Narrative:

Thunderstorms were impacting the arrival gate into denver. We had one large cell in particular of moderate to extreme precipitation that was pushing all the arrivals over larks. At some point; denver tracon (D01) wanted us to transition to putting these arrivals over powdr instead; the parallel arrival west of larks. I called D01 and verified they wanted this; the reply was 'I'd appreciate that' and I told him we still had 4 more arrivals on the wrong side of that cell but will transition to powdr as soon as possible. The sector feeding us tried to get as many over powdr as quickly as possible but it just wasn't feasible with the four already over larks. I called D01 again to verify the aircraft would be routed 'point to point' and not on an RNAV arrival; they agreed.the #3 and #4 aircraft over larks; the last two in the larks gate; were aircraft X and aircraft Y ; who were deviating approximately 90 degrees off course for the weather. The r-side worked hard to keep these two separated and sequenced. D01 called and said they couldn't take #4; aircraft Y ; because they couldn't take 'side by sides' like we were feeding them. At this time; the #3 and #4 aircraft were 7.2nm in trail; and while we were only under instruction to give 5nm in trail; the parallel powdr route had 3 aircraft spaced at 20 miles; 14.6 miles; and 15.1 miles between them; not to mention these parallel arrivals were over 24 miles away from the two aircraft east of larks - hardly a 'side by side' situation and triple to quadruple the spacing they requested.D01 told me that point-out was approved with aircraft Y ; and to turn him west - which was directly back into the weather the aircraft were deviating around. I asked D01 if they really meant for us to turn aircraft Y into some of the highest depicted weather; he hung up on me. I called again and asked if this was the same controller I had coordinated exactly what I was now feeding them (see above); he said no. I asked if this was a tmc; he said no; he was a supervisor. I then asked to speak to the D01 arrival controller. Things got testy; and he hung up on me without letting me speak to the controller. The r-side told aircraft Y that D01 would not take him and asked if he could make a left turn; as they requested. He said no and could only go right. He ended up doing a 180 then turning east where he was put into a different stream.this is a recurring problem. Quite often you'll do some coordination with some voice - I say voice because we have no idea who we are talking to - only to be superseded by a different voice. The traffic management coordinators (tmc's) and supervisors at D01 do this on a regular basis. Coordination was already affected in this situation and we were doing exactly what was coordinated. Within minutes; a different person; in this case a supervisor; stepped in and nullified it creating an unsafe and totally unacceptable situation with an airliner who was doing exactly what we told him to do - which was exactly what D01 told us to do. This is not the first time D01 has told us to turn aircraft directly into high level weather; with the main emphasis on 'get him out of our airspace' or 'keep him in your airspace'; which the latter was used in this situation - regardless of the reality and direness of the situation.we don't know how qualified; or even if certified; on this positions these tmc's and supervisors are. Are they properly briefed and aware of the actual traffic and weather situation? Recent experience says they are not as they appear to jump on the line and make traffic calls that make no sense - or worse; are unsafe. It is unacceptable to agree to a plan; execute that plan; only to be told by someone not even working the position that the plan is null and void. We moved several aircraft around a large cell to make this work. We back-coordinated to set this plan in motion. We can't just be told; at the boundary with weather very close by to just take someone around. Not to mention the 'west' they wanted us to go was not only directly into the weather; but also directly toward the parallel stream of arrivals - all of which they already had hand-offs on. This was either gross incompetence; or a set up for a completely unsafe situation vis-a-vis aircraft into weather and aircraft into other aircraft. I asked more than once if this is what the 'controller' talking to me wanted; they said yes. Of course the biggest loser in this situation was the user. The D01 supervisor demanded action putting aircraft Y into an unsafe situation. We are briefed ad nauseam about weather and avoiding precipitation. Presumably D01 displays what we do; do they follow different rules? And this habit of not identifying oneself when we call a particular position has to stop. When I call arrivals; I want arrivals. I don't want a committee of non-controllers with marginal knowledge of the situation anywhere near my coordination. Again; this happens often at denver tracon and must end.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZDV Center Controller reported trying to coordinate traffic flows to the D01 TRACON during a period of weather deviations. The Center Controller was receiving conflicting instructions from different people at the TRACON. The Center Controller reports this is an ongoing problem when trying to coordinate with the TRACON.

