Narrative:

I had received a message a day before from a friend asking if I wanted to make money for a ferry trip. With not much going on for the time being and interested in new experiences; I told him to send more details. The opportunity was to ferry the 172s to europe. I came in contact with the owner and over dinner; he seemed as it was revolved around business and insisting I do the trip for him listing all the positives about the adventure. The previous pilot who was supposed to conduct the trip had to cancel due to family issues and he needed a pilot last minute. I was still skeptical and knew about the risks and asked various questions about the ordeal; but the owner reassured that with my experience I would be fine. I gave in and agreed to do the trip for him. He told me to meet him at the FBO the next morning.anxious as I was with little sleep; I did show up. He gave me a packet with all the details and told me I could read it in the plane when I get to cruise. Before I took off; he wanted to speak to me about the ferry tank and how to operate it. The tank held 100 gallons of avgas along with the 53 usable in the wings. Takeoff and landing on wing tanks only and when I got up to cruise; burn off 1/3 of the left wing and then open the ferry tank valve and pull the fuel shut off valve on. The ferry tank will refuel the left wing. I filed an IFR flight plan; briefly looked at the weather; and conducted a preflight in an attempt to hurry since it was planned to be an 11-12 hour flight. My plan was that I was going to read the weather briefing in cruise in attempt to save time.the flight was planned from ZZZ to [the northeast coast] at 9;000 feet; with the first 7 hours going well. The smooth and VMC conditions calmed my nerves for what I was about to do. Winds were in my favor which expected to cut down on flight time. With previous altitude chamber training; I realized that I started to become mildly hypoxic. My mind was very sluggish and confused. Everything just snowballed from there. My decision was to descend to a lower altitude. I had noticed that when I was approaching the great lakes region; 'lake effect snow' was forming. At the time with my inexperience with the area; I had never heard of that term. I started to feel uncomfortable and needed to do everything to get out of possible icing conditions. I spoke with each ARTCC handling me if they could provide me with updates on weather enroute to my destination. He advised there was no one else flying in my area and information was limited. I also spoke with FSS. He had reported that top were at 10;000 feet and freezing temperatures were at the surface. My poor judgment told me to get out of the snow and climb above to be VFR on top. I slowly made my way up there. I started to notice my speed decreasing in the climb and in the cloud layer my plane was starting to accumulate a thin layer of clear ice. I was terrified at this point; I prayed I would just break out of top already. Center asked if I was on top yet and I replied 'no'; finally at 11;000 feet; I saw light. For only a minute after leveling off at that altitude; my engine started to sputter. Without thinking and muttering; I chimed to center and [informed them of my situation]. Unsure of my call for distress; the lead controller asked me to repeat. My engine started again and I was confused; I told him never mind. Big mistake. My engine then proceeded to lose power and from there I did confirm that I [did have an] engine failure. I had no success in restarting the engine.ARTCC had advised that I had [an airport] to my east for landing and they were to pause all departures and arrivals for me. He then handed me off to tower control in which he was giving me vectors for any runway. Luckily; I had a lot of altitude to work with. Tailwinds at the time were strong out of the west so I told him I would like runway xx. I carried my speed quicker and realized I would pick up more ice in the descent. As I remember;the controller vectored me for a wide left pattern for the runway until I broke out of the clouds with a 3 mile final. Under stress; I came in high on the glideslope and without thinking used my second notch of flaps. I then came to realize that I was encountering a strong headwind so I took out my flaps. I was going to be low on runway xx and knew if I was going to continue I would hit the approach lighting system (ALS). So at the last second; I veered right in an attempt to land on the taxiway. I touched down in the grass a few feet short of the pavement which sprung me up onto the taxiway. The aircraft then slowed to a complete stop and emergency vehicles moved in. They saw fuel draining out of my fuel vent and said I needed to get away from the plane.after receiving medical attention; I had reported to the responders that I felt very short of breath and they gave me supplemental oxygen. It took me nearly 24 hours for me to finally recover to breath normally. Although my pulse calmed down; I was