Narrative:

It was a very short flight; and I was expecting to land on 23L or 5R just like every single other trip to this airport over the years. Both of us have been on the aircraft for years.5-10 minutes into the flight; we requested the ATIS over ACARS.when the ATIS came in; advising us the airport was landing 32; I immediately recognized that as a threat to take seriously. Several things concerned me: 1. I had not been to gso in many months. 2. Neither of us had ever landed on that runway. 3. The ATIS included a NOTAM stating that runway 14 had been shortened to 5800 feet. Why? And did they simply forget to mention runway 32? Does 14 just have a displaced threshold; or is the actual pavement only 5800 feet? 4. Glancing at the airport diagram; how would we taxi to the terminal if we miss D1? Should we be ready to back-taxi.....or plan on making a left on a? Are any of those taxiways affected by notams? I only looked for NOTAMS affecting the taxiways that we normally use. Who can remember every NOTAM you read back at the departure airport?my main concern was the actual length of the runway. How could 14 be shortened to 5800 feet and 32 not be affected? Maybe the threshold for 14 is displaced; but we can't assume that. The first officer agreed.the first officer quickly briefed the visual approach for 32 in accordance with our robotic cultural standard. 'Visual backed up by the ILS...... Localizer freq...inbound course.......2500 until glideslope intercept.....da.....in the event of a missed.......MSA........PAPI on the left......touch down zone elevation.......no hotspots.......any questions? 'Nope. No questions. Your controls' my brain just tuned all that out. Today; I perceived the biggest threat for us to be the runway length. I wanted to know how much runway we had available. Could I trust the ACARS data we received? This had to get solved soon. We would hold if we had to. But not too long since we don't get much fuel on a nice day like this.approach gave us a descent to 4000; and I acknowledged the instruction.I had to check the NOTAMS on the release again; the answer would likely be there. If not; I'll ask the tower when I check in. So I pulled out the dot-matrix printed release on recycled newsprint and started looking through all the notams again. 32 reils OTS....'that's ok;' I think to myself....'it's daylight.' M6 sign not lit up........23L inner marker out of service...... Crane.... Crane.... Crane.... Tower..... Crane.... Tower..... New LNAV MDA for another runway.approach asked us if we saw the airport. I saw it ahead and to the left in the distance and the first officer gave me the thumbs up; so I replied that we had the airport in sight. We were then cleared for the visual approach to 32.the first officer (first officer) says '2500 for ulide'. '2500' I reply.back to the notams.....GPS 5R.....GPS 23L......something in my gut starts feeling very wrong. It is something deep in my subconscious I can't explain.approach hands us off to tower; and I try to check in. No answer. He is talking to a GA aircraft. I'll give him a minute.I find a NOTAM for 14 but not 32: tora 5800FT toda 5800FT asda 5800FT lda 5800FT.ok; tora....that's takeoff runway available. Toda.....takeoff distance available.....what the heck is asda?something feels wrong....I look up and see an antenna passing in the distance at our 2 o'clock. Closer and higher than it should be. In fact; it's higher than us!'what the hell?!?' 'you see that; right?' I say as I point it out to the first officer.'why did ATC give us such a low altitude? We have to [report] that.' I think to myself; and then out loud to the first officer as the antenna passes on our right.now I'm looking outside like a hawk. I find the airport again.....my brain starts doing the math.....'DME:14......close enough to 15..... 15 x 3.... About 4500 feet ...add in 800......we are at.....I didn't have time to finish.'caution. ......Terrain' I see a little amber square on the mfd in front of the airplane symbol. I don't see any obstacles outside. Doesn't matter.'let's go! Firewall!' I say.the first officer responds as trained and we immediately climb from 2500 to 4000 in a couple seconds. In the process we exceed vfe at flaps 1 by a couple knots for a couple seconds. I advise the tower that we need to break off the approach. We then receive vectors from ATC towards the east to rejoin the final for 32 for a normal landing.that giant antenna we saw as we passed is not depicted on the 23L chart that we always use. It is depicted on the ILS 32 chart; but with all the other things the first officer has been conditioned to say during an approach briefing; the real threats were overlooked. The pilot flying simply descended too low; too early during the visual approach. I was so concerned about possibly overlooking an important NOTAM affecting 32 that I failed to monitor the flying pilot properly.we visually passed the first antenna laterally by several miles. Neither of us saw the second antenna depicted on the 32 chart; but with the egpws warning; we climbed well above it. Without the warning; I estimate we still would have cleared the obstacle by at least 400-500 feet vertically; but neither of us will ever forget this flight. From now on; if I'm the pilot monitoring; I will mentally stay in the present moment with the flying pilot during the approach no matter how much experience he or she has.this was not complacency. I was too fixated on completing a task and didn't monitor properly. Never again.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Air carrier flight crew reported descending too early on a visual approach and generated a GPWS warning. Crew executed the escape maneuver and returned for a normal approach and

