Narrative:

We were climbing in the nyc airspace during our departure. We were being vectored for traffic during the climb with an initial heading of 350 and 10;000 ft. I; as pilot flying; was hand flying the aircraft during the climb out and followed those instructions. Soon thereafter; nyc departure control requested an expedited climb to 10;000 ft for traffic; so I pitched up and slowed the aircraft to 200 kts; while requesting the flight guidance to be set to 'speed 200.'during the climb-out; we were rocked a bit by light turbulence and encountered icing conditions at around 8;000 feet which we briefly remarked about and created a minor distraction.I was considering requesting the ca (captain) (pilot monitoring) to turn on the autopilot at that time; but ATC assigned us directly to coate (our first waypoint) and handed us off to a new frequency in the same transmission. So I was waiting for the pilot monitoring to complete these tasks.the ca put us on a course directly to coate using our FMS and armed the navigation guidance. Afterward; he contacted the next controller.when the navigation was armed; I noticed the guidance was in yellow instead of magenta needles; which indicates that the GPS info was shared between both pilots; rather than using two independent FMS nav systems (which was available on this aircraft). Nevertheless; the guidance was still correct for navigating the plane.I was distracted by this minor issue (of yellow vs. Magenta); and reset my own FMS mode selection to see if I was using ca side data. This kicked the lateral flight guidance out of being correctly naved into roll (wing level) mode. I immediately set it back; but the lateral guidance was no longer coupled. I immediately transitioned to raw data from the RNAV RMI needle which I had prepared in advance.as all this was going on; the plane was still being hand flown at 200 kts full thrust and pitched up because I was relying on the vertical guidance which was still set for that earlier expedited climb. (This sets a very high pitch attitude reference)due to the previous distraction to my scan; the high pitch attitude speed hold guidance; and the ca's simultaneous check-in with a new ATC controller; I was right at 10;000 ft msl before I initiated my level off which is where the ca queried me about capturing the altitude of 10;000 ft. Thus; I overshot our assigned altitude by 300 ft and immediately pitched to recapture 10;000 ft.as a result of my rapid descent rate back to 10;000 ft; I received an RA because we were in the vicinity of a citation flying just below us at 9;000 ft. I held the altitude and 'monitored vertical speed' from the RA until we were clear of the conflict. The citation made a descent as a result of the RA. Once clear; I requested the autopilot to hold 10;000 ft; re-coupled the vertical & lateral guidance (and the captain went back on his own FMS for magenta needles); and we continued the flight uneventfully.threats: turbulence; icing; ATC handoff; ATC changes from vectors to waypoint navigation; while demanding expeditious climb; speed mode during climb to a level-off; sharing of FMS data; dense air traffic; task saturation; hand flying.errors: first officer pilot flying: not increasing level of automation and becoming task saturated; momentary fixation on irrelevant navigation status (magenta vs. Yellow) guidance; following coupled guidance to coate waypoint; using speed hold while hand flying; which will not guide for a smooth transition to level-off. Not anticipating level-off to 10;000 ft. Making a rapid correction after realizing overshoot.ca pilot monitoring: slow to recognize and point out threat of speed hold; late verbal or physical correction due to ATC communications around 10;000 ft. Having FMS naved to #2 side which created minor distraction over navigation needles; probably should have just 'fessed-up' to ATC immediately after our overshoot.ATC: assigned navigation & hand-off simultaneously around 10000 ft level-off which increased pilot workload significantly.navigation not properly coupled to coate due to fiddling with navigation source near critical level-off. Altitude overshoot. RA as a result of rapid correction following overshoot. If I encounter a question over flight guidance sources; I will make that a lower priority; especially when within 1000 ft of level-off.I will avoid using FMS speed hold near a level-off due to the threats of a very high G pitch change or an overshoot due to a change from high pitch to level in an instant; especially when hand-flying.due to our company policy to dictate flight guidance changes to the non-flying pilot; I was hesitant to request the autopilot or request a different vertical mode until the pilot monitoring was no longer task saturated with ATC calls; etc. In the future; I will not hesitate to reach up and activate the autopilot or change the guidance myself if the pm becomes task saturated and I am also getting saturated.really; this whole incident is a reminder that we need to abide by that old pilot mantra of 'aviate; navigate; communicate.' simply following that would have put our priorities toward flying the plane over questioning the navigation source; or responding to an ATC hand-off. Then I would have been focused on my scan and not overshot the altitude.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 First Officer reported becoming task saturated while hand flying during departure and complying with ATC revisions to the published departure procedure. The assigned altitude of 10;000 feet was overshot and the rapid pitch over to return to 10;000 feet caused a TCAS RA with a Citation at 9;000 feet.

Narrative: We were climbing in the NYC airspace during our departure. We were being vectored for traffic during the climb with an initial heading of 350 and 10;000 ft. I; as pilot flying; was hand flying the aircraft during the climb out and followed those instructions. Soon thereafter; NYC departure control requested an expedited climb to 10;000 ft for traffic; so I pitched up and slowed the aircraft to 200 kts; while requesting the Flight Guidance to be set to 'Speed 200.'During the climb-out; we were rocked a bit by light turbulence and encountered icing conditions at around 8;000 feet which we briefly remarked about and created a minor distraction.I was considering requesting the CA (Captain) (Pilot Monitoring) to turn on the autopilot at that time; but ATC assigned us directly to COATE (our first waypoint) and handed us off to a new frequency in the same transmission. So I was waiting for the Pilot monitoring to complete these tasks.The CA put us on a course directly to COATE using our FMS and armed the Navigation guidance. Afterward; he contacted the next controller.When the Navigation was armed; I noticed the guidance was in Yellow instead of Magenta Needles; which indicates that the GPS info was shared between both pilots; rather than using two independent FMS Nav systems (which was available on this aircraft). Nevertheless; the guidance was still correct for navigating the plane.I was distracted by this minor issue (of Yellow vs. Magenta); and reset my own FMS mode selection to see if I was using CA side data. This kicked the Lateral flight guidance out of being correctly NAVed into Roll (wing level) mode. I immediately set it back; but the Lateral Guidance was no longer coupled. I immediately transitioned to RAW data from the RNAV RMI needle which I had prepared in advance.As all this was going on; the plane was still being hand flown at 200 kts full thrust and pitched up because I was relying on the vertical guidance which was still set for that earlier expedited climb. (This sets a very high pitch attitude reference)Due to the previous distraction to my scan; the High Pitch Attitude Speed Hold guidance; and the CA's simultaneous check-in with a new ATC controller; I was right at 10;000 ft msl before I initiated my level off which is where the CA queried me about capturing the altitude of 10;000 ft. Thus; I overshot our assigned altitude by 300 ft and immediately pitched to recapture 10;000 ft.As a result of my rapid descent rate back to 10;000 ft; I received an RA because we were in the vicinity of a Citation flying just below us at 9;000 ft. I held the altitude and 'Monitored Vertical Speed' from the RA until we were clear of the conflict. The Citation made a descent as a result of the RA. Once clear; I requested the Autopilot to hold 10;000 ft; re-coupled the Vertical & Lateral Guidance (and the Captain went back on his own FMS for magenta needles); and we continued the flight uneventfully.Threats: Turbulence; Icing; ATC handoff; ATC changes from vectors to waypoint navigation; while demanding expeditious climb; Speed Mode during climb to a level-off; sharing of FMS data; dense air traffic; task saturation; hand flying.Errors: FO Pilot Flying: Not increasing level of automation and becoming task saturated; momentary fixation on irrelevant Navigation status (magenta vs. yellow) guidance; following coupled guidance to COATE waypoint; using SPEED hold while hand flying; which will not guide for a smooth transition to level-off. Not anticipating level-off to 10;000 ft. Making a rapid correction after realizing overshoot.CA Pilot Monitoring: Slow to recognize and point out threat of speed hold; late verbal or physical correction due to ATC communications around 10;000 ft. Having FMS NAVed to #2 side which created minor distraction over navigation needles; probably should have just 'Fessed-up' to ATC immediately after our overshoot.ATC: Assigned navigation & hand-off simultaneously around 10000 ft level-off which increased pilot workload significantly.Navigation not properly coupled to COATE due to fiddling with NAV source near critical level-off. Altitude overshoot. RA as a result of rapid correction following overshoot. If I encounter a question over flight guidance sources; I will make that a lower priority; especially when within 1000 ft of level-off.I will avoid using FMS Speed hold near a level-off due to the threats of a very high G pitch change or an overshoot due to a change from high pitch to level in an instant; especially when hand-flying.Due to our company policy to dictate Flight Guidance changes to the non-flying pilot; I was hesitant to request the autopilot or request a different vertical mode until the pilot monitoring was no longer task saturated with ATC calls; etc. In the future; I will not hesitate to reach up and activate the Autopilot or change the guidance myself if the PM becomes task saturated and I am also getting saturated.Really; this whole incident is a reminder that we need to abide by that old pilot mantra of 'AVIATE; NAVIGATE; COMMUNICATE.' Simply following that would have put our priorities toward flying the plane over questioning the navigation source; or responding to an ATC hand-off. Then I would have been focused on my scan and not overshot the altitude.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.