Narrative:

I was working yorktown sector 50. I had aircraft Y on route direct wozee which takes the route of flight a few miles from sector 39. Sector 39 flashed me aircraft X climbing from 36;000 feet to 38;000 feet. Aircraft Y and aircraft X were traffic; so I called sector 39 and had him tell aircraft X to be level in 2 minutes or less referencing aircraft Y with a display of the traffic placed on sector 39's radar scope and the sector 39 controller acknowledged.my first instinct was to have aircraft stop at 36;000 feet; but I assessed aircraft X's climb rate when the handoff was initiated to me and determined his rate of climb would be sufficient to be level well within 2 minutes or less. After my coordination with sector 39 with the control instruction; I then took the handoff on aircraft X. A minute or two passed and I noticed aircraft X's climb rate diminishing. I then turned aircraft Y 30 degrees right; but did not do so in enough time to keep separation. I called sector 39 back and asked if aircraft X had reported level; but did not receive a response from the sector 39 controller. I elected a turn to the right because the upper level winds were from the west northwest and thought the aircraft would turn a little quicker with the help of the wind.after the turn was initiated; aircraft Y reported getting an RA and had the traffic in sight. I then advised my supervisor of the situation. When I was relieved from the position; my supervisor stated he had listened to the tapes and that I had called sector 39 with the control instruction approximately 3 1/2 minutes before separation was lost. My supervisor stated that as soon as I hung up from sector 39 with the control instruction; the sector 39 controller immediately told aircraft X to be level within 2 minutes or less with pilot concurrence. At some point; the pilot of aircraft X reported he was a little heavy and wasn't going to make the 2 minute restriction. The sector 39 controller advised the pilot that was okay. No coordination was ever given to me with that information. Had the sector 39 controller done so; I could have turned aircraft Y a little sooner and the sector 39 controller could have turned aircraft X and separation could have been maintained.if I receive a call from a controller advising me of a control instruction; if I or the pilot cannot make that work; I would immediately call the controller back and advise that could not be accomplished and to come up with a different course of action. Secondly; if someone is going to climb or descend an aircraft close to another controllers boundary; take a little initiative and look at the receiving controllers traffic to see if there are any conflicts. Although not required; it is a good and safe habit to have.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDC Controller and A321 flight crew reported not being able to make the time restricted climb and receiving a TCAS Traffic Advisory.

Narrative: I was working Yorktown sector 50. I had aircraft Y on route direct WOZEE which takes the route of flight a few miles from sector 39. Sector 39 flashed me aircraft X climbing from 36;000 feet to 38;000 feet. Aircraft Y and aircraft X were traffic; so I called sector 39 and had him tell aircraft X to be level in 2 minutes or less referencing aircraft Y with a display of the traffic placed on sector 39's radar scope and the sector 39 controller acknowledged.My first instinct was to have aircraft stop at 36;000 feet; but I assessed aircraft X's climb rate when the handoff was initiated to me and determined his rate of climb would be sufficient to be level well within 2 minutes or less. After my coordination with sector 39 with the control instruction; I then took the handoff on aircraft X. A minute or two passed and I noticed aircraft X's climb rate diminishing. I then turned aircraft Y 30 degrees right; but did not do so in enough time to keep separation. I called sector 39 back and asked if aircraft X had reported level; but did not receive a response from the sector 39 controller. I elected a turn to the right because the upper level winds were from the west northwest and thought the aircraft would turn a little quicker with the help of the wind.After the turn was initiated; aircraft Y reported getting an RA and had the traffic in sight. I then advised my supervisor of the situation. When I was relieved from the position; my supervisor stated he had listened to the tapes and that I had called sector 39 with the control instruction approximately 3 1/2 minutes before separation was lost. My supervisor stated that as soon as I hung up from Sector 39 with the control instruction; the sector 39 controller immediately told aircraft X to be level within 2 minutes or less with pilot concurrence. At some point; the pilot of aircraft X reported he was a little heavy and wasn't going to make the 2 minute restriction. The sector 39 controller advised the pilot that was okay. No coordination was ever given to me with that information. Had the sector 39 controller done so; I could have turned aircraft Y a little sooner and the sector 39 controller could have turned aircraft X and separation could have been maintained.If I receive a call from a controller advising me of a control instruction; if I or the pilot cannot make that work; I would immediately call the controller back and advise that could not be accomplished and to come up with a different course of action. Secondly; if someone is going to climb or descend an aircraft close to another controllers boundary; take a little initiative and look at the receiving controllers traffic to see if there are any conflicts. Although not required; it is a good and safe habit to have.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.