still feeling the symptoms of hypoxia. They took me and towed my aircraft to the FBO. At the time I was very confused on why I lost the engine. I sat there had thought about possible reasons on why it occurred. I spoke with the owner and another pilot who occasionally does the trips. They told me they suspected icing which blocked the air filter. They also said they were curious to see if the aircraft would start up again. I told him I would try whenever I had the chance in an attempt to find the cause. After the fuel vent had slowed to a drip; I requested if I could be taken to the aircraft. I was given consent from airport rescue and fire fighting (arff) to start up the plane. With no success; I came to realize that the ferry tank was empty; but the wings were still full. I had operated it the way the owner instructed me to so I was confused. The special airworthiness certificate packet had stated that there is supposed to be instructions on how to operate it provided during flight to the pilot. Of course; I had no luck on finding that. The only instructions I remembered was the 1-2 minute spew the owner gave me.I feel as the contributing factors were get-there-itis; insufficient flight planning and poor judgment. There were three critical turning points which occurred that could have been avoided in this flight: hypoxia; icing and fuel starvation. Hypoxia is no joke. What I learned is that it can differentiate depending on the certain conditions; for me I believe the lack of sleep; eating and being at higher altitudes could have caused it. It affected my performance and decision making throughout the flight. With the icing conditions; I had encountered in climbs and descents; I should learn to watch for weather patterns in unfamiliar regions more closely. The idea of flying a bottom chain aircraft long distances is limiting. No boots; poor performance; no radar; oxygen; etc. It doesn't matter if the aircraft is brand new or however much time you have in the plane; it will still have the same limits in versatility. With these two factors contributing to the third; fuel starvation. To my own conclusion; I had operated the ferry fuel system insufficiently. The reason why the fuel vent was leaking was because the line that pumps fuel into the left wing pumped 14-15 gallons/hour when I was only burning around 8-9 gallons/hour. What I was supposed to do was switch back and forth between the left wing tank and ferry fuel tank. I ran out of fuel in the ferry tank which led to fuel starvation resulting in engine failure. I had thought it was going to be a self-sustaining system.overall; it was a difficult lesson well learned. It's a hard pill to swallow knowing that I had the perfect recipe for disaster. Theoretically; I was not supposed to make it out alive. I was traumatized enough; I vowed to never let this happen to me again. To never accept any sketchy opportunities without proper planning and research. I could have stopped and landed at the closest airport to continue the next day or even call it off. My will to get this flight done and not to disappoint customers out spoke my judgment. Not all flights go as planned; but we learn that this is aviation. Delay is always better than a disaster. I had proper reasoning and so many factors working against me; I should have just discontinued. I was the sole PIC during the flight and no one was there to tell me what to do. The red flags were peer pressure; time commitments; short notice; money; single engine piston over the ocean and lack of team members to fly along with. As you can see here; the risk assessment was already high before the flight was even conducted. I didn't need the money or flight time. Just breaking enough flight time for ATP; I thought of this as my last hoorah before I went to the airlines. It'd be a fun experience builder. I was wrong it does not matter what experience level you are as well because it can happen to anyone and I got to see it in a first-hand account. No one told me to do the trip and it could have all been avoided. With that being said; I am extremely lucky and blessed to be with helpful and caring people that day who saved me. They executed everything perfectly and I am able to come home to my family for [the holidays]. From that; I am able to build my moral judgment and character on future flights and my career. I feel as I now have the courage whenever I become a captain somewhere to be confidently decline if ever situated with a difficult problem and it will be valuable down my career. I can take a risk assessment next time I am faced with it. I will most definitely bring up this case as an example for future aviators in hopes they will never make the same decision I made that day and from that I am gifted to come out unharmed to be able to take the skies again another day.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C172 pilot reported an enroute divert after losing his engine. He missed the runway then landed short of a taxiway.