Narrative: It was a very short flight; and I was expecting to land on 23L or 5R just like every single other trip to this airport over the years. Both of us have been on the aircraft for years.5-10 minutes into the flight; we requested the ATIS over ACARS.When the ATIS came in; advising us the airport was landing 32; I immediately recognized that as a threat to take seriously. Several things concerned me: 1. I had not been to GSO in many months. 2. Neither of us had ever landed on that runway. 3. The ATIS included a NOTAM stating that RWY 14 had been shortened to 5800 feet. Why? And did they simply forget to mention runway 32? Does 14 just have a displaced threshold; or is the actual pavement only 5800 feet? 4. Glancing at the airport diagram; how would we taxi to the terminal if we miss D1? Should we be ready to back-taxi.....or plan on making a left on A? Are any of those taxiways affected by NOTAMs? I only looked for NOTAMS affecting the taxiways that we normally use. Who can remember every NOTAM you read back at the departure airport?My main concern was the actual length of the runway. How could 14 be shortened to 5800 feet and 32 not be affected? Maybe the threshold for 14 is displaced; but we can't assume that. The first officer agreed.The first officer quickly briefed the visual approach for 32 in accordance with our robotic cultural standard. 'Visual backed up by the ILS...... LOC freq...inbound course.......2500 until glideslope intercept.....DA.....in the event of a missed.......MSA........PAPI on the left......Touch Down Zone Elevation.......no hotspots.......any questions? 'Nope. No questions. Your controls' My brain just tuned all that out. Today; I perceived the biggest threat for us to be the runway length. I wanted to know how much runway we had available. Could I trust the ACARS data we received? This had to get solved soon. We would hold if we had to. But not too long since we don't get much fuel on a nice day like this.Approach gave us a descent to 4000; and I acknowledged the instruction.I had to check the NOTAMS on the release again; the answer would likely be there. If not; I'll ask the tower when I check in. So I pulled out the dot-matrix printed release on recycled newsprint and started looking through all the NOTAMs again. 32 REILs OTS....'that's ok;' I think to myself....'it's daylight.' M6 sign not lit up........23L inner marker out of service...... crane.... crane.... crane.... tower..... crane.... tower..... new LNAV MDA for another runway.Approach asked us if we saw the airport. I saw it ahead and to the left in the distance and the first officer gave me the thumbs up; so I replied that we had the airport in sight. We were then cleared for the visual approach to 32.The First Officer (FO) says '2500 for ULIDE'. '2500' I reply.Back to the NOTAMs.....GPS 5R.....GPS 23L......Something in my gut starts feeling very wrong. It is something deep in my subconscious I can't explain.Approach hands us off to tower; and I try to check in. No answer. He is talking to a GA aircraft. I'll give him a minute.I find a NOTAM for 14 but not 32: TORA 5800FT TODA 5800FT ASDA 5800FT LDA 5800FT.Ok; TORA....that's Takeoff runway available. TODA.....takeoff distance available.....what the heck is ASDA?Something feels wrong....I look up and see an antenna passing in the distance at our 2 o'clock. Closer and higher than it should be. In fact; it's HIGHER THAN US!'What the HELL?!?' 'You see that; right?' I say as I point it out to the FO.'Why did ATC give us such a low altitude? We have to [report] that.' I think to myself; and then out loud to the first officer as the antenna passes on our right.Now I'm looking outside like a hawk. I find the airport again.....My brain starts doing the math.....'DME:14......close enough to 15..... 15 x 3.... about 4500 feet ...add in 800......we are at.....I didn't have time to finish.'CAUTION. ......TERRAIN' I see a little amber square on the MFD in front of the airplane symbol. I don't see any obstacles outside. Doesn't matter.'LET'S GO! FIREWALL!' I say.The first officer responds as trained and we immediately climb from 2500 to 4000 in a couple seconds. In the process we exceed Vfe at flaps 1 by a couple knots for a couple seconds. I advise the tower that we need to break off the approach. We then receive vectors from ATC towards the east to rejoin the final for 32 for a normal landing.That giant antenna we saw as we passed is not depicted on the 23L chart that we always use. It is depicted on the ILS 32 chart; but with all the other things the first officer has been conditioned to say during an approach briefing; the real threats were overlooked. The Pilot Flying simply descended too low; too early during the visual approach. I was so concerned about possibly overlooking an important NOTAM affecting 32 that I failed to monitor the flying pilot properly.We visually passed the first antenna laterally by several miles. Neither of us saw the second antenna depicted on the 32 chart; but with the EGPWS warning; we climbed well above it. Without the warning; I estimate we still would have cleared the obstacle by at least 400-500 feet vertically; but neither of us will ever forget this flight. From now on; if I'm the pilot monitoring; I will mentally stay in the present moment with the flying pilot during the approach no matter how much experience he or she has.This was not complacency. I was too fixated on completing a task and didn't monitor properly. Never again.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.