Narrative:

This was day one of a three day sequence. It was also the first adverse weather; cold weather operation of the season at lga; and the first cold weather/deicing operation for myself and the first officer on the airbus fleet. When we arrived at [the] gate; the aircraft was covered in snow and ice; as expected. Light snow was falling. Deicing was being performed on the gate; with aircraft pushed back just slightly. We pushed back only 6' feet to be deiced; as per ramp control's instruction. This left very little room for deicing between the nose of the aircraft and the jet bridge. The tow bar and tug were still attached; and the jet bridge was only 15-20 feet away; at the 10 o'clock position off the nose. Off the right side of the nose of the aircraft was more ground equipment and then the taxiway. The deicing crew checked in and asked that the aircraft be prepared for deicing. It was; and they started deicing us.after approximately 25 minutes; the deicer came on the radio; and told us deicing and anti icing was complete. He told us what fluids and percentages were used in the process; as well as what time our holdover time started. We were then pushed back into the alley while we both entered the deice data into the [holdover time] application. We then started engines. I then noticed there was still ice was on left flight deck window on my side. I looked at the first officer's side; and there was ice there as well. I then leaned forward and looked down onto the nose of the aircraft and saw about an inch of patchy ice and snow on both the nose and radome of the aircraft. I then realized that I had not heard the spray of deice fluid near the flight deck during the entire deicing process. I then called the ramp tower and got the deicer back on the radio and told him they had not deiced the aircraft properly. He assured me they had. It was obvious they had not. I requested we be towed back into the gate and have a manager come to the aircraft.an aircraft that was behind us in the alley then came on the radio and told us it appeared that the fuselage also was contaminated. I spoke to [two] managers on duty who told me they were certified deicers; but neither were involved in the deicing of my aircraft. They assured me it would be done properly the second time. We then had to wait our turn to have the aircraft deiced properly. We started to run up against the 3HR DOT rule. We had the jet bridge return and door was opened. The 'opportunity to deplane and discontinue the flight' PA was made. Four people chose to deplane and discontinue the flight. We were finally deiced again and finally departed three hours late.this event occurred because the aircraft was not deiced properly and the required post deicing check was either not performed or performed inadequately. A review of the training for the deice crews may be in order. It [is] important to note that the post deicing check was not accomplished. If it was; it was performed poorly [since] a significant contamination was left on the aircraft.in reviewing the deicing information in [the manual]; I saw no clear guidance on deicing the fuselage. The clean aircraft policy is based on [regulations and policies]. The guidance; policies and restrictions focus on 'critical areas' as they should; however; I could not find any information on deicing the non-critical areas (i.e. Fuselage); aside from a description of the allowable amount of hoar frost on the fuselage and the post deicing check below.this is obviously an oversight. This makes me question the deicing training that the ground [personnel] take. Is their course material lacking this guidance as well? If so; it is understandable how poor training could lead to the situation I encountered.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain reported insisting he be deiced again after he felt his aircraft was not properly deiced the first time.

Narrative: This was day one of a three day sequence. It was also the first adverse weather; cold weather operation of the season at LGA; and the first cold weather/deicing operation for myself and the First Officer on the Airbus fleet. When we arrived at [the] gate; the aircraft was covered in snow and ice; as expected. Light snow was falling. Deicing was being performed on the gate; with aircraft pushed back just slightly. We pushed back only 6' feet to be deiced; as per ramp control's instruction. This left very little room for deicing between the nose of the aircraft and the jet bridge. The tow bar and tug were still attached; and the jet bridge was only 15-20 feet away; at the 10 o'clock position off the nose. Off the right side of the nose of the aircraft was more ground equipment and then the taxiway. The deicing crew checked in and asked that the aircraft be prepared for deicing. It was; and they started deicing us.After approximately 25 minutes; the deicer came on the radio; and told us deicing and anti icing was complete. He told us what fluids and percentages were used in the process; as well as what time our holdover time started. We were then pushed back into the alley while we both entered the deice data into the [holdover time] application. We then started engines. I then noticed there was still ice was on left flight deck window on my side. I looked at the First Officer's side; and there was ice there as well. I then leaned forward and looked down onto the nose of the aircraft and saw about an inch of patchy ice and snow on both the nose and radome of the aircraft. I then realized that I had not heard the spray of deice fluid near the flight deck during the entire deicing process. I then called the ramp tower and got the deicer back on the radio and told him they had not deiced the aircraft properly. He assured me they had. It was obvious they had not. I requested we be towed back into the gate and have a manager come to the aircraft.An aircraft that was behind us in the alley then came on the radio and told us it appeared that the fuselage also was contaminated. I spoke to [two] managers on duty who told me they were certified deicers; but neither were involved in the deicing of my aircraft. They assured me it would be done properly the second time. We then had to wait our turn to have the aircraft deiced properly. We started to run up against the 3HR DOT rule. We had the jet bridge return and door was opened. The 'opportunity to deplane and discontinue the flight' PA was made. Four people chose to deplane and discontinue the flight. We were finally deiced again and finally departed three hours late.This event occurred because the aircraft was not deiced properly and the required post deicing check was either not performed or performed inadequately. A review of the training for the deice crews may be in order. It [is] important to note that the post deicing check was not accomplished. If it was; it was performed poorly [since] a significant contamination was left on the aircraft.In reviewing the deicing information in [the manual]; I saw no clear guidance on deicing the fuselage. The Clean Aircraft policy is based on [regulations and policies]. The guidance; policies and restrictions focus on 'critical areas' as they should; however; I could not find any information on deicing the non-critical areas (i.e. fuselage); aside from a description of the allowable amount of hoar frost on the fuselage and the post deicing check below.This is obviously an oversight. This makes me question the deicing training that the ground [personnel] take. Is their course material lacking this guidance as well? If so; it is understandable how poor training could lead to the situation I encountered.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.