Narrative: I had received a message a day before from a friend asking if I wanted to make money for a ferry trip. With not much going on for the time being and interested in new experiences; I told him to send more details. The opportunity was to ferry the 172s to Europe. I came in contact with the owner and over dinner; he seemed as it was revolved around business and insisting I do the trip for him listing all the positives about the adventure. The previous pilot who was supposed to conduct the trip had to cancel due to family issues and he needed a pilot last minute. I was still skeptical and knew about the risks and asked various questions about the ordeal; but the owner reassured that with my experience I would be fine. I gave in and agreed to do the trip for him. He told me to meet him at the FBO the next morning.Anxious as I was with little sleep; I did show up. He gave me a packet with all the details and told me I could read it in the plane when I get to cruise. Before I took off; he wanted to speak to me about the ferry tank and how to operate it. The tank held 100 gallons of avgas along with the 53 usable in the wings. Takeoff and landing on wing tanks only and when I got up to cruise; burn off 1/3 of the left wing and then open the ferry tank valve and pull the fuel shut off valve on. The ferry tank will refuel the left wing. I filed an IFR flight plan; briefly looked at the weather; and conducted a preflight in an attempt to hurry since it was planned to be an 11-12 hour flight. My plan was that I was going to read the weather briefing in cruise in attempt to save time.The flight was planned from ZZZ to [the northeast coast] at 9;000 feet; with the first 7 hours going well. The smooth and VMC conditions calmed my nerves for what I was about to do. Winds were in my favor which expected to cut down on flight time. With previous altitude chamber training; I realized that I started to become mildly hypoxic. My mind was very sluggish and confused. Everything just snowballed from there. My decision was to descend to a lower altitude. I had noticed that when I was approaching the Great Lakes region; 'lake effect snow' was forming. At the time with my inexperience with the area; I had never heard of that term. I started to feel uncomfortable and needed to do everything to get out of possible icing conditions. I spoke with each ARTCC handling me if they could provide me with updates on weather enroute to my destination. He advised there was no one else flying in my area and information was limited. I also spoke with FSS. He had reported that top were at 10;000 feet and freezing temperatures were at the surface. My poor judgment told me to get out of the snow and climb above to be VFR on top. I slowly made my way up there. I started to notice my speed decreasing in the climb and in the cloud layer my plane was starting to accumulate a thin layer of clear ice. I was terrified at this point; I prayed I would just break out of top already. Center asked if I was on top yet and I replied 'no'; finally at 11;000 feet; I saw light. For only a minute after leveling off at that altitude; my engine started to sputter. Without thinking and muttering; I chimed to Center and [informed them of my situation]. Unsure of my call for distress; the lead controller asked me to repeat. My engine started again and I was confused; I told him never mind. Big mistake. My engine then proceeded to lose power and from there I did confirm that I [did have an] engine failure. I had no success in restarting the engine.ARTCC had advised that I had [an airport] to my east for landing and they were to pause all departures and arrivals for me. He then handed me off to Tower Control in which he was giving me vectors for any runway. Luckily; I had a lot of altitude to work with. Tailwinds at the time were strong out of the west so I told him I would like Runway XX. I carried my speed quicker and realized I would pick up more ice in the descent. As I remember;the controller vectored me for a wide left pattern for the runway until I broke out of the clouds with a 3 mile final. Under stress; I came in high on the glideslope and without thinking used my second notch of flaps. I then came to realize that I was encountering a strong headwind so I took out my flaps. I was going to be low on Runway XX and knew if I was going to continue I would hit the Approach Lighting System (ALS). So at the last second; I veered right in an attempt to land on the taxiway. I touched down in the grass a few feet short of the pavement which sprung me up onto the taxiway. The aircraft then slowed to a complete stop and emergency vehicles moved in. They saw fuel draining out of my fuel vent and said I needed to get away from the plane.After receiving medical attention; I had reported to the responders that I felt very short of breath and they gave me supplemental oxygen. It took me nearly 24 hours for me to finally recover to breath normally. Although my pulse calmed down; I was still feeling the symptoms of hypoxia. They took me and towed my aircraft to the FBO. At the time I was very confused on why I lost the engine. I sat there had thought about possible reasons on why it occurred. I spoke with the owner and another pilot who occasionally does the trips. They told me they suspected icing which blocked the air filter. They also said they were curious to see if the aircraft would start up again. I told him I would try whenever I had the chance in an attempt to find the cause. After the fuel vent had slowed to a drip; I requested if I could be taken to the aircraft. I was given consent from Airport Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) to start up the plane. With no success; I came to realize that the ferry tank was empty; but the wings were still full. I had operated it the way the owner instructed me to so I was confused. The special airworthiness certificate packet had stated that there is supposed to be instructions on how to operate it provided during flight to the pilot. Of course; I had no luck on finding that. The only instructions I remembered was the 1-2 minute spew the owner gave me.I feel as the contributing factors were get-there-itis; insufficient flight planning and poor judgment. There were three critical turning points which occurred that could have been avoided in this flight: hypoxia; icing and fuel starvation. Hypoxia is no joke. What I learned is that it can differentiate depending on the certain conditions; for me I believe the lack of sleep; eating and being at higher altitudes could have caused it. It affected my performance and decision making throughout the flight. With the icing conditions; I had encountered in climbs and descents; I should learn to watch for weather patterns in unfamiliar regions more closely. The idea of flying a bottom chain aircraft long distances is limiting. No boots; poor performance; no radar; oxygen; etc. It doesn't matter if the aircraft is brand new or however much time you have in the plane; it will still have the same limits in versatility. With these two factors contributing to the third; fuel starvation. To my own conclusion; I had operated the ferry fuel system insufficiently. The reason why the fuel vent was leaking was because the line that pumps fuel into the left wing pumped 14-15 gallons/hour when I was only burning around 8-9 gallons/hour. What I was supposed to do was switch back and forth between the left wing tank and ferry fuel tank. I ran out of fuel in the ferry tank which led to fuel starvation resulting in engine failure. I had thought it was going to be a self-sustaining system.Overall; it was a difficult lesson well learned. It's a hard pill to swallow knowing that I had the perfect recipe for disaster. Theoretically; I was not supposed to make it out alive. I was traumatized enough; I vowed to never let this happen to me again. To never accept any sketchy opportunities without proper planning and research. I could have stopped and landed at the closest airport to continue the next day or even call it off. My will to get this flight done and not to disappoint customers out spoke my judgment. Not all flights go as planned; but we learn that this is aviation. Delay is always better than a disaster. I had proper reasoning and so many factors working against me; I should have just discontinued. I was the sole PIC during the flight and no one was there to tell me what to do. The red flags were peer pressure; time commitments; short notice; money; single engine piston over the ocean and lack of team members to fly along with. As you can see here; the risk assessment was already high before the flight was even conducted. I didn't need the money or flight time. Just breaking enough flight time for ATP; I thought of this as my last hoorah before I went to the airlines. It'd be a fun experience builder. I was wrong it does not matter what experience level you are as well because it can happen to anyone and I got to see it in a first-hand account. No one told me to do the trip and it could have all been avoided. With that being said; I am extremely lucky and blessed to be with helpful and caring people that day who saved me. They executed everything perfectly and I am able to come home to my family for [the holidays]. From that; I am able to build my moral judgment and character on future flights and my career. I feel as I now have the courage whenever I become a Captain somewhere to be confidently decline if ever situated with a difficult problem and it will be valuable down my career. I can take a risk assessment next time I am faced with it. I will most definitely bring up this case as an example for future aviators in hopes they will never make the same decision I made that day and from that I am gifted to come out unharmed to be able to take the skies again another day.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.