Narrative: Thunderstorms were impacting the arrival gate into Denver. We had one large cell in particular of moderate to extreme precipitation that was pushing all the arrivals over LARKS. At some point; Denver Tracon (D01) wanted us to transition to putting these arrivals over POWDR instead; the parallel arrival west of LARKS. I called D01 and verified they wanted this; the reply was 'I'd appreciate that' and I told him we still had 4 more arrivals on the wrong side of that cell but will transition to POWDR as soon as possible. The sector feeding us tried to get as many over POWDR as quickly as possible but it just wasn't feasible with the four already over LARKS. I called D01 again to verify the aircraft would be routed 'point to point' and not on an RNAV arrival; they agreed.The #3 and #4 aircraft over LARKS; the last two in the LARKS gate; were Aircraft X and Aircraft Y ; who were deviating approximately 90 degrees off course for the weather. The R-side worked hard to keep these two separated and sequenced. D01 called and said they couldn't take #4; Aircraft Y ; because they couldn't take 'side by sides' like we were feeding them. At this time; the #3 and #4 aircraft were 7.2nm in trail; and while we were only under instruction to give 5nm in trail; the parallel POWDR route had 3 aircraft spaced at 20 miles; 14.6 miles; and 15.1 miles between them; not to mention these parallel arrivals were over 24 miles away from the two aircraft east of LARKS - hardly a 'side by side' situation and triple to quadruple the spacing they requested.D01 told me that point-out was approved with Aircraft Y ; and to turn him west - which was directly back into the weather the aircraft were deviating around. I asked D01 if they really meant for us to turn Aircraft Y into some of the highest depicted weather; he hung up on me. I called again and asked if this was the same controller I had coordinated exactly what I was now feeding them (see above); he said no. I asked if this was a TMC; he said no; he was a supervisor. I then asked to speak to the D01 arrival controller. Things got testy; and he hung up on me without letting me speak to the controller. The R-side told Aircraft Y that D01 would not take him and asked if he could make a left turn; as they requested. He said no and could only go right. He ended up doing a 180 then turning east where he was put into a different stream.This is a recurring problem. Quite often you'll do some coordination with some voice - I say voice because we have no idea who we are talking to - only to be superseded by a different voice. The Traffic Management Coordinators (TMC's) and supervisors at D01 do this on a regular basis. Coordination was already affected in this situation and we were doing exactly what was coordinated. Within minutes; a different person; in this case a supervisor; stepped in and nullified it creating an unsafe and totally unacceptable situation with an airliner who was doing exactly what we told him to do - which was exactly what D01 told us to do. This is not the first time D01 has told us to turn aircraft directly into high level weather; with the main emphasis on 'get him out of our airspace' or 'keep him in your airspace'; which the latter was used in this situation - regardless of the reality and direness of the situation.We don't know how qualified; or even if certified; on this positions these TMC's and supervisors are. Are they properly briefed and aware of the actual traffic and weather situation? Recent experience says they are not as they appear to jump on the line and make traffic calls that make no sense - or worse; are unsafe. It is unacceptable to agree to a plan; execute that plan; only to be told by someone not even working the position that the plan is null and void. We moved several aircraft around a large cell to make this work. We back-coordinated to set this plan in motion. We can't just be told; at the boundary with weather very close by to just take someone around. Not to mention the 'west' they wanted us to go was not only directly into the weather; but also directly toward the parallel stream of arrivals - all of which they already had hand-offs on. This was either gross incompetence; or a set up for a completely unsafe situation vis-a-vis aircraft into weather and aircraft into other aircraft. I asked more than once if this is what the 'controller' talking to me wanted; they said yes. Of course the biggest loser in this situation was the user. The D01 supervisor demanded action putting Aircraft Y into an unsafe situation. We are briefed ad nauseam about weather and avoiding precipitation. Presumably D01 displays what we do; do they follow different rules? And this habit of not identifying oneself when we call a particular position has to stop. When I call ARRIVALS; I want ARRIVALS. I don't want a committee of non-controllers with marginal knowledge of the situation anywhere near my coordination. Again; this happens often at Denver Tracon and must end.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.