Narrative:

We were approaching sjc at night on the hyp 2 arrival, and the first officer was flying the aircraft with the autoplt engaged. We had been cleared to 10000', and shortly before reaching the sau 120 degree right, ZOA cleared us to turn right heading 270 degrees to intercept the sjc 30L localizer. After intercepting the localizer I made a 'G/south alive' callout, and had just commented to the first officer that I was going to ask center if he still wanted us on his frequency when we were cleared to contact bay approach control. The approach control frequency was congested, and I was not immediately able to contact them. I noticed that the altimeter indicated 9800' and descending, and said, 'we need to stay at 10000'.' when the first officer didn't say anything or stop the descent, I applied enough back pressure to the yoke to overpwr the autoplt, stop the descent and initiate a climb. I told the first officer that we needed to maintain 10000', and saw that his hands were on the controls. He said he thought we had been cleared for the approach. We then established contact with bay approach, and we were asked to identify, cleared for the approach, and asked to identify again. I don't know if the identify requests were related to our altitude excursion or not; nothing was said about it. I then realized that the aircraft was now climbing slowly past 10100' and turning to the right. When I pointed out to the first officer that the autoplt was still in cws pitch and roll, he disconnected the autoplt and manually flew the rest of the approach (flawlessly). I wasn't paying much attention to xchking the INS. I was absorbed with listening to the chatter on the approach frequency. I didn't loudly and clearly say, 'I have the airplane!' when I took the controls, or, 'you have the airplane.' I felt we had been cleared to contact approach, and that center would not have cleared us for the approach. After fling 4 more legs with him the next day, I'm convinced that this was a language problem. The first officer had been recently hired by our airline, and had previously had a long career as a commuter pilot in his native puerto rico. I don't know if the ATC environment/procedures/phraseology that he was used to is significantly different. The first officer had 2 months' experience in the aircraft. It's possible that he hadn't yet experienced several F the 'gotcha' modes of this autoplt which all happened at once. When we were cleared to intercept the localizer, the intercept heading was selected and the approach mode was armed. The localizer (only) mode should have been armed, as we had not been cleared for the approach. When the autoplt is overpwred or the yoke inadvertently bumped, the autoplt reverts to control wheel steering. I don't know if the timing of the switch from center to approach had to do with workload or sector boundaries, but in this case it caused significant distraction in the cockpit. My guess is that approach's workload delayed the handoff; I know it delayed my clearance and contributed to my problem, which may have added to his workload!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: REPORTER ALLUDES TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF PLT OR FLT CREW EXPERIENCE LEVEL, COMPOSITION AND LANGUAGE BARRIERS IN AN ALT DEVIATION INCIDENT.

Narrative: WE WERE APCHING SJC AT NIGHT ON THE HYP 2 ARR, AND THE F/O WAS FLYING THE ACFT WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED. WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO 10000', AND SHORTLY BEFORE REACHING THE SAU 120 DEG R, ZOA CLRED US TO TURN RIGHT HDG 270 DEGS TO INTERCEPT THE SJC 30L LOC. AFTER INTERCEPTING THE LOC I MADE A 'G/S ALIVE' CALLOUT, AND HAD JUST COMMENTED TO THE F/O THAT I WAS GOING TO ASK CENTER IF HE STILL WANTED US ON HIS FREQ WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO CONTACT BAY APCH CTL. THE APCH CTL FREQ WAS CONGESTED, AND I WAS NOT IMMEDIATELY ABLE TO CONTACT THEM. I NOTICED THAT THE ALTIMETER INDICATED 9800' AND DSNDING, AND SAID, 'WE NEED TO STAY AT 10000'.' WHEN THE F/O DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING OR STOP THE DSCNT, I APPLIED ENOUGH BACK PRESSURE TO THE YOKE TO OVERPWR THE AUTOPLT, STOP THE DSCNT AND INITIATE A CLB. I TOLD THE F/O THAT WE NEEDED TO MAINTAIN 10000', AND SAW THAT HIS HANDS WERE ON THE CONTROLS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT WE HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE THEN ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH BAY APCH, AND WE WERE ASKED TO IDENT, CLRED FOR THE APCH, AND ASKED TO IDENT AGAIN. I DON'T KNOW IF THE IDENT REQUESTS WERE RELATED TO OUR ALT EXCURSION OR NOT; NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT IT. I THEN REALIZED THAT THE ACFT WAS NOW CLBING SLOWLY PAST 10100' AND TURNING TO THE RIGHT. WHEN I POINTED OUT TO THE F/O THAT THE AUTOPLT WAS STILL IN CWS PITCH AND ROLL, HE DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND MANUALLY FLEW THE REST OF THE APCH (FLAWLESSLY). I WASN'T PAYING MUCH ATTN TO XCHKING THE INS. I WAS ABSORBED WITH LISTENING TO THE CHATTER ON THE APCH FREQ. I DIDN'T LOUDLY AND CLEARLY SAY, 'I HAVE THE AIRPLANE!' WHEN I TOOK THE CONTROLS, OR, 'YOU HAVE THE AIRPLANE.' I FELT WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO CONTACT APCH, AND THAT CENTER WOULD NOT HAVE CLRED US FOR THE APCH. AFTER FLING 4 MORE LEGS WITH HIM THE NEXT DAY, I'M CONVINCED THAT THIS WAS A LANGUAGE PROB. THE F/O HAD BEEN RECENTLY HIRED BY OUR AIRLINE, AND HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD A LONG CAREER AS A COMMUTER PLT IN HIS NATIVE PUERTO RICO. I DON'T KNOW IF THE ATC ENVIRONMENT/PROCS/PHRASEOLOGY THAT HE WAS USED TO IS SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT. THE F/O HAD 2 MONTHS' EXPERIENCE IN THE ACFT. IT'S POSSIBLE THAT HE HADN'T YET EXPERIENCED SEVERAL F THE 'GOTCHA' MODES OF THIS AUTOPLT WHICH ALL HAPPENED AT ONCE. WHEN WE WERE CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE LOC, THE INTERCEPT HDG WAS SELECTED AND THE APCH MODE WAS ARMED. THE LOC (ONLY) MODE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ARMED, AS WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR THE APCH. WHEN THE AUTOPLT IS OVERPWRED OR THE YOKE INADVERTENTLY BUMPED, THE AUTOPLT REVERTS TO CONTROL WHEEL STEERING. I DON'T KNOW IF THE TIMING OF THE SWITCH FROM CENTER TO APCH HAD TO DO WITH WORKLOAD OR SECTOR BOUNDARIES, BUT IN THIS CASE IT CAUSED SIGNIFICANT DISTR IN THE COCKPIT. MY GUESS IS THAT APCH'S WORKLOAD DELAYED THE HDOF; I KNOW IT DELAYED MY CLRNC AND CONTRIBUTED TO MY PROB, WHICH MAY HAVE ADDED TO HIS WORKLOAD!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.