Narrative:

This a/C (aircraft) has log history from the previous few days for the engine 1 reverser fault. On previous flight we received this ECAM just prior to departure. With mx we did a reset and received new [maintenance release] and continued to [our destination]. When about 40 minutes from landing we received the ECAM engine 1 reverser fault again. We completed ECAM and QRH. We discussed the event with mx and dispatch while airborne trying to determine proper action with a/C. With everyone's agreement we continued where we agreed to have mx defer the #1 reverser then continue to [with the return leg]. While enroute we completed landing distance calculations for inoperative thrust reverser. We landed in day VFR on dry runway. Contract mx met aircraft ready to defer engine 1 reverser. The mx technicians worked on a/C while talking to [maintenance control]. We did notice that the mechanics had engine 2 cowl open as well. We thought that they were just comparing valve positions vs no 1 engine. After they closed cowls and did a status check on the FMGC with [maintenance control] the technician signed off engine 1 reverser fault. Installed correct placards and we received new [maintenance release] from [maintenance control]. We reviewed the [maintenance release] for pilot actions associated with the deferral. We received rls #4 from dispatch and new takeoff data to reflect the MEL'd engine 1 reverser inoperative. I took a quick look at engine 1 to insure cowl was closed and the thrust reverser was locked out. I also ensured cowl on engine 2 was closed. With all proper paper work on board we did another release verify to ensure proper [maintenance release] and release number. Satisfied we closed a/C with passengers and departed. Per the [maintenance release] we made sure we saw correct ecams once fadec was energized (engine I reverser fault) then after engines were stabilized no over pressure. While enroute we made sure to do landing calculations for the landing with one thrust reverser inop. [Destination] weather was night VMC with dry runways. After touchdown I put the thrust levers in the reverse detent and we did not get a thrust reverser to engine #2! We get associated ecams now for both engine 1 and 2. While taxiing to gate I made comment that 'I bet the mechanic locked both reversers'. We called mx to meet a/C at gate. Once parking checklist was complete and all passengers deplaned I went outside to inspect a/C with the mechanic. As we walk around a/C both engine reversers were locked closed. The mechanic ask if both were deferred and I said only engine 1 was deferred. He then ask why #2 was locked and I said I have no idea! He said he would call [maintenance control] and look into issue. While we were outside the captain. Made a phone call to [maintenance control] as well to discuss the issue. We briefed next crew on issues.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The flight crew of an Airbus A319 reported that contract maintenance was asked to defer and deactivate the #1 reverser due to a fault; subsequent landing discovered that both #1 and #2 reversers had been deactivated.

Narrative: This A/C (aircraft) has log history from the previous few days for the ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT. On previous flight we received this ECAM just prior to departure. With MX we did a reset and received new [maintenance release] and continued to [our destination]. When about 40 minutes from landing we received the ECAM ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT again. We completed ECAM and QRH. We discussed the event with MX and Dispatch while airborne trying to determine proper action with A/C. With everyone's agreement we continued where we agreed to have MX defer the #1 reverser then continue to [with the return leg]. While enroute we completed landing distance calculations for INOP thrust reverser. We landed in day VFR on dry runway. CONTRACT MX met aircraft ready to defer ENG 1 REVERSER. The MX technicians worked on A/C while talking to [maintenance control]. We did notice that the Mechanics had ENG 2 cowl open as well. We thought that they were just comparing valve positions vs NO 1 ENG. After they closed cowls and did a status check on the FMGC with [maintenance control] the technician signed off ENG 1 REVERSER FAULT. Installed correct placards and we received new [maintenance release] from [maintenance control]. We reviewed the [maintenance release] for pilot actions associated with the deferral. We received RLS #4 from dispatch and new takeoff data to reflect the MEL'd ENG 1 REVERSER INOP. I took a quick look at ENG 1 to insure cowl was closed and the thrust reverser was locked out. I also ensured cowl on ENG 2 was closed. With all proper paper work on board we did another release verify to ensure proper [maintenance release] and release number. Satisfied we closed A/C with passengers and departed. Per the [maintenance release] we made sure we saw correct ECAMS once FADEC was energized (ENG I REVERSER FAULT) then after engines were stabilized no over pressure. While enroute we made sure to do landing calculations for the landing with ONE thrust reverser inop. [Destination] weather was night VMC with dry runways. After touchdown I put the thrust levers in the reverse detent and we did not get a thrust reverser to ENG #2! We get associated ECAMs now for both ENG 1 and 2. While taxiing to gate I made comment that 'I bet the mechanic locked both reversers'. We called MX to meet A/C at gate. Once parking checklist was complete and all passengers deplaned I went outside to inspect A/C with the mechanic. As we walk around A/C both engine reversers were locked closed. The Mechanic ask if both were deferred and I said only ENG 1 was deferred. He then ask why #2 was locked and I said I have no IDEA! He said he would call [maintenance control] and look into issue. While we were outside the CAPT. made a phone call to [maintenance control] as well to discuss the issue. We briefed next crew on issues.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.