37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1399859 |
Time | |
Date | 201611 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | A319 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer) |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Person 2 | |
Function | First Officer Pilot Flying |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
Approximately 20 minutes into flight class I ECAM autoflt ap off; autoflt a/thrust off; autoflt rudder travel limit 1 all appeared. Aircraft was climbing in IMC with significant static activity occurring with very active st. Elmo's fire appearing on airframe. Both captain and first officer pfds displayed flight director failure flags. Numerous other automation failures were also detected (mcdu airspeed data missing; mcdu mode changes not correct; etc.). First officer was flying pilot and non normal procedures were accomplished (ECAM; QRH; ECAM follow up). Advised ATC of automation malfunctions and requested descent out of rvsm airspace. Advised dispatch and maintenance control of difficulties and requested additional guidance. Under maintenance control direction; reset facility (flight augmentation computer) 1 and 2 in an attempt to restore automation. Efforts were unsuccessful and flight continued to destination with first officer using raw data and hand flying with manual thrust. VMC conditions were encountered at some point thereafter and remainder of flight was uneventful. Maintenance advised that telemetry from aircraft suggested a tat (total air temperature) probe failure as probable cause for our automation failures.it is the flight crew's opinion that the static buildup and discharges were the possible cause of the automation malfunctions. If possible; the safety team could draft a communication to fellow flight crews of the possibility of losing automation due to factors not monitored by ECAM (tat probe failure); since none of the non normal procedures were of any use in determining what had malfunctioned and therefore caused some uncertainty for the flight crew as to the veracity of the ECAM warnings displayed.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A319 flight crew reported loss of multiple autoflight systems possibly related to the total air temperature probe; flight augmentation computer failure; or static discharges.
Narrative: Approximately 20 minutes into flight Class I ECAM Autoflt AP OFF; Autoflt A/Thrust OFF; Autoflt Rudder Travel Limit 1 all appeared. Aircraft was climbing in IMC with significant static activity occurring with very active St. Elmo's fire appearing on airframe. Both Captain and FO PFDs displayed Flight Director Failure flags. Numerous other automation failures were also detected (MCDU airspeed data missing; MCDU mode changes not correct; etc.). FO was flying pilot and Non Normal Procedures were accomplished (ECAM; QRH; ECAM Follow up). Advised ATC of Automation malfunctions and requested descent out of RVSM Airspace. Advised Dispatch and Maintenance Control of difficulties and requested additional guidance. Under Maintenance Control direction; reset FAC (Flight Augmentation Computer) 1 and 2 in an attempt to restore automation. Efforts were unsuccessful and flight continued to destination with FO using raw data and hand flying with manual thrust. VMC conditions were encountered at some point thereafter and remainder of flight was uneventful. Maintenance advised that telemetry from aircraft suggested a TAT (Total Air Temperature) Probe failure as probable cause for our automation failures.It is the flight crew's opinion that the static buildup and discharges were the possible cause of the automation malfunctions. If possible; the Safety Team could draft a communication to fellow flight crews of the possibility of losing automation due to factors not monitored by ECAM (TAT Probe Failure); since none of the Non Normal procedures were of any use in determining what had malfunctioned and therefore caused some uncertainty for the flight crew as to the veracity of the ECAM Warnings displayed.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.