Narrative:

Ft worth center experienced an rdp failure. This basically allows the center computer to send and receive aircraft information to dfw's ARTS III computer, when TRACON reconfigured its fdep at approximately XA30 am. This is when the center computer rdp problem started. This situation was allowed to continue with an arrival and departure push to begin at XB00 am. I worked a handoff position and observed 2 airspace violations from the center into TRACON airspace. Several flts, no matter if we couldn't take the handoff, would have violated our airspace. One flight that the center was handing off had different beacon codes than what our computer said was assigned to the aircraft. The apparent cause was a new software program implemented by ft worth center loaded this morning. When the TRACON reconfigured, that sent the center's program into a loop. A simple solution to this and any future software is for the FAA to test these types of changes before implementation or use some type of error checking routine. Once again instead of the code they give us, the controller makes the system work.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: NEW SOFTWARE PROGRAM AT ARTCC CAUSES AN INTERFACE PROBLEM WITH APCH CTLR FACS DURING HANDOFF.

Narrative: FT WORTH CENTER EXPERIENCED AN RDP FAILURE. THIS BASICALLY ALLOWS THE CENTER COMPUTER TO SEND AND RECEIVE ACFT INFO TO DFW'S ARTS III COMPUTER, WHEN TRACON RECONFIGURED ITS FDEP AT APPROX XA30 AM. THIS IS WHEN THE CENTER COMPUTER RDP PROBLEM STARTED. THIS SITUATION WAS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE WITH AN ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE PUSH TO BEGIN AT XB00 AM. I WORKED A HANDOFF POSITION AND OBSERVED 2 AIRSPACE VIOLATIONS FROM THE CENTER INTO TRACON AIRSPACE. SEVERAL FLTS, NO MATTER IF WE COULDN'T TAKE THE HANDOFF, WOULD HAVE VIOLATED OUR AIRSPACE. ONE FLT THAT THE CENTER WAS HANDING OFF HAD DIFFERENT BEACON CODES THAN WHAT OUR COMPUTER SAID WAS ASSIGNED TO THE ACFT. THE APPARENT CAUSE WAS A NEW SOFTWARE PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED BY FT WORTH CENTER LOADED THIS MORNING. WHEN THE TRACON RECONFIGURED, THAT SENT THE CENTER'S PROGRAM INTO A LOOP. A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THIS AND ANY FUTURE SOFTWARE IS FOR THE FAA TO TEST THESE TYPES OF CHANGES BEFORE IMPLEMENTATION OR USE SOME TYPE OF ERROR CHECKING ROUTINE. ONCE AGAIN INSTEAD OF THE CODE THEY GIVE US, THE CTLR MAKES THE SYSTEM WORK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.