight deck; I incorrectly believed the aircraft was legal for a ferry flight. A detailed review of the [operations manual] chapter for aircraft ferry/reposition flights and I would have caught that these two logbook entries needed to be completed. In addition I dropped the parking brake without adequate departure fuel on board. But the before start check was never completed until we received proper dispatch release fuel. The aircraft never moved and no engine was started until we had release fuel on board.a reposition flight with two pilots is very different from what we normally do on a consistent basis in our work. My normal standard operating procedures were interrupted. My normal cadence and normal flows and procedures were non-standard due to it being a reposition flight. Such things as: no dispatch release needed to be signed and handed to a gate agent. No security form needed to be signed for exterior and interior security check. No cargo load report or passenger count. No gate agent. No terminal jet bridge to pull away. No flight attendants to close and arm all cabin doors. After I conducted the ferry/reposition QRH checklist; and arming all doors; I sat down and belted myself in. The flight deck door remains locked open per the checklist instead of closed like a normal flight. No APU to start; as it was inoperative. No flight attendant to state; 'bags stowed. Okay to close doors?' no ramp personnel on a headset to communicate with. No establishing communications with the pushback coordinator to check if the ramp is secure and clear below. No pushback tug. The exterior panel for steering disconnect; cockpit call; and headset jack panel was closed. Typically this panel is open. Typically the PIC will check in with ramp control via headset and state they are secure and clear below for parking brake released. I would typically state 'parking brake released; standby'. This procedure was absent as no ground personnel were on a headset. The second in command (sic) and I did a detailed standard departure briefing. Three additional checklists were required to be read in addition to a normal flight. A ferry/reposition checklist; a external pneumatic ground start check; and a cross bleed start check. We were a busy flight crew. I called for the preflight check. We finished the preflight check. A lot of the 'cues' or 'triggers' that we as pilots get used to conducting every day like 'muscle memory' were missing for this flight. And so a lot of the standard items were missing and I believe this interrupted my normal cadence; and rhythm; and I released the parking brake without departure fuel on board. Per the checklist procedures; fuel on board is not checked until the before start check is read. However per [company] standard operating procedures section of the [operations] manual states the brake can be released prior to takeoff data being received and prior to the before start checklist being completed. I realized the lack of fuel on board and I kept the parking brake set until we received fuel. A few minutes later the fuel truck arrived and we received proper departure fuel. It was then the seat belt sign came on and we could do our before start check. I then called for the before start check and we proceeded. I did my normal before start flow for beacon; sterile; thrust idle; toga press and steering off. We typically call for push back and coordinate with ramp for the beacon being on; parking brake released; and cleared to push. But again this element was absent. The aircraft was parked such that we could taxi out on one engine. We had a ground power unit off our nose. A external pneumatic air cart off our right wing. And so we never had the intention of starting engines or beginning taxi for takeoff with inadequate fuel. I made an honest mistake to release the brake early. I just got caught up in non-standard procedures and somehow got led into releasing the brake too early. At no time was it my intention to break a company policy or FAA regulation. There were many non-standard items that influenced my mistake of releasing the brake early. I will be sure to not let this happen again by introducing another layer of protection. We accepted tower's takeoff clearance and we had more than minimum takeoff fuel.this was my first reposition flight that was not at a jet bridge and that did not have a push back ground crew; nor anyone on the headset.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB175 Captain described some of the oversights and omissions that occurred during preparation for a ferry flight from a remote parking spot with an inoperative APU.

Narrative: I was Pilot in Command PIC on a reposition flight. I thought the aircraft maintenance logbook was complete and I thought the Ferry Permit was adequate. We departed without a Ferry Write-up placed in the aircraft maintenance logbook.We were missing the statement in the logbook of 'Released for Ferry Flight' entry as well as missing the statement of 'Aircraft determined to be capable of safe flight per the attached Ferry Permit'. I thought the aircraft maintenance logbook was in compliance at the time I accepted the aircraft for flight. I also gave a detailed look-over of the Ferry Permit form. I checked the effective date; expiration date; the aircraft tail number; the two flight crewmember's names; and the purpose for the ferry preposition trip. And had a signature. With the logbook and the ferry permit in the flight deck; I incorrectly believed the aircraft was legal for a Ferry flight. A detailed review of the [Operations manual] chapter for Aircraft Ferry/Reposition Flights and I would have caught that these two logbook entries needed to be completed. In addition I dropped the parking brake without adequate departure fuel on board. But the before Start Check was never completed until we received proper dispatch release fuel. The aircraft never moved and no engine was started until we had release fuel on board.A reposition flight with two pilots is very different from what we normally do on a consistent basis in our work. My normal standard operating procedures were interrupted. My normal cadence and normal flows and procedures were non-standard due to it being a reposition flight. Such things as: No dispatch release needed to be signed and handed to a gate agent. No security form needed to be signed for exterior and interior security check. No cargo load report or passenger count. No gate agent. No terminal jet bridge to pull away. No flight attendants to close and arm all cabin doors. After I conducted the Ferry/Reposition QRH checklist; and arming all doors; I sat down and belted myself in. The flight deck door remains locked open per the checklist instead of closed like a normal flight. No APU to start; as it was inoperative. No flight attendant to state; 'bags stowed. Okay to close doors?' No ramp personnel on a headset to communicate with. No establishing communications with the pushback coordinator to check if the ramp is secure and clear below. No pushback tug. The exterior panel for steering disconnect; cockpit call; and headset jack panel was closed. Typically this panel is open. Typically the PIC will check in with ramp control via headset and state they are secure and clear below for parking brake released. I would typically state 'parking brake released; standby'. This procedure was absent as no ground personnel were on a headset. The Second in Command (SIC) and I did a detailed standard departure briefing. Three additional checklists were required to be read in addition to a Normal flight. A ferry/reposition checklist; a external pneumatic ground start check; and a cross bleed start check. We were a busy flight crew. I called for the preflight check. We finished the preflight check. A lot of the 'cues' or 'triggers' that we as pilots get used to conducting every day like 'muscle memory' were missing for this flight. And so a lot of the standard items were missing and I believe this interrupted my normal cadence; and rhythm; and I released the parking brake without departure fuel on board. Per the checklist procedures; fuel on board is not checked until the Before Start Check is read. However per [company] Standard Operating Procedures section of the [operations] manual states the brake can be released prior to Takeoff Data being received and prior to the Before Start Checklist being completed. I realized the lack of fuel on board and I kept the parking brake set until we received fuel. A few minutes later the fuel truck arrived and we received proper departure fuel. It was then the seat belt sign came on and we could do our before start check. I then called for the Before Start Check and we proceeded. I did my normal before start flow for beacon; sterile; thrust idle; TOGA press and steering off. We typically call for push back and coordinate with ramp for the beacon being on; parking brake released; and cleared to push. But again this element was absent. The aircraft was parked such that we could taxi out on one engine. We had a Ground Power Unit off our nose. A External Pneumatic Air Cart off our right wing. And so we never had the intention of starting engines or beginning taxi for takeoff with inadequate fuel. I made an honest mistake to release the brake early. I just got caught up in non-standard procedures and somehow got led into releasing the brake too early. At no time was it my intention to break a company policy or FAA regulation. There were many non-standard items that influenced my mistake of releasing the brake early. I will be sure to not let this happen again by introducing another layer of protection. We accepted Tower's takeoff clearance and we had more than Minimum Takeoff Fuel.This was my first Reposition flight that was not at a jet bridge and that did not have a push back ground crew; nor anyone on the headset